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Suurimmalle osalle vakuutusten ostajia Suomessa ja maailmalla hinta on tärkin tekijä 
vakuutuksen ostamiseen tai ostamatta jättämiseen. Samaan aikaan riskienhallinta on 
vakuutusyhtiöiden tärkein haaste. Käyttäjäpohjainen hinnoittelu telematiikan avulla pystyisi 
tarjoamaan tähän ratkaisun alentamalla huomattavasti vakuutuksenottajien vakuutusmaksuja ja 
tarjoamalla vakuutusyhtiöille mahdollisuuden hyvin tehokkaaseen riskienhallintaan. Teknologiaan 
perustuvia autovakuutuksia on jo myynnissä monissa maissa, mutta ei Suomessa. Tässä 
tutkimuksessa argumentoidaan sen puolesta, että sääntely Suomessa on vaikuttanut yritysten 
liiketoimintamalliin, mikä taas on vaikuttanut kilpailuun, mistä taas on seurannut tilanne, jossa 
vakuutusyrityksille ei ole välttämättä strategisesti järkevää pyrkiä kohti telematiikkaan huolimatta 
sen mahdollisista hyödyistä. Tämä on tutkimuksen lähtökohta, mutta sen tarkoitus ei silti ole 
ratkaista vain tätä spesifiä ongelmaa, vaan tarjota laajemmin yleistettävä mekanismi 
samankaltaisiin tilanteisiin muilla toimialoilla.  
Tutkimuksen kirjallisuuskatsauksessa tutustutaan, siihen miten disruptiivista teknologiaa voi 
käyttää kilpailuetuna, miten liiketoimintamallin innovointia voi käyttää kilpailuetuna, siihen miten 
sääntely vaikuttaa rajoittavasti liiketoimintamalleihin ja lopulta innovaatioiden ja imitaation 
suhteeseen. Kehitetty teoreettinen viitekehys auttaa ymmärtämään tutkimuksen tuloksia ja tukee 
lopulta esitettyä teoriaa.  
Jotta tutkimus voisi sekä antaa vastauksen Suomen vakuutusmarkkinoille, että tuottaa 
yleistettävän mekanismin muille aloille, “grounded theory” valittiin lähtökohdaksi tutkimuksen 
metodologialle. Tutkimuksen data kerättiin seitsemästä haastattelusta, jossa haastateltiin 
vakuutusyhtiöiden kilpailudynamiikan ja oman yrityksensä strategian hyvin tuntevia 
vakuutusjohtajia, jotka edustivat eri vakuutusyhtiöitä Suomesta. Haastateltujen avulla saatiin 
katettua lähes koko suomen autovakuutusmarkkinat.  
Tulosten ja teoreettisen viitekehyksen pohjalta tutkimuksessa tultiin tulokseen, että tiukka 
sääntely vaikuttaa liiketoimintamalleihin ja sitä kautta kilpailuun. Telematiikan ylittäessä yritysten 
perinteisen sietokyvyn epävarmuutta ja lain rajoja kohtaan, ja sen uhatessa tuottavaa nykytilaa, ovat 
vakuutusyhtiöt siirtyneet hitaasti kohti uutta teknologiaa.  
Lopulta tutkimuksessa argumentoidaan, että yritysten tulisi tehdä testejä vähentääkseen 
epävarmuuttaan ja ollakseen valmiita tulevien muutosten varalta. Lisäksi yhtiöitä neuvotaan 
muodostamaan strategisia yhteistyösopimuksia telematiikkaan ja autoilun tulevaisuuteen liittyvien 
tahojen kanssa parantaakseen kilpailuasetelmiaan, sekä lopulta vähentämään riippuvuuttaan 
autovakuutuksista. Tutkimuksessa todetaan myös, että sen tulokset saattavat olla hyödynnettävissä 
esimerkiksi terveysalan kehityksessä, suomalaisen taksi-alan murroksessa sekä kuluttajien 
pankkialan digitalisoitumisessa.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Research motivation and research gap 
 
”Gosh, I hate insurance companies!” is a sentence I hear every now and then when I tell 
people that I used to work for an insurance company. Usually when asked “why?” the 
people give answers like “they take money from me, but never pay me anything!” or “I do 
not know. For some reason however, they just annoy the living heck out of me!” Even for 
the people giving the latter, less precise answer, their dislike towards insurance companies 
usually stems from money, and the fact that they have to give up some amount of it in 
regular intervals to their insurance companies. 
Pricing customers as little as possible is a long-time dilemma for many industries, but 
especially for the insurance industry. Ferguson et al. (2003) state, that it would in fact be 
impossible for insurance companies to charge sustainable rates from their customers: on 
one hand the customers would deem this “one-price- for all” insurance too expensive and 
on the other hand the government would put pressure on insurance companies to lower the 
prices. When forced to lower the price under a sustainable level, the insurance companies 
must take advantage of customer selection to the highest degree possible. They calculate 
risks the best they can, and so those deemed to be less risky will get lower insurance 
payments and those deemed to be riskier, will have to pay a larger amount to compensate 
their higher risk of an accident. On average this is fair: an 18-year old BMW driver is 
probably a riskier driver than a 40-year old Kia Rio driver. Firstly, because the 18 years old 
has less driving experience, and secondly because his BMW has a more powerful engine 
and is statistically more accident prone. As said, on average this is true, but not necessarily 
on an individual level. Why could not the Kia Rio driver be the speeder and the young 
BMW driver a slow driver driving only on weekends? More importantly, none of the car 
insurance customers can really affect their insurance payments by driving less or better.  
These questions are now more relevant than ever in Finland. Telematics devices, which 
can monitor how, how much and where a car is driven, have become common and cheap 
enough, so that they can be used to track customers and send the precise information of 
them to the insurance companies, so that insurance prices can be more individualized. 
Insurances based on telematics-devices are already sold in many countries across the 
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globe, including the US, the UK, Switzerland and Italy to name a few. Nevertheless, no 
insurance product based on the technology is yet to be sold in Finland.  
From literature there is no clear answer to this. There are studies about usage-based car 
insurances from single companies, most notably a case-study from the Progressive 
insurance company by Desyllas and Sako, (2013), but no studies on any of telematics 
insurances in Finland. Matti Pohjola (2015) has studied the digitalization of financial 
institutions, but he too does not address the concept of telematics-based car insurances. 
From literature we can derive context on why companies might be hesitant towards 
innovation. For example authors like such as Porter (1985) or Mcafee et al. (2012) have 
written about using technologies as competitive advantage and authors like Teece (2010) 
or Kim & Mauborgne (1999) have made theories on business model innovation, which 
helps to understand how to best take advantage of new technologies. Herzlinger (2006) and 
Hwang & Christensen (2008) have explained how for the health care industry embracing 
innovations can be difficult and even a non-profitable action. Authors such as Liebermann 
and Asaba (2006) or Semadeni & Anderson (2010) have illustrated how companies deal 
with choices of imitation and innovation. Putting literature like this together, can give us a 
good perspective on why companies might be hesitant to embrace innovations and change 
their business models. However, if these writings are compared to the writings of Desyllas 
and Sako (2013) or for example Karapiperis et al. (2015), insurance industry would not 
seem to hold many restraints introduced in those writings. Instead, it seems like a perfect 
market for new innovations, with its high level of competition and need to increase 
customer value, which is why the Finnish insurance market needs to have a closer look. 
The literature explains the choices companies have to make in terms of new technologies, 
but it does not explore the role regulation can have in the business model creation and 
competition dynamics. This is where the research gap lies.  
1.2 Research Implications  
 
From the research gap, rises the research question of this study: “how slow-moving or 
traditional industries and companies react on disruptive technological advancements?” 
“Slow-moving” and “traditional” mean in this context companies that slowly move 
towards technological advancements in their offerings, or try to hold on to the current state 
of the competition, keeping the advancements as still as possible.  The question is 
formulated without the word “insurance” because although the question is looked through 
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the lenses of the Finnish insurance industry, and its decision-making process over the 
telematics-industry, the purpose of this study is still not just to solve this particular 
problem of telematics insurances and the Finnish market, but to be applicable to other 
industries and businesses as well. In other words; studying this topic through the lenses of 
the Finnish insurance market will give us a mechanism that is more widely applicable, and 
explains, not just this particular situation, but many others, where regulation plays a role in 
defining business models and competition. To some extent the theory generated in this 
thesis can be applicable to industries where other barrier of entry than regulation has 
created a profitable state of competition in the market. 
What was discovered in this study was that basically all companies face questions on how 
to use innovations for their advantage. Many times innovating first is not necessarily the 
best way to do that, but to wait for others to do it first and then to imitate those companies. 
To fully take advantage of the new innovations or technology, business model innovation 
is needed. Then again, regulation can have a strong impact on how the business model has 
been built. Interviewing the respondents of this study, seven well-informed insurance 
managers representing basically the whole Finnish car insurance market, it was found that 
the regulation does not even have to be too restrictive to affect business models, as long as 
it has an initial impact on how the business model was built, and is perceived as restrictive. 
From these findings a mechanism was found: when regulation affects business models and 
then the form of competing, and when the situation is mostly profitable to its participants, 
there is very little incentive for the companies to embrace new innovations as that might 
unbalance the profitable status quo of today. Although this strategy was deemed as sensible 
in this thesis, some actions to secure the insurance companies’ future are recommended in 
this thesis. The mechanism found is seen as applicable to the Finnish insurance market and 
other industries with strict regulations, but possibly also on markets with other high 
barriers of entry and a profitable competitive situation.  
The solving of the research question of this study meant solving some sub-questions as 
well. The first of the sub-questions is “How are the business models of regulatory bound 
companies constructed?” As was found out, the regulations force the companies to create 
similar business models, emphasizing the same processes, differentiation and underlying 
logic of the company.  
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The second sub-question is “How does the similarity of business models affect 
competition?” As the business models are similar, so seem to be the competitive measures 
as well. When the competitive situation is beneficial for the companies, they have very few 
incentives to use innovations as competitive measures in order not to disturb the 
competition.  
And finally “How do slow-moving companies react to the innovativeness of their 
competitors?” When the companies are benefitting from the status quo, this leaves them to 
a situation where they are hesitant to use innovations themselves, but they must be alert on 
the actions of their competition or outsiders in order to be able to imitate. As is found out 
in literature, imitation is not however necessarily any easier than innovating, leaving the 
companies with much ambiguity towards the future, even if they decide to favor imitation 
over innovation.  
1.3 The outline of the research  
 
After this chapter, we will take a look on the literature available on the subjects of 
innovation vs. imitation, disruptive technologies as competitive advantages, business 
model innovation as competitive advantage, and regulation as a limitation to business 
model innovation. The purpose of the literature review and the theoretical framework is to 
provide theoretical lenses, through which we can look the issues at hand. To understand 
what we know about the subject at hand, before discussing the findings of this study. What 
was found in the literature review was firstly that to efficiently monetize new technology, 
at least some business model innovation is needed, since what happens around the new 
product based on the technology is more important in that sense than the actual technology. 
This notion is supported among others by Mcafee et al. (2012), Constantinou and 
Kallinikosis (2015) and Porter (1985).  
Knowing that other activities than the technology itself hold great importance in taking 
advantage of the new technology, business model innovation was then studied. From the 
literature studied there, we could conclude, that in business model innovation uniqueness is 
the most important factor: a company can try to escape the current competition by either 
finding hidden or creating new customer value through business model innovation. This 
notion was supported by the writings of Teece (2010), Kim and Mauborgne (1999) and 
Chesborough (2010) among others.  
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From these points it can be concluded, that when innovation matches customer value well, 
and when a company is in a highly contested market, embracing innovation would seem 
like a good choice. However, we know that at least regulation can be a strong force 
affecting company embracing innovations or business model innovation, which is why the 
topic of regulations affecting business models was discussed. What was found from 
Hwang & Christensen (2008) and Herzlinger (2006) was that in the health care industry 
strict regulations protect profitable business models from disruptive technologies. In the 
health care industry the strict regulations are made to protect the public, but the regulations 
can sometimes be unintentionally restrictive too, as stated by Paraskepolou (2012).  Lucas 
and Goh (2009) also brought up, that companies with much less or no regulatory protection 
compared to the health care industry can be very protective over their old profitable 
business models when facing disruptive technologies.  
To some extent, what was learnt in the regulation part of the literature, explains why 
companies might not embrace innovations, but the literature in that part does not explain 
the difficult choices companies need to make when their competitors decide to innovate, 
which is an important aspect in competition dynamics. This is why we then look on 
literature about innovation and imitation. We start this part by Schumpeter’s (1950) 
classical notion on creative destruction. We then specify this through the writings of 
Aghion et al. (2001) and especially on their theory about how the incremental rates of 
innovation are more important than the individual rates of innovation against imitation. 
Liebermann and Asaba (2006) explain two different types of innovation they have found 
and Pepall (1997) continues on how the innovator can protect from imitation. Semadeni 
and Anderson (2010) introduce the follower’s dilemma explaining how both imitating and 
not imitating can have deep consequences for a company. Jenkins (2014) supports this by 
highlighting the difficulty over the decision on imitation. Finally Teece (1986) explains 
how imitator might sometimes be more successful than innovator. Using all this 
information Figure 1 was drawn to illustrate the difficulties the companies face when they 
have to decide between innovating, imitating or doing nothing.  
After exploring all this literature it was possible to create a theoretical framework, which is 
illustrated in Figure 2. With the help of the literature synthesis we can understand, that 
companies with profitable business models alongside with regulatory protection, can have 
great resistance towards embracing innovation. Then again, this is not the whole part of 
issue, but it should be noted, that for companies where the regulation is not actually too 
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strict, but has affected the form of the business model, it is more plausible that their current 
competitor or a third party engages innovation in their field of business, which means that 
that kind of company should be ready to make decisions over imitation even if it is not 
ready to innovate itself.   
Before moving on to the research itself, it was important to have a look on the literature 
about insurance companies and insurance business in general. This was done in order to 
highlight what makes the Finnish insurance field different to its foreign counterparts and to 
understand some basic and universal principles of the business. From the writings of 
Bickley (1967) and Ferguson (2003), we can get that risk management and price setting are 
very important and classical problems for insurance companies. Karapiperis et al. (2015) 
and Desyllas and Sako (2013) then again explain, that telematics based car insurances can 
be a solution to these problems and provide the customer value much better than the older 
car insurance products. From the articles of this part of the study we can also note, that 
consumers and managers across the globe share similar fears and ambiguity towards the 
new technology. Still the fact is, that the technology is in use in the US for example but on 
in Finland. Later, as we get to the results of the study, we can note, that there are 
differences between Finnish and foreign markets in terms of market size and customer 
volume for example, but clearly the biggest difference is the regulation and the competition 
dynamics.  
After going through the literature synthesis and the literature about the insurance business, 
we will explore in the methodology chapter: how, and for what reasons, was the study 
conducted the way it was. After this, we move on to discover findings and the different 
categories that emerged from the data through analysis and coding.  
After exploring the findings, we will discuss the relation between the findings and the 
literature synthesis. We will find that the answer to the research question explains that for 
some companies and industries, tight regulations mold the business models for certain 
shape, which then makes the competitive measures alike for all the companies in the 
industry. If this competition dynamic is profitable, there is little incentive for the 
participants of the market to shake the profitable status quo. We will also shortly discuss 
some advice to the Finnish insurance companies, on how they should move forward with 
the information provided in this thesis. It will also be explained how the theory that has 
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been created in this study is applicable to other circumstances as well. Finally, the thesis is 
concluded.  
2.  USING NEW TECHNOLOGY AS A COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE  
 
Even if a company decides to innovate, it needs to know how it will use the technology to 
its advantage. Disruptive new technology, meaning any new technology that better helps to 
offer customer value by radically changing the way an industry or a company operates, can 
be a powerful tool in competition, but it needs to be used properly as well. Today, new 
technologies are not just something that would come in steady intervals, but the whole 
global business environment is changing, and all companies need to be ready for this as 
well. One example of this ongoing technological change is information technology brought 
by digitalization. A new form of technology based on this development are the telematics-
based car insurances. 
According to Miles (1989), companies of the 21st century need to be more flexible and 
faster to change than their predecessors. He sees, that the accelerating pace of the 
technological progress means, that competition everywhere has become tougher and more 
global. No company, according to him, can escape this change, and should be prepared for 
it in order to survive. He sees, that the companies of today need to be especially prepared 
to change their organizational structure to meet the needs of today.  
Information technology, has according to Contantinou & Kallinikos (2015) been a way to 
create competitive advantage for companies for a long time now, providing possibilities for 
disruptive technologies. However, previously the gathering of the data has been more static 
then it is today: the information has been updated in certain intervals (for example each 
quarter) and there has been less of it available. Older theories about information 
technology in general are useful when trying to understand on what premises companies 
have acted before, but to understand how they should or might change their current 
strategies because of the new information technology we should take a closer look on 
theories about the current possibilities of the disruptive technology emerging from 
information technology, or in other words: big data.  
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McAfee et al. (2012) describe big data as analytics which is unique in its “volume, velocity 
and variety” meaning that there is more information available than ever before, with higher 
speed and more accurately, and that data can be collected from various different sources. 
However, Davenport (2014) then again finds it more difficult to accurately describe big 
data and even finds the term somewhat misleading but sees it nevertheless as an “umbrella-
term for new massive data types that have emerged in the last decade”. Both McAfee et al. 
and Davenport (2012,2014) see big data nevertheless as something that will have a 
profound impact on businesses, implying to its disruptive nature.  
Big data is not just a new version of data analytics but it is something that defines a new 
completely new era, where data analytics can have rigorous impact on business decision 
making (McAfee et al., 2012). McAfee et al. (2012) also found out in their research that 
overall performance of the firm improved when they embraced the change to data-driven 
market compared to those firms which did not state to be data-driven. So how can 
companies use this change to their advantage? McAfee et al. (2012) list five different 
challenges a company must address, before it can gain full benefits of being a data-driven 
company. Firstly, having more or better data does not cut it, but “human values” such as 
vision and human-insight (leadership) is required. Secondly, skilled data scientists are 
needed to process the new influx of potential information. Thirdly, the new technology that 
has emerged to analyze the data is not sufficient at its own, but needs skilled workers to 
use it. Fourthly, the organizational structure must be modified so, that the right people get 
to use both the available new data and the people who can analyze it. Finally, the 
corporation must change the way it thinks.   
 The human-side of big data is supported by Thomas Davenport (2014) and Alnori 
Bhimaan too (2015). The main point for all of them concerning that is, that big data by 
itself does not create value but it needs to be properly used, to harvest all the available 
value. Davenport (2014) goes as far as to predict that managers will still use their “hunch” 
with big data available, as they have mostly done so with modern analytics available as 
well.  What this means is, that although big data provides tremendous possibilities for 
managers it will not take away their job: managerial decisions are still extremely important 
and human aspect has strong meaning in creating value. To use an analogy: there is a new 
tool available to create a strategic advantage but to get the advantage one needs to actually 
use the tool.  
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Constantinou & Kalinikosis (2015) emphasize the real-time nature of big data and the 
importance of choosing the right numbers to analyze. They note that one should be 
cautious when using big data to modify the company strategy. Although they do not say it 
directly, what they mean is similar to the other authors we have discussed; the human-
aspect matters significantly when using big data, both in business operations and in 
creating a new strategy. As we already stated: big data is not a solution to generate a new 
strategy but rather a tool for it. Related to strategy-creation, Constantinou & Kalinikos 
(2015) note, that as big data with its massive volume and timeliness differs significantly 
from the data that has been used previously for strategy making, it cannot be used to create 
new strategies with the old methods. This is an important point concerning the topic of 
telematics insurances. For example traditional insurances are based on proxy-factors 
gathered from the customers as he/she buys the new vehicle. Big data (telematics) based 
insurance then again, is not based on one-time information but to a constant (or a long 
time) influx of massive amount of information. Surely old strategies need to be changed in 
this case as well.  
In his book “Big Data at Work” Thomas Davenport (2014) brings up not only the 
possibilities of big data in company operations but also its use in creating new offerings. 
He mentions how LinkedIn has managed to use big data in both customer acquisition and 
retention and brings up Google, Netflix and Kaplan as success stories too. Davenport 
(2014) sees these companies as examples in that in order to create a successful big data-
based product or service, the technical side needs to work together with product 
development and marketing. Bhimani (2015) adds to this, that the customers will also have 
an important role in developing the big-data based products, since the products or services 
are based on their behavior. In short: we need to concentrate on the business and 
managerial actions instead of too much on the product itself.  
The authors also remind of the short-term nature of big data. According to them big data is 
something that tells much about the present, but might not tell us what we need to know in 
order to determine what is going to happen in the future. Taken into account what we have 
discussed earlier, it would seem, that this is a question of management and human 
capabilities again. Constantinou & Kalinikos (2015) 
Even before big-data was even introduced as a concept, Porter & Millar (1985) already 
stressed the possibilities of information technology in creating a competitive advantage, 
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and noticed how it can affect all the “five forces of Porter” meaning “bargaining power of 
suppliers”, “threat of new entrants”, “bargaining power of buyers”, “threat of substitute 
products or services” and “rivalry among existing competitors” (Porter & Millar, 1985).  
Not just information technology in general but big data technologies are sure to affect all 
these forces as well. We noted already, that big data enables companies to create new 
services and products. These are sure to affect the rivalry among competitors, threat of new 
entrants and the threat of substitute products or services. The authors of big data do discuss 
its implications on the overall value chain of a company, which would match with the 
powers of suppliers and buyers. When Porter (1985) advices the companies to use 
information technology, he emphasizes decision-making and the analysis of the new 
technology. This correlates to what the big-data authors wrote about the human side of the 
implementation. The new technology by itself does not mean instant success, but to get full 
advantage of it, the right managerial decisions are crucial.   
 
Table 1: How disruptive technology (big data) forces business model changes (McAfee et al. (2012) and Porter (1985)) 
 
Looking at the Table 1 above, one can understand that disruptive technologies (such as big 
data) can affect every part of a business. If new information technologies affect every side 
of the Porter’s five forces as stated by Porter (1985) for a company, it is easy to imagine 
that for that company to succeed, it does eventually need to take actions in those area that 
McAfee et al. (2012) listed, which can mean significant reorganizing. It seems, that no 
matter whether are you introducing new disruptive technology or your competitors has 
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brought the disruptive technology to the market, you will need to make big changes to your 
organization. This is what leads us to the next topic of business model innovation.  
 
 
 
3. BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION AS A COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE 
 
As we learnt, to fully take advantage of an innovation can mean profound impact to the 
whole strategy of a company. To change the strategy of a company means changing its 
business model: a concept which Teece (2010, p. 172) names as “the business logic 
required to earn a profit”. Business model innovation means then making fundamental 
changes to this logic.  
Teece (2010) sees, that because of the advancements made in communications and 
computing technologies consumers now have more options than ever, meaning that their 
needs and alternatives are various. According to him, without a good business model a 
company is unable to address the needs of the customers or fully monetize on their 
offering(s). Teece (2010) points out, that firms might be completely unable to benefit from 
new product or service innovations without proper business model innovation. Business 
model design and strategic analysis are according to him – “vital” for a new innovations 
success.  
To make a business model work, it should not be just a “logical way of doing business”, 
but also created so that it answers the customers’ needs. Also, the model should be hard or 
impossible to replicate for others.  This does not necessarily mean strong intellectual 
property rights, but can also mean the difficulty of organizing supplier-chains or relations 
with alliance partners. (Teece, 2010)  
According to Kim and Mauborgne (1999) companies in established industries tend to 
match their strategies, because they see that “this is how we compete in our industry or 
strategic group”. They note, that the more the companies rely on competing in these similar 
strategies, the fiercer the competition, leading the companies to compete in cost or quality 
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or both. However, the authors see too, that companies can generate value by looking value 
beyond the conventional boundaries of competition. This notion is exactly the reason, 
which provides the possibility for business model innovation. Matching strategies might 
feel, and can actually be, safe for the company and its shareholders but that might prevent 
the company from looking outside the box. Engaging in business model innovation might 
provide a company a chance to get out of the fierce competition of cost and quality that 
strategy matching generates.  
Firstly, Kim and Mauborgne (1999) suggest companies that want to find this “external 
value” to look across substitute industries: to see who they are really competing against. 
For example, a taxi company is not competing against other taxis but against trains and 
buses too for example.  The main point in looking across substitute industries is to 
understand the customers and to see what they really get out of the product: what is the 
value to them in using the company’s offering? Teece (2010) notes too, that when 
evaluating a provisional business model (“provisional” in the sense, that all business 
models can be argued to be eventually displaced by another, more suitable model) a 
company needs to look for “competitive offerings” and “how the product offers a solution 
to the customers’ problem?” Both of these notions are similar findings then those of Kim 
& Mauborgne (1999). 
Secondly, companies should look “across strategies groups within industry” (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1999). This means, that companies should look on what dimensions do they 
compete in their respectful strategic group at the moment, and how they could change the 
weighting of those dimensions. In general these dimensions can be categorized into two: 
price and performance. Kim & Mauborgne (1999) mention for example price and fashion 
in clothing industry and price and quality in car industry. Perhaps for insurance industry 
this could be a question of price and customer service. The better the customer service, the 
happier the customers are to deal with their insurance company, but the costlier their 
insurances are too. And this works the other way around too: the poorer the customer 
service the cheaper the insurances can be because of savings in employee costs.  
Thirdly, companies should look to chain of buyers (Kim & Mauborgne, 1999). The point is 
to make distinction between purchasers, users and influencers. By simply concentrating on 
one group or segment, the company risks of overlooking a big part of its possible 
customers. That is why companies should see who really are involved in the buying 
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process. For insurance companies (in terms of car insurances) an influencer could be the 
purchaser’s fiancé, or the car dealer. The user of a car (the one bringing in the risk of an 
accident) might then again be in reality someone else then the purchaser too, for example 
the child of the purchaser who can be more risk-prone then the purchaser him/herself.  
Fourthly, companies should seek for “complementary product and service offerings” (Kim, 
Mauborgne, 1999). This means that the product or service is not necessarily the only aspect 
that the customers seek when buying. They mention as an example the Borders and B&N 
book store, which understood that buying books is not the only aspect that the customers 
seek from a bookstore, but actually they wanted a reading space and good customer service 
as well, both of which are aspects that used to lack from an American bookstore. For 
insurance companies this might be about safety in general: people might call the insurance 
company for problems that are not necessarily the company’s concern, such as problems 
when travelling, or issues about building a house for example. Offering a service, where 
customers could call on technical or practical issues before anything actually happens 
might prove to increase customer satisfaction and the amount of damages. Teece (2010) 
too advices companies to look for competitive offerings and to see how our offering is (or 
should be) superior to those. 
Fifthly, companies should look “across functional or emotional appeal to buyers” (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1999). The authors note that a company can sell its product from a functional 
perspective or an emotional perspective. For example cosmetic companies can sell their 
products with the emotional appeals of beauty, hope and dream. However, sometimes it 
might be beneficial to move away from the usual industry-wide appeals, as it was for 
Bodyshop as it moved away from the said appeals of cosmetic industry. The authors also 
mention how the British insurance company Direct Line moved away from traditional 
brokers to focus on cost savings via information technology. Although this makes dealing 
with the insurance company less personal, it also save the customers money as their 
premiums get lower. If money (functional appeal) and not the personal relations (emotional 
appeal) is the main concern of the insurance buyers, then both the company and the client 
can benefit. Teece (2010) advocates on looking and understanding on what grounds do the 
customers actually use the offering as well. He advices the management to ask themselves, 
how their product solves the customers problem.  
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Finally, companies should according to Kim & Mauborgne (1999) “look across time”. This 
means that they should try to see what trends affect their industry and change their value 
curve accordingly. The authors note however, that this might be easier said than done, and 
give three conditions which are critical in forming a new value curve according to future 
trends. Firstly, “the trends must be decisive to your business”, secondly “they must be 
irreversible” and thirdly “they must have a clear trajectory”. Big data and digitalization 
could fulfill these three conditions for the insurance industry in Finland: as we will discuss 
later in this chapter, it has meaning to their business. The changes are most probably 
irreversible as we have not taken full advantage of the current technology which is still 
rapidly advancing all the time.  Also, as we learnt from the big data articles, we know that 
there is more and more information available cheaper than before every day.  
Amit and Zott (2012) see three different ways business model innovation can occur: 
focusing on novel activities, focusing on linking activities in novel ways and making 
changes in governance. The biggest difference between their model and that of Kim & 
Mauborgne is that Amit & Zott (2012) focus more to the novelty factor of the business 
whereas Kim & Mauborgne (1999) proposed to look how the business functions at the 
moment and try to find “empty space”. To a high degree these two approaches naturally 
overlap. Looking at the current business model, finding gaps is essentially the same then 
trying to come up with something novel: in order for an idea to be novel it naturally needs 
to be something that has not been done before.  
What Kim and Mauborgne (1999) suggest is that a company should look for certain 
aspects in their business, find hidden value and change their business accordingly. If it is 
this simple (just to have a look) why do most of the companies in a selected industry still 
stay where they are? For example, how come the Body shop (an example by Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1999) was able to capitalize on the hidden value in cosmetics industry, but the 
other players did not come up with it, although many of the big players in the cosmetic 
industry had longer experience of the industry then the Body shop did?  
In their article, Sarasvathy and Dew (2005) answer those questions. What they argued in 
their article is that whether or not a new market is born, is dependent on the stakeholders of 
the company. They must see that the proper action for the company is to take new means to 
develop the business instead of redefining the old. The first main issue is to understand, 
that it is difficult or even near impossible to define consumer tastes before the new market 
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creation since, they will evolve with the product. So basically what they say is, that the 
creation of a new market cannot be based on demand, because the said demand is in fact 
abstract, and assumed meaning it does not exist until the new market has been created. In a 
way this argument can be seen in contrast with Kim & Mauborgne (1999) since their 
article can be understood as finding demand where others have not found it. Then again, 
Kim & Mauborgne (1999) do bring up many times in their article the concept of value 
creation or value finding, which can be understood in the sense that one does not 
necessarily look for demand but where extra value can be given and then the demand 
follows.  
The second main issue for Sarasvathy and Dew (2005) is that they see, that a company 
cannot first interpret customers’ hidden needs and then develop technology that matches 
these needs, because customers’ needs are so ambiguous that they will change anyway or 
be difficult to interpret beforehand. In other words: a company cannot just analyze 
customer needs and then bring a product to the market matching that need, thinking it 
succeeded because of the analysis. In fact, the new product might be successful because the 
customer needs evolved after the product launch. This idea is relevant, because it makes us 
better understand why new market space is being created. Other cosmetic firms than the 
Body shop did not necessarily leave their business model as they had always been just 
because they were afraid what their customers might say, but because convincing their 
stakeholders would have been too difficult. This is easy to understand: consumers are only 
one group of stakeholders. Shareholders might see it risky to invest in a new business 
model that has no guarantee of success when the current business is doing well. For the 
Body shop then again, the whole formula for success was to be different than the others. If 
an investor believed in the Body shop from the beginning, they needed to believe to the 
new business model too.  
O’Connor & Rice (2012) take the idea of changing customer perceptions even further by 
suggesting that it is actually something that the company should actively strive for itself 
when launching new technology. They emphasize that the market creation requires as 
much time as technical development of the new technology. They see, that market creation 
is the result of creating applications for technology, “discovering business model”, 
“stimulating value chain”, “priming the market”, market entry and managing the market 
evolution. Overall, these activities are in line with the theories we have discussed earlier. 
Creating new markets or using new technology to do that, means that one needs to do 
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changes in the existing business model or at least consider its revisal. O’Connor & Rice 
(2012) nevertheless emphasize that the learning with the new technology is continuous 
process and not linear. This means, that there is no pre-determined “road” one could 
follow, but instead the new technology and the new market will be generated all the time, 
beginning from technological development and still continuing at customer feedback.  
Whereas O’Connor & Rice (2012) see the development of technology and business model 
with equal importance, Chesbrough (2010) then again, writes that business model 
innovation might be more important than the advancement of the technology. He too sees, 
that overall in strategic literature there is a strong bias towards action over analytics – the 
firms are more creators then users, when it comes to new markets and business model 
innovation. To Chesbrough (2010) firms are more experimenting with their new business 
models then implementing them. However, business model innovation and experimenting 
affects many parts of the company business (selling, producing, financing…) so 
experimenting can be difficult. Not to mention that many times experimenting means 
balancing between the old and the new business model. It is easy to imagine, that 
experimenting with new business models, or changing the business model completely is 
even harder for larger companies with established corporate structures based on the old 
business model. This is similar situation to what we discussed earlier about the Body shop 
example presented by Kim & Mauborgne (1999). Even if the old cosmetic companies saw 
hidden value where the Body shop saw it too, it might have been too expensive for them to 
go and test it. To be able to test new business model efficiently the companies must be 
open to business model innovation. Also, although Chesborough (2010) as well as 
O’Connor & Rice (2012) stated that it is impossible to know beforehand what is going to 
happen with the new business model, it is possible and should be studied what starts to 
happen after the model has been taken into use. The main point for Chesborough (2010) is, 
that predetermined models will probably fail, but if a company has an effectual attitude 
towards business model innovation, leadership committed to business model innovation 
and it pursues data driven planning with business model innovation it is possible to create a 
successful new business model.  
Chesbrough & Rosenblooms (2002) study on Xerox’s spin-off companies, clarifies 
Chesbroughs (2010) later study. Although initially Xerox set the spin-offs to do business 
with the same business model as what the mother company had used itself, the spin-offs 
nevertheless used business model innovation successfully. Chesbrough & Rosenbloom 
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(2002) make a distinction between corporate strategy and business model: according to 
them there can be one corporate strategy but several business models in the same 
corporation. To them the difference rises from customer value, which is more of an issue 
with business model creation then with corporate strategy creation. This makes sense, 
when one thinks about a corporation with a parent company and many subsidiaries. The 
purpose of a corporation is usually to maximize the value of shareholders. To do this 
however, the company needs a working business model. An important part of a business 
model is the customer value proposition which might differ from subsidiary to subsidiary. 
The company might be for example in an industry such as the food-industry, where 
customer value can differ significantly from country to country. Also even if the 
corporation as a whole sells to only a few large clients, the need of those clients might 
differ from each other again. So the point is, that the corporation does not necessarily have 
to compromise its corporate strategy because of the pressure to its business model, but the 
business model should be flexible.  
The importance of flexibility arose from the results of Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002) 
too. All of the spin-offs they studied had changed their business model from the initial one 
that was chosen. What the authors actually note is that the initial business model is not 
actually a strategy but “an initial hypothesis” for customer value proposition. In 
subsidiaries of their study, where the business worked the best, there was an ongoing 
strong connection between the clients and the company. As we have discussed earlier with 
other authors too, the customer value cannot be seen beforehand, and it does not 
necessarily even exist beforehand. The company usually creates this new value, and must 
therefore observe intensely how the value turns out to be or develops throughout the co-
operation. One important aspect of Chesborough and Rosenbloom (2002) study is that 
those spin-offs that failed, had equally promising offers than those that succeeded, what 
those firms failed to do according to the authors was, that they did not modify their 
business model enough as time went on.  The authors note too, that with new and smaller 
firms, business model innovation is more common and more expected then with 
established companies.  
Sometimes business model innovation can mean taking a business model from one 
industry to another. As processing power of computer increases (as suggested by Moore’s 
law) exponentially, business model innovation is more and more related to advances in 
computing technology. As computers become more capable, there are more applications 
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for them and so the customers will need them more for their day-to-day tasks, in other 
words computers will become (if they already are not) a necessity, to which a utility 
business model can be used (Rappa, 2004). A utility business model can be applied for 
example to water consumption, where the customers can pay per every liter they consume. 
However, now this business model, thanks to developed computing technology, can be 
applicable to some computer based business models (Rappa, 2004). Although Rappa 
(2004) explains the “future” utility-business model through software, which was 
previously licensed, but could now be acquired through subscription, one could possibly 
see telematics insurances from this utility-perspective, as the customers pay according to 
their own usage.  
 
Table 2: How to engage in business model innovation?  (Teece, 2010. Kim & Mauborgne, 1999. Amir & Zott, 2012) 
 
The advice given by Teece (2010), Kim and Mauborgne (1999) and Amir and Zott (2012) 
is mostly compatible to what Chesborough and Rosenbloom (2002), Sarasvathy & Dew 
(2005) and Chesborough (2010) wrote on the analyzing of business model innovation. The 
latter group emphasizes somewhat more on value creation instead of finding value, 
whereas for the first group it is the other way around. Nevertheless, the unifying concept 
here is uniqueness. Whether it is finding value or creating it. Business model innovation is 
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about the uniqueness of the offering it creates in the way that it has little competition, and 
hopefully also in the way that it is difficult to copy by the competition.  
So what if there is a brand new technology that offers value in a unique and increasing way 
for the customers? What if that happens in a contested market offering a chance to escape 
the rigorous competition? What reasons could a company have to decline the opportunities 
that the technology offers for successful business model innovation at that point? One 
reason could be regulation, which relationship to business models is a topic we will cover 
in the next chapter.   
4. REGULATION AS A LIMITATION FACTOR FOR 
BUSINESS MODELS 
 
One industry, where demand and costs are so high that for some the services remain 
inaccessible, is the health care industry. According to Hwang & Christensen (2008) one of 
the reasons why new disruptive technologies alongside with business model innovation 
have not been adopted or have been adopted slowly by the health care industry is the 
regulation around the industry, meaning laws and decrees limiting new innovations. The 
writers argue, that the regulation is made so, that it favors the status quo of the business so 
that a disruptive change would not “jeopardize public safety for higher profits” (Hwang & 
Christensen, 2008) Nevertheless, although the regulations are written with the good 
intention of protecting the public, the writers see, that those who profit from the current 
state of things the most also lobby the hardest to keep them as they are. This limitative 
regulatory factor towards innovation has according to the authors lead to a high cost model 
of health care, where the efficiency and quality of treatment is not necessarily on the best 
level. (Hwang, Christensen, 2008). Although the authors do not state it directly, it can be 
intervened, that when the costs get higher so too the barriers of entry for the business. This 
surely increases the incentives for the larger profitable companies to keep up the status 
quo.  
Herzlinger (2006) writes, that sometimes regulation might in fact favor innovation 
adaptation. For example she mentions drugs which are created to cure rare diseases. In the 
case of rare diseases, the cure might be unknown and hard to find, so the government 
wants to subsidize the adaptation of innovation for these. Then again, many times the 
   
20 
 
legislation hinders the progress as she points out. She notes, that there is a political side to 
this as well. Politicians, according to her, face a greater risk in their personal approval 
rates, if they are under regulating a harmful drug, than if they are over regulating a non-
harmful drug (Herzlinger, 2006). This resonates well with what Hwang & Christensen 
(2008) wrote. If the largest operators in the market benefit from the status quo and lobby 
towards preserving it, and at the same time politicians risk to lose their approval rates by 
under regulating, the incentives to impose strict regulations are very high.  
However, despite the fact that regulation has a strong impact on how the companies can 
innovate and that the policymakers are the only ones who can change the regulations and 
do not necessarily want to do that, this does not mean that the companies would be helpless 
according to Herzlinger (2006). She sees, that the companies can try to take advantage of 
the current state of things by recognizing the forces affecting it. These are firstly, the 
different players in the field. Secondly, generating sufficient funding. Thirdly, 
understanding the policies and policy making. Fourthly, understanding and adapting the 
technology involved. Fifthly, understanding the customer value; although the larger 
companies might enjoy status quo, and the policy makers do not want to take risks on “too 
loose” medical regulations, the customers would welcome new, more efficient and cheaper 
processes. Finally, accountability needs to be understood; embracing innovation in medical 
field, does not mean, that the company should take unnecessary risks. (Herzlinger, 2006) 
What Herzlinger (2006) tries to say with this guidance is that although the regulation 
strongly affects the way companies can embrace innovation in medical field, it does not 
mean, that it inhibits it altogether. It sets the boundaries, which in this industry are stricter 
than in some other, inside of which the companies can still innovate. She also sees, that 
there already are companies which have embraced innovation or business model 
innovation in the medical field, but that the strong regulation among other obstacles 
explains why the change in medical industry has been so slow. (Herzlinger, 2006)  
As mentioned, when a business is strongly regulated like the medical industry, and a 
company profits from the status quo, there is little incentives from profits perspective to 
invest in disruptive innovations. By very definition disruptive innovations and business 
model innovation are made to produce value from a new set of issues, meaning not to 
maximize the profits from the current business, but to change the existing business 
altogether. This raises a question: why are the larger companies so satisfied with the status 
quo, even if it is profitable for them, if disruptive technologies are more about future 
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profits than current ones? Von den Eichen et al. (2015) mention corporate culture as an 
issue which causes business model innovation to fail. They note for example that economic 
rationality and job insecurity can cause mixed feelings towards business model innovation 
in a company but also more ambiguous issues like self-esteem. The authors note that the 
company needs to be “confident” in striving towards business model innovation (Von den 
Eichen et al. 2015). Surely, when we discuss larger established and profitable companies in 
a field that is strongly regulated, we can agree that they are confident towards that 
business: they know that the company will keep on generating profit, while simultaneously 
being protected from competition with the regulation. Conversely, these actors are 
certainly less confident towards the more ambiguous new way of doing business.  
The dilemma in this can be seen already from the advice that Von den Eichen et al. (2015) 
give to companies to overcome the cultural barriers for business model innovation. Firstly, 
the authors argue that the companies striving for business model innovation should 
understand, that the new business model “might follow a different path then the current 
business and need different guidance or people” (Von den Eichen et al. 2015). From a 
perspective of a large corporation described by Hwang and Christensen (2008) this advice 
does not sound too attractive; why should a company, which has a strong market position  
and is profitable to invest in something, which completely shakes the current state of 
things, risking both the favorable position and revenue-stream of the company.  
The second advice from Von den Eichen et al. (2015) is that the companies should “avoid 
debilitating frictions in the existing departmental cultures”. They note that in order to avoid 
cannibalization of the old markets, they need to create separate units with independent 
cultures. Again, to shaken up the current state of profitable business just to embrace new 
disruptive technology seems like something that could almost sound like creating anarchy 
for some leaders.  
Regulation can have a strong effect on innovation, even if is not directly targeted to limit it, 
argues Paraskevopoulou (2012). According to her, regulations can have an impact on both 
the management of innovations and on the structures on which the company has been built. 
This is why even if the disruptive technology itself is in the frames that the law provides, 
the company might need to overcome other legislative problems in terms of business 
model innovation and utilizing most out of the new technology. Again, this resonates with 
the dilemma brought up by Herzlinger (2006): if a company is doing well, and has a good 
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market position, why to risk the current profits, spend on new innovations, risk 
confrontation with regulations and from the personal perspective of a corporate decision 
maker: why to risk one’s own status and position in a successful company by shaking and 
stirring the current beneficial state of things? Paraskevopoulou (2012) does state however, 
that a company should partake in political decision making, because sometimes the 
regulations are not meant to be restricting towards innovation but because of managerial 
and structural implications they happen to still do this in the end. If the company can get its 
voice heard, maybe the legislation will be more lenient towards innovation as well. 
However, as we discussed earlier, this can work the other way around too: a company 
enjoying the current status quo, can try to use its influence to make the laws stricter and so 
deliberately make it more difficult for disruptive technologies to “change the rules of the 
game” so to speak.  
Relying too much on the old profitable business model can prove to be a disastrous 
strategy, when a new disruptive technology enters the market, making the old business 
model obsolete. Kodak for example had invested in digital photography before the 
technology became widespread, but the company failed to capitalize on it, because they 
instead relied on their old business model (Lucas & Goh, 2009). Largely this was because 
of the company’s inability to understand customer value, undermining the customer will to 
transfer to digital cameras, but also because of the trouble of organizational changes caused 
by the new business model and most importantly, the fear that they would cannibalize their 
current profitable business model (Lucas & Goh, 2009). It is important to note from this 
case, that Kodak did not have a similar “regulatory protection” against disruptive 
innovations as the health industry (or insurance industry as we will later discuss), but still 
they were very protectionist towards their old business model and the profits it created. It is 
therefore easy to assume, that if a company not only has a profitable large business but also 
a feeling of “protection by regulation”, they could end up to making a similar decision as 
Kodak. The authors end their research by saying, that if a company wants to be prepared 
for the change brought by disruptive technology, it needs to be prepared to “attack the 
culture of the organization” (Lucas & Goh, 2009, p. 55). Although it is easy to have 
hindsight about the Kodak-case, no company operating in today’s era of digitalization 
should think that a similar fate could not happen to them.  
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5. COMPETITION DYNAMICS: INNOVATION VS 
IMITATION   
 
One of the strongest or perhaps even the strongest force for any business is competition: 
the competitors and the competition are the strongest force which keeps the company 
innovating and finding new solutions too win over customers. One of the most famous 
economists of 20th century, Joseph Schumpeter, introduced the idea of creative destruction 
in his book capitalism, socialism and democracy (1950). He noted, that the “mutation” of 
industries “revolutionizes the economic structures…incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter, 1950 p. 83.). According to Schumpeter 
economic growth is not about gradual and peaceful growth but about creative destruction, 
where economic disruption is brought by old or new businesses.   
What can be derived from Schumpeter’s  (1950) ideas, is that the more there is product 
market competition, the less there should be incentives for innovation (Aghion & Howitt, 
1992). That is, because of creative destruction, investing heavily on future research, the 
company might risk the current rents it gets from product market competition (Aghion & 
Howitt, 1992). In other words: why use money on something which will not increase but 
possibly decrease your profits? Nevertheless, Aghion et al. (2001) have later clarified this 
theory: they note, that the issue in innovating is not really about the individual rents of the 
original innovator, but about the “incremental rates” or the difference in rent between the 
one that innovates and those who do not. If it is difficult for a company to catch up the 
difference in R&D, the incentive for innovation is larger, than if the difference is caught up 
more easily. A company of the industry might try to “escape” from the competition as 
Aghion et al. (2001) put it. When considering the obstacles that laws, patents and R&D 
costs put to innovating, it might not necessarily be the best strategy to innovate “too 
eagerly” in a market, where imitation is easy.  
So what aspects affect imitation then? Lieberman & Asaba (2006) see two distinct versions 
of it. Firstly, there is information-based imitation. In this type of imitation, the companies 
act in an uncertain environment and so the managers act on the information they get from 
their competition. The companies following this, might be fast to act and can rush to 
imitate in order to gain maximum benefits of first-mover advantage. For this reason this 
type of imitation also holds the greatest risks: bubbles can be created, when companies are 
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not clear on all the ambiguities related to the decisions. The authors mention the .com-
bubble of the 1990’s as an example.  
Second type of imitation according to Lieberman & Asaba (2006) is rivalry-based 
imitation. In this type, the imitating companies do not do the imitation because of 
information but because of economic or strategic reasons. This type of imitation happens, 
when companies have similar resources and market positions with intense (price) 
competition. Differentiation could prove to be successful and lead the company away from 
the tough competition leading to higher profits, but it is also a risky choice. There is no 
proof, that the new niche or market they strive to proves to be profitable. Therefore it is the 
most risk-free choice to strive for homogenous offerings throughout the competition. 
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006) Although the rivalry-based competition is in general less risky 
than information-based this does not mean it would be without risk. The companies in the 
market might all get stronger if the path they have chosen is productive, but it can also 
foster overall collusion in the competition. (Liebermann & Asaba, 2006) Supposedly one 
can say, that the expected rate of return for information based imitation is higher than with 
rivalry based, but so is then the risk. Sometimes following the “safe” path might however 
prove not to be that safe after all if the company by doing so misses a shot for taking 
advantage of new revolutionizing technology.  
Even if the company does innovate successfully, it might necessarily not enjoy a first-
mover advantage for long. Pepall (1997) found in his study of a duopolistic market that 
even when a company innovates successfully, it cannot hold on for a monopolistic position 
for long, since its competitor will soon imitate. This is according to Pepall (1997) 
especially true, when the products of the innovator and the imitator are close to each other. 
The author also found out in his study, that the imitator is more eager to imitate, when the 
market is wealthy and the distribution of income between the competitors homogenous. 
Indeed, Pepall (1997) notes, that unless the innovator is guaranteed a protection for its new 
product through patents or cooperative alliance with the later entry rival, it might be 
deterred from innovation all together. These findings resonate with what Liebermann & 
Asaba (2006) wrote about rivalry-based competition: when competition is intense and 
imitation is easy, “staying put” and not innovating might prove to be the most risk-free 
solution.  
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How much to invest in research and development and to decide whether or not to pursue to 
innovate are difficult questions, but so is the question on whether to imitate or not as well. 
If a follower decides to imitate, there is a risk that they do the same mistakes as the first 
mover, which they would have avoided by not imitating. Also, by imitating the follower 
might just intensify the price competition, lowering profits for everyone in the field. 
However, there is a chance that the first-mover did find a “gold-mine” so to speak and by 
not imitating, the follower misses the market opportunity (and might be left behind the way 
Aghion et al. (2001) noted). In addition the company might give a “staid” image of itself, 
and that it is not up to the recent market trends (which surely is noted by the investors). 
Semadeni & Anderson (2010) call this “the follower’s dilemma”. Both imitating and not 
imitating can have deep consequences for the company. What Semadeni & Anderson 
(2010) found out in their study about professional service industry, was that companies 
need to balance between rationality, meaning that a company should not jump in to 
anything too hastily, and progressiveness meaning a company should try to keep up with 
the development of the business environment. The lower the level of the innovation 
however, the stronger are the chances that the follower will imitate. This is, because the 
companies want to keep up with the incremental progress made by the competition but 
avoid “extreme” innovations. (Semadeni & Anderson, 2010) Innovating radically can 
therefore be the best way to differentiate according to the authors, since then the 
competition is also least likely to follow (Semadeni & Anderson, 2010). Their findings 
resonate with those of Lieberman & Asaba (2006) (rivalry-based competition) and with 
those of Aghion et al. (2001) about incremental innovation. In a competition with rivalry-
based innovation, differentiation will not happen with small incremental innovations, since 
those can be easily caught up. The best chance for differentiation is to make radical 
innovations, but those are then the most risky and uncertain investments as well.  
So which one should a company favor? Imitation or innovation? According to Jenkins 
(2014) companies performing poorly should critically evaluate both options. What 
literature many times suggests according to Jenkins (2014), is that imitation is usually the 
easier of the two choices. However, according to him, the reality is more complex than 
that. If the imitating company fails to understand basis of successful imitation, it will waste 
both “time and “performance opportunities through suboptimal strategies” (Jenkins, 2014, 
p. 180.). To maximize the benefits of either one, innovation or imitation, the companies 
should understand the benefits of intertwined innovation and imitation. An innovation 
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should be designed so that it can be modified for “competitive responses” and imitations 
should also include new performance features. (Jenkins, 2014) To only focus on innovation 
or to only focus on imitation is probably not a good strategy, especially in a highly 
competitive field.  One of the most important findings of Jenkins (2014) was, that the 
managers have a very strong role in whether or not innovation or imitation is emphasized: 
managerial distrust on company competence with the current product leads to emphasis on 
innovation (to tackle competitions competitive advantage), and managerial distrust on 
company innovatory capabilities will lead the company towards imitation. This view 
challenges the resource-based view, that some companies might not be imitable because of 
their privileged resources. Instead it emphasizes the importance of managerial decision 
making. Another important aspect which can be derived from the findings of Jenkins 
(2014) is, that from a game-theory aspect imitation will ultimately lead to greater 
innovation as well. That is, because imitation will probably be more successful with some 
innovative features as discussed, but also because if the imitation fails some new 
innovation is probably required.  
Despite Jenkins (2014) underlining his theory’s difference to resource-based view of 
imitation, there might still be similarities between these approaches. For example, 
Markides and Williamson (1996, p. 367), note that differentiation will only be beneficial if 
the differentiating (innovating) company gets a hold on strategic assets, which are hard to 
obtain and “costly to imitate”. However, Markides and Williamson (1996) admit too, that 
no matter how rare the assets, the benefit will eventually suffer from erosion and imitation. 
Therefore, although the success of the differentiation is dependent of the resources of the 
company, the original decision to differentiate or the follower’s decisions to imitate or not 
are all managerial decisions in the end. It cannot be absolutely clear from the beginning 
which resources are not imitable and therefore, although the end-result can be judged from 
a resource-based view, the original decision was a managerial one.  
In his classical article about profiting from innovation, Teece (1986) noted, that despite 
innovation can be a major source of benefit for a company, many times it might be others 
then the original innovator company who get the largest benefit. He sees it as an illusion, 
that innovating and investing into new technology would give an automatic first-mover 
advantage to the innovating company, and instead notes, that very well the one who 
benefits the most might not be the fastest mover with the innovation, but instead the second 
fastest or even a “slow third” (arguing for imitation). In his article Teece (1986) creates a 
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managerial framework in which he argues, that the importance of complementary assets 
around the innovation is what determines who will be the eventual winner in the 
innovation. These complementary services can be for example manufacturing, service, 
distribution or complementary services. Basically any asset that will have impact on the 
commercialization and/or utilization of the new innovation. (Teece, 1986)  
Besides complementary services, Teece (1986) mentions trade barriers and regional 
differences as aspects which can affect who will benefit from innovation. Naturally, if a 
company creates a new innovation in country A, because of tariffs, taxes or laws, it might 
be more difficult for it to succeed in country B then another company that originates from 
country B. Also, the competitive situation might be very different in country B then 
country A, which would again give an advantage for a B-country company in country B 
compared to an A-country company. If the overall market in country B is bigger than in 
country A, then the company from B will get a greater overall benefit from the innovation 
that country-A company created, as it has a greater potential for revenue. What should be 
understood from Teece’s (1986) article is that even more important than the original 
innovation are the complementary assets and issues revolving around it. Monetizing an 
innovation does not mean that one needs to participate in technological innovation. 
Although his original article is from 1986, in his later article from 2006, he argues, that the 
framework presented in his earlier article is still valid after two decades. (Teece, 2006)  
Teece (1986: 2006) is not alone with his claim, that innovation (even spot-on one) does not 
mean instant success. The six step-process of Binham and Rattfield (Kalafatis et al, 2000) 
mentions price, product quality, distribution, image, service and technology as possible 
positioning strategies. What Padgett and Mulvey (2007) note, is that not only is technology 
something that can be used as a positioning strategy, but in fact disruptive technology 
forces changes to the market structure, which then forces the company to change its 
positioning. This is very similar to what we discussed about Schumpeter’s theories on 
creative destruction (1950).  
Porter (1985) who in his article focuses on how to use technology as a competitive 
advantage, mentions that “technology affects competitive advantage if it has a significant 
role in determining relative cost, position or differentiation” (Porter, 1985, p. 63). What 
can be taken from all of these authors, is that the main purpose of innovating new 
technology is not to generate a new product or service. To receive full advantage of the 
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new technology, changes to the positioning need to be made.  Christensen (2013) noted 
too, that some firms were at one point able to create new innovative technology and 
capitalize on it, but then later somehow lost their innovativeness, aggressiveness and 
customer sensitiveness. This notion too, supports the fact that creating an innovation or 
being the first to use an innovation (as Teece, 1986, presented as an alternative to innovate 
self) is only secondary to controlling all the other issues revolving around the monetization 
of the new innovation. Similarly, this resonates with what Aghion et al (2001) and 
Lieberman & Asaba (2006) wrote about incremental innovation and the factors affecting 
imitation. If a company fails to make innovation which is difficult to imitate, the followers 
will soon catch up, and even if they do innovate in a way which is hard to imitate, erosion 
will eventually effect the new product/service and the competitors will catch up.  
Padgett and Mulvey (2007, p. 376) write that “new technology has the potential to 
fundamentally change a service market”. They also identify three different ways how new 
disruptive technology can have an impact on the existing market: 1) general impact on 
market space 2) impact on customer values and 3) impact on firm performance. Let’s take 
a look on each of these separately. Firstly, the authors found out, that companies can and 
do position and differentiate themselves with the help of the new technology (Padgett and 
Mulvey, 2007). Secondly, they noticed three different ways how the technology could 
affect the customers: level of service integration, service interface and interaction. 
However, they also noted that companies could position themselves wider from each other 
but still choose to stay in clusters. Finally, they fail to conduct whether or not new 
technology offers affect firm performance (in terms of ROIC, meaning return on invested 
capital). They do note, however, that since the impact on customer value is clear, firms 
might have different goals to use new technology on positioning than instant effect on firm 
performance. (Padgett and Mulvey, 2007) What we can derive from their findings is that 
new technology does affect the market as a whole in terms of changes in competition, and 
it affects the customer value but that it does not necessarily affect firm performance at least 
right away. However, what we can also imply from this is that firms might have other 
strategies then short term growth on ROIC when investing to disruptive technology. One 
could also argue based on these findings that a company striving for more stable short-term 
ROIC might be skeptical on radical innovations.  
This resonates with Porter (1985) who gives recommendations on how a company should 
formulate its technological strategy in order to make the technology a competitive 
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advantage.  According to him, technology should provide change, and to do that it should 
“lower cost or raise differentiation directly”, “shift cost or uniqueness factors”, “lead to 
first-mover advantage” and “improve overall industry structure” (Porter, 1985, p. 64) . 
When looking at these we can notice, that all of these factors, and especially the 
improvement of overall industry factor, can be changes that can fundamentally affect a 
market, as suggested by Padgett and Mulvey (2007). For example: it is easy to assume that 
if a large player in a certain market is able to cut its costs, raise differentiation, shift 
uniqueness factors or improve  the overall industry factors, the market could change 
radically.  
From the authors of this chapter, three possible choices are given for companies. They can 
either innovate, imitate or do nothing as others innovate. All of the choices carry possible 
benefits or problems for the company, but the main question remains in the incremental 
level of the innovations: is the incremental level of an innovation high enough to stop 
imitation and to give a fist-mover advantage, or is it too high making the risks unbearable 
for the innovator? The possible benefits and problems of these choices are illustrated in the 
Figure 1 below.  
 
 
Figure 1:  To innovate, to imitate or to do nothing? (Teece, 1986. Liebermann & Asaba, 2006. Jenkins, 2014) 
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6. LITERATURE SYNTHESIS & THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK  
 
The first topic which literature we discussed about, was using new technology as a 
competitive advantage. The importance of new technologies was brought up by Miles 
(1989), who stated that technological change is inevitable. We then looked to a more 
specific and modern topic of big data, which is also highly linked to this study as 
telematics based insurances are about big data. The main finding here, was that according 
to the authors whose literature was discussed (McAfee, 2012: Davenport, 2014: 
Constantinou & Kalinikosis, 2015) using new technology successfully as a competitive 
advantage means large changes in the organization and large changes in the strategy of the 
company. Porter too (1985) noted that new information technology affects all of the 
“porter’s five forces” implying that new technologies can change the whole strategy of the 
company. Alnori and Bhimaan (2015) and Davenport (2014) all pointed out the main idea 
of this part of the literature: business and managerial actions are more important than the 
product development actions to fully monetize new technologies.  
As we could conclude, based on the literature, that the main questions in monetizing 
disruptive technologies is not really about the products themselves, but about other, 
business model related issues, we then moved on to study business model innovation.  
What was discovered of that subject was that business models, and the success of them in 
comparison to others, is about uniqueness (Teece, 2010). It should be hard for the 
competitors to copy it, because of patent protection or alliances for example. Kim and 
Mauborgne (1999) noted that companies tend to match their strategies, which is exactly 
why some companies embrace business model innovation. They try to look their business 
models from completely new angles, by still maximizing the customer value. The authors 
then give several proposals on how to do business model innovation. Mostly this advice is 
about customer value again. Amir and Zott (2012) see that the most important part of 
business model innovation is in novelty factor and trying to find it. Sarasvathy and Dew 
(2005) and O’Connor & Rice (2012) see business model innovation more in the way of 
creating new value for customers than actually finding it Chesborough (2010) supported 
this, and noted that it is impossible through pre-made analysis to find customer value when 
the company can in fact create it through business model innovation. Chesborough and 
Rosenbloom (2002) noted too, that the larger companies can test out different business 
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models in different divisions and see which one work. The on-going analysis right after the 
launch is the most important part of business model innovation nevertheless; the model 
needs to be flexible in order to meet the customer needs. Whether or not companies mainly 
create new value or find hidden value through business model innovation, the most 
important part that should be taken and understood from this section is that through new 
technologies and business model innovation the companies can harvest customer value that 
is harder to reach for their competitors. By not embracing business model innovation the 
companies might be left to harvest the same customer value with their competitors.  
So if new technologies are emerging in an ever growing rate, and if the business model 
innovation needed for it monetization can bring unique customer value inaccessible to all 
the company’s competitors, why would any firm feel reserved about these actions? One 
reason can be regulation. Hwang & Christensen (2008) brought up the health care industry, 
where the customers are protected by the state with regulations over new drugs and health 
care practices. Despite the fact that the regulation is made to protect the customers, it 
protects the current big players in the market too; their profitable business model is not at 
risk because of any disruptive technologies. Herzlinger (2006) supported this notion and 
noted that political risk is a factor here too: the law-makers face a greater political risk in 
under-, than over-regulating. This leaves the companies with a great incentive to lobby the 
law-makers to keep the regulation as restrictive as it is, as the lobbying actions have a great 
probability of succeeding. Despite the very limiting nature of health care industry 
regulations Hezlinger (2006) still noted, that business model innovation and embracing 
new technologies is possible in the field, it is just much slower. At this point, we reminded 
ourselves that Von den Eichen et al (2015) stated that confidence is needed for business 
model innovation to be successful, as it requires such large changes to the company 
structure. Surely, if a company were to truly embrace business model innovation in a 
situation, where the company is very profitable and protected by outside competition, the 
company would need even more confidence than usually and probably lack the confidence 
altogether to even consider such a move. Health care industry as an example is very clear 
as the regulation is so strict. Paraskevopoulou (2012) however, reminds us, that sometimes 
the law might be unintentionally restrictive. In those cases she advises companies to lobby 
for the change of the law. Still the same question remains: if the company benefits from the 
current status quo, why would it lobby to change the laws, even if they were 
unintentionally restrictive. Finally, we took a look on the case of Kodak as presented by 
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Lucas and Goh (2009). What was learnt, was that despite Kodak lacking a regulatory 
protection, it was still very hesitant to change its profitable business model to a new one, 
which lead to a situation, where it lost its change to a first-mover advantage in a 
completely new market. What should be taken from this part, is that companies can be very 
hesitant to engage in business model innovation if they are profiting from the current state 
of things. This is especially true when there are strong regulations protecting the profitable 
business model.  
Even if the company finally decides, that it should not embrace new technology or 
business model innovation, it still faces the chance, that its competitor(s) might do that. 
This led us to study literature on the relationship between innovation and imitation. 
Competition between businesses has been for a long time partly determined by creative 
destruction, where new innovations destroy old businesses and favor new ones 
(Schumpeter, 1950). However, what was the main point of this part of the literature was 
best described by Aghion et al. (2001). The success of an innovation is not determined by 
the individual rate of innovation, but by the incremental rate of it. In other words: how 
progressive is the innovation compared to others. If the incremental rate is high enough the 
innovating company might “escape” its competition, as the innovation is harder to imitate 
the higher the incremental rates are. Liebermann and Asaba (2006) founded two types of 
imitation, the first one being information-based imitation, where the companies are fast to 
imitate (typical to high-tech businesses). The other was rivalry-based imitation, where the 
imitator imitates for strategic or economic reasons, and where the companies are fairly 
close to each other offering homogenous offerings. This type of imitation is closer to the 
topic of this thesis. Innovation and imitation should still not be seen as two separate issues, 
but as intertwined subjects, as successful imitation usually requires new innovations too 
according to Pepall (1997). Jenkins (2014) says this too and adds, that both options should 
be critically evaluated. Markides and Williamson (1996) note that eventually even the best 
innovations will suffer from erosion and imitation. Teece (1986) goes as far as saying that 
many times the second comer or even the slow third might be the biggest benefiter of a 
technology.  
Semadeni & Anderson (2010) introduced the “follower’s dilemma” which well describes 
the problems associated with the incremental rates of innovation from the imitators’ 
perspective: if the imitator chooses not to imitate, it might miss its chance of a new less 
uncontested market. However, by imitating it risks of doing the same mistakes again, and 
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intensifying the competition. Although Semadeni & Anderson (2010) do not call it that 
way, they introduce the “innovator’s dilemma” too: the innovator faces a smaller risk of 
imitation with higher incremental rate of innovation. However, simultaneously it faces a 
higher risk of failure as well. The three choices and the outcomes of those choices, the 
companies face in terms of innovation and imitation are illustrated at the end of chapter 5 
in Figure 1.  
What should be taken from this part of the literature is the importance of the incremental 
level of innovation and the three choices it leaves for companies. When innovating, 
companies need to analyze whether or not the incremental level of innovation is high 
enough to encounter possible imitation. Then again imitation is not necessarily an easy 
option either, even if the incremental level of innovation is not too high: the company 
might make the same mistakes as its competitor or unnecessarily intensify the competition. 
Not to do anything could be a choice of avoiding the mistakes of the competition, but it 
could also lead to a situation, where the company is out of the game, so to speak.  
The theoretical framework of this thesis could be put together as follows. A new 
technology, which might better address customer value, or create new one, emerges. If a 
company wants to monetize that technology properly, they need to make big changes to 
their business model. Business model innovation, then again means large changes to the 
company structure; all the way from its employees, company culture and processes. If the 
company benefits from the current state of things it probably is very hesitant to radically 
alter its current business model, even if the new technology would better address the 
customer value. This is especially true, when strict regulation protects the profitable 
current business model from disruptive innovations out- or inside the current competition. 
Even strict regulations, however, do not prevent innovations from happening, just slow 
them down. If a regulation protected company decides to innovate nevertheless, it risks the 
current profitable state of things and it will not get a first-mover advantage from the 
innovation if the incremental level of innovation is not high enough, in which occasion, its 
competitors can imitate it, and perhaps even learn from its mistakes, profiting more from 
the innovation in the end. Then again, even if the company decides not to engage in 
monetizing the product through business model innovation, its competitor might do this. 
This is when the company needs to decide whether or not it will imitate or not. Again, the 
company might learn from the mistakes of its competitors, but it might also just do the 
same mistakes as its competition. It could also miss the opportunity of the new technology 
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by not innovating or not imitating. This framework, and the questions it raises for a 
company management has been depicted in Figure 2 below. This framework as itself 
already gives an idea on how a company from a traditional industry deals with the issues 
revolving around new technologies, but it cannot by itself answer the problems faced in the 
insurance market as there are some industry specific questions. We will have a closer look 
on these issues in the next chapter.  
 
Figure 2: Theoretical framework 
 
 7. INSURANCE BUSINESS IN LITERATURE AND 
PRIVATE STUDIES 
 
Insurances are a very old business, and risk management has been a key component of this 
business as long as it has existed. In his article “an overview of insurance market” in 1967 
John S. Bickley describes how the growing competition has put pressures on premiums. 
Some of Bickleys (1967) arguments or positions seem not valid today, for example he sees 
“little likelihood” that computers would bring any cost savings to insurance companies. 
What is interesting to see however, is what has stayed the same: what are the underlying 
truths of insurance business which prevail, despite the technological changes?  
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Bickley (1967) says that “price wars are destructive” and in his text emphasizes the 
meaning of sales and cost reduction in overcoming that risk. For risk adjustment for cars, 
he notes that changes usually come in late. This was probably because at the time of 
writing his book they did not have the technology to go through the data in real time, and 
therefore the calculation of the risks was a) slower and b) more imprecise. However, what 
we can learn from Bickley and the fundamentals of the 1960’s, insurance business is that 
risk is and has always been the driving force in the insurance business. However, what is 
different today is that insurance companies have new technology that has the potential to 
revolutionize the whole business. Whereas in the 1960’s the insurance companies could 
use only some aspects to count the price of the car insurance and the pricing according to 
risk was “inadequate” (Bickley, 1967), today the insurance companies can use dozens of 
different aspects to rate their drivers and risk calculation is a vital part of their competition. 
The products however are still not personalized. Different groups can be risk-categorized 
fairly accurately but still, an individual might seem to be risk-prone although he or she is 
not. Most importantly, never before in history have people been able to affect the rates of 
their insurances by changing their own every day behavior. The emergence of big data 
technology in the form of telematics has made this possible, but they will also require 
changes to the current business models of the insurance companies, as we have also 
discussed.  
In their article Ferguson et al. (2003) consider if insurance business is viable in its current 
form – meaning whether or not the risk levels and pricing bring viable profits to the 
companies.  What they argue in their article, is that many times consumers see 
economically viable insurance premiums as too high, leading to a situation, where the 
government pressures the insurance companies to lower their premiums below a point 
where it would not be economically viable anymore.  The authors argue that this leads to a 
situation, where the insurance companies must concentrate more on an excessive risk 
assessment, possibly leaving the customers without an insurance altogether if the estimated 
risk exceeds a reasonable amount. What Ferguson et al. (2003) see, is that if all the parties 
(insurance companies and the customers) act for their own self-interest, it might drive 
those parties away from reaching a situation where all benefit. The authors see the system 
itself a problem: when unable to price their insurances viably, insurance companies turn to 
risk-classification, which according to the authors is unfair to some groups. Classification 
based on income-levels, neighborhoods or credit history might discriminate against some 
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groups more than others. Although Ferguson et al.’s (2003) study is strongly biased to the 
US and strongly emphasizes the political factor, which differs much country by country, 
their article explains well how the insurance companies generally operate. It would be 
impossible to charge fixed prices from everyone, because then the customers would deem 
the prices too high, which would then either lead to a situation where the government 
would intervene (as Ferguson et al. 2003 suggest) or to a situation, where the competition 
uses risk classifications to price their products, in which case the fixed priced insurances 
would only be affordable to those who belong to the higher risk groups in which case again 
– selling the insurances would not be viable. Since consumers will always be 
heterogeneous when it comes to risk, grouping people into different risk groups, no matter 
how small, will always lead to “mismatched” groups to some extent.   
Desyllas and Sako (2013) have studied how the US insurance company Progressive has 
used business model innovation with the adaptation of Pay-As-You-Drive insurance 
(PAYD-insurance), a form of telematics-based car insurance. The authors point out, that 
what characterizes the US insurance market is fierce price competition and “shift to more 
efficient insurer”. This basically means effective risk categorization: the better the 
customer segmentation (poor versus careful drivers) the better the profit margin/combined 
ratio since less damages need to be paid. According to Desyllas and Sako (2013) although 
there are several categories, that the insurance companies can use to classify their 
customers (such as age, living place, car brand etc.) they are still imperfect and therefore 
profits vary overtime. This could indicate that although the insurance business has 
developed a long way from the world that Bickley (1967) described, some of the basic 
problems still remain. Although we have better computers (more data with higher speed), 
and therefore more information to use, a better generalization is still a generalization.  
One important aspect in insurance competition which the authors mention is financial 
income. For example out of Progressives 9% operating margin 5/9, consisted of profit from 
the insurances (insurance premiums vs. claims and underwriting expenses) and 4/9 
consisted of financial income (invested capital) (Desyllas & Sako, 2013). The insurance 
companies can (and do) significantly increase their income by investing the money they 
have in their use at a given moment. However, this strategy is “heavily dependent on stock 
market cycles”.  What supports this claim, is the combined ratio of Progressive (ratio of 
claims and expense cost to income). If the combined ratio figure is below 100 it means that 
the company is profitable. In 2003 Progressive’s ratio was 87.3, which was well below the 
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average of the industry (94.6) (Desyllas & Sako, 2013). However, right after the financial 
crisis and the adaptation of PAYD, the combined ratio of Progressive was much higher at 
94.6, but nevertheless still lower than the industry average (wiki-invest, 2016). To 
overcome or reduce this dependency on the overall condition of the stock market is a 
strong competitive advantage to an insurance company. 
Desyllas and Sako (2013) note several differences on the new PAYD-based business 
model compared to a conventional insurance company business model. Firstly, they argue 
that the customer value proposition will alter significantly with the new technology. 
Whereas with traditional models, the customers only get the underwriting cover and 
“mental safety” that someone will financially cover them in a case of accident. With the 
PAYD-insurances they get “empowered”, in the sense that they can themselves affect how 
much they pay. Also, with the additional offerings such as roadside assistance and 
emergency button, they get to drive even safer than before and feel safer than ever before.  
The second difference is market segmenting. Whereas previously people have been 
segmented into groups, now Progressive can identify and charge the drivers according their 
individual characteristics (Desyllas & Sako 2013). This means, that whereas previously 
drivers were affected solely by their neighborhood, age, credit rating etc. now customers 
can affect their prices by their own behavior. They mention some of the groups that are 
most probable to benefit from the new offering of the company, such as lower-income 
customers, young customers and those with a bad credit rating. Also they point out, that 
with the additional offerings the company can generate a new segment of those people who 
are attracted by the additional offerings that can be attached to the PAYD-system. 
(Desyllas & Sako, 2013)  
Third difference is the change to the value chain of the company. Whereas previously 
information from customers has been collected at the time of creating a new insurance or 
later through surveys, with the new technology it is possible to collect information about 
their (driving) behavior all the time, and there is much more of it available. Also, the 
managing of the PAYD-insurances is done online, and the people who are willing to try it 
are more internet- and tech-savvy then insurance holders in general, which means savings 
to the company, since that means less work for brokers. (Desyllas & Sako, 2013)  
Fourthly, the value network of the company got some additions. Previously the most 
important stakeholders were suppliers, brokers, customers and the state.  Now there are 
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new stakeholders in the network, most notably telematics providers and telecommunication 
operators. (Desyllas & Sako, 2013) As we discussed earlier the relation to some (or 
possibly all) stakeholders will change with the new stakeholders entering the network (for 
example telematics providers). This might provide some challenges for the company.  
The fifth difference according to the authors (Desyllas & Sako, 2013) was about the profit 
formula of the company. Previously the revenue of the company was made from premiums 
of the insurances that were counted with the proxy factors (age living place credit rating 
etc.) Now that the premiums are counted according to individual driving behavior, there 
should be less customers who are imperfectly charged; for example customers who are 
young but still drive safely and not very much.  Also the costs will be affected: 
underwriting and paying claims on accidents will remain as big cost factors, but now that 
customers will change their driving behavior in order to reduce payments this should lead 
to overall less accidents and therefore less costs related to them. The authors do note, 
however, that selecting good drivers might not lead to “better” premiums at first, but it 
does still have an effect on renewal rates and accessing new market segments nevertheless. 
(Desyllas & Sako, 2013). What the new profit formula means, is that there will be smaller 
premiums, but they will be more “long-term” and “more safe” since the customers are 
more likely to renew their insurances with the new customers and less likely to drive an 
accident because of their new, safer driving behavior. So in other words: PAYD-system 
will help the insurance company to get more sustainable revenue and to reduce its costs.  
Finally, the whole competitive strategy of the company changes. Whereas, with a 
conventional insurance company business model, the company tries to take advantage of 
economies of scale by acquiring as many customers as possible, with the PAYD-insurance 
the company is more concerned in rewarding the “good customers”, and this way gaining 
customers from conventional insurances, gaining new market segments and making 
savings on underwriting and accident losses. (Desyllas & Sako, 2013) Supposedly one 
could argue from this, is that conventional insurance strategy is like producing one-size fits 
all clothes; they fit all, but some better than others (and some perhaps not at all). PAYD-
insurances then again are, at their best, tailored to the needs of each individual personally. 
The differences between the old and the new business model are depicted below in Table 
3.  
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Table 3: Business model changes for Progressive (Desyllas & Sako, 2013) 
 
Desyllas and Sako (2013) note that Progressive has been able to generate the new business 
model alongside the old one. This seems similar to what we discussed earlier about the 
findings of Cherborough (2010) about creating new business models alongside old one. It 
would be impossible to assume that one can know how the consumers will react to the 
product before it has been launched so the best idea is to let the new business model 
develop over time. In the case of Progressive for example the managers first thought that 
the new business model would contradict with the business model of the conventional 
insurances, but in fact found that they could keep it up alongside the old business model as 
they actually support each other instead of damaging. (Desyllas & Sako, 2013)  
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Despite being the first to offer a PAYD-product in the US and being very protective 
towards it intellectual property, competition followed Progressive shortly after the 
introduction of its PAYD-product. Progressive nevertheless gained a first-mover 
advantage, but there are some issues the authors note that will affect the competition in the 
field: firstly, the technology has matured and its cost have dropped. As telematics 
technology becomes a standard for many car models companies like Progressive lose their 
competitive advantage making PAYD-insurances more accessible to larger number of 
people and it is probably easier for other companies to join the race too, since they do not 
have to invest as money to the technology development as progressive did.  (Desyllas & 
Sako, 2013)  
Second change that is causing problems to the larger insurance providers such as 
Progressive, is that there has been constant growth in the telematics service providers. Like 
the cost drops in the technology itself, this change makes it easier to enter the PAYD-
insurance field even without big initial investments that Progressive did. (Desyllas & Sako, 
2013)  
Finally, the authors highlight the growing public concerns on privacy. The trend in social 
media and with other similar service is, that people are reluctant to give away their 
personal privacy. (Desyllas & Sako, 2013) The authors do not mention it, but this fact does 
raise up the question of information ownership too. Perhaps if customers are too reluctant 
to give way their information to insurance companies they might be more willing to do that 
if their information would be stored by the insurance company but owned by themselves. 
This could then again be negative development for the insurance companies, since it would 
make changing insurance companies easier for the customers (the customer could give 
his/her information to another insurance company) which would minimize the advantages 
they get from increased customer contract renewal through the PAYD-product.  
What Desyllas and Sako (2013) found out in their research is that designing and 
implementing a new business model is not enough by itself, but the firm should also 
capture the value that the new business model brings with it. This resonates with the claims 
of Porter (1985), McAfee et al. (2012), Chesborough (2009) and others, in the sense that 
new business models cannot be studied and perfectly implemented, but in fact they are 
formed through time and experimentation. One aspect, that Desyllas and Sako (2013) 
emphasize are the intellectual property rights, which they see as very important factors 
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when creating a new business model based on PAYD-systems, and also brought up by 
Teece (2006) as possibly one of the crucial factors when creating a new business model for 
innovations. However, Desyllas and Sako (2013) validate this point from Progressive’s 
perspective and how Progressive could have benefitted more from their new business 
model. However, Progressive was not a pioneer just in terms of business model innovation, 
but from technological perspective too. Still, although Progressive was fairly effective in 
protecting its intellectual property rights, it did not take long for competitors to show up as 
the authors point, reminding us of the dilemma between innovation and imitation.  
Whereas Desyllas and Sako (2013) focused on an individual insurance company, 
Karapipers et al. (2015) focus on the whole field of telematics-insurances in the United 
States.  They too see, that PAYD-insurances benefit the customers not only in price 
reduction but improved safety and claims experience. (Karapiperis et al 2015). As Desyllas 
and Sako (2013), Karapiperis et al. (2015) note that privacy is one of the core problems in 
PAYD-insurances for the customers and therefore for the providers as well. Karapiperis et 
al (2015), see that because of PAYD-insurances and other telematics insurances the whole 
insurance industry is moving towards becoming “a big data industry”.  They see that the 
reduction of cost in telematics technology has led to this situation.  
Desyllas and Sako (2013) focused in their study to Progressive which uses a method where 
the customers get discount to their current insurance payments if they drive less riskily. 
Another method mentioned by Karapiperis et al. (2015) is the one used by Allstate: that is, 
that the drivers will not receive any discounts but in fact they might lose insurance savings 
if they drive more riskily. State Farm is mentioned as a company that has more additional 
services included in their telematics offerings. This is a strategy recommended by Desyllas 
and Sako (2013) too.  
Karapiperis et. al (2015) describe the auto-insurance market in a way that correlates with 
the claims of Ferguson et al. (2003) and the viability of the insurance market in general. In 
the last ten years before the writing of the article by Karapiperis et al. (2015) the total 
premiums for the auto insurance industry in the United States has grown less than the 
inflation at the same time, and so they argue, that even those companies with more growth 
have succeeded in that by capturing market share from other companies, making 
“attraction, retention and accurate rating” more important goals than ever for insurance 
companies. (Karapiperis et al. 2015)  
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Progressive, which was the example by Desyllas and Sako (2013) is still mentioned as the 
market leader of auto insurances by Karapiperis et al. (2015). Perhaps even more without 
criticism, Karapiperis et al. (2015) see that Progressive has benefitted from its first mover 
advantage, since they were able to create new market space and gain customer loyalty by 
being first. The authors see, that latecomers of the user based insurance market may face 
serious disadvantages, since customer retention is proven to be cheaper then customer 
acquisition, so if some of the customers of the latecomers have been lured away with 
telematics-based insurances, it might prove difficult to get them back.  
Consumers too, seem to accept the product, and according to the authors, a study by 
Deloitte stated, that most of the car insurance policy holders would be ready to try a 
telematics based insurance. (Karapiperis et al. 2015) The customer value stems not only 
from the reduced price but from the add-on services. For insurers add-on services are of 
course a great possibility to generate extra revenue streams, to differentiate themselves and 
also to improve customer retention. The authors also mention gamification as a possibility 
for future customer value: in this scenario a customer could “play” against his friends in 
order to drive less or be more eco-friendly. (Karapiperis et al. 2015) 
Karapiperis et al. (2015) see tremendous possibilities for the industry to be revolutionized 
by the new technology. They note that according to some studies, insurers could offer 80% 
discounts on insurances and still be profitable. This could revolutionize the industry and 
change the pre-telematics era insurance competition rules portrayed by Ferguson et al 
(2003) and Bickley (1967). Karapiperis et al. (2015) remind too, that the change could 
happen fairly quickly, since as we have discussed, the first-mover advantage can be very 
beneficial, and seen from the other side, and latecomers can suffer significantly. Another 
aspect that harms the latecomers of telematics insurance technology, is that it is easier to 
do customer selection for those companies that are early adopters of the technology. Those 
customers who are more risk-prone by choice, or know that they are more risk-prone will 
probably join a UBI (usage based insurance)-service. However, if (or when) the technology 
is more common, it is possible for the company to raise the prices for those customers who 
refuse to join the program. Those customers will then find cheaper prices at a latecomer 
company, which does not offer a UBI-service. The less risk-prone customers of the 
latecomer company, however, will join the UBI-company and so the latecomer is left with 
more risk-prone customers then the other UBI-offering companies.  Naturally, some 
customers facing the possibility of reduced premiums will alter their driving behavior 
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making the previously risk-prone customers less risk-prone. This is obviously one of the 
most beneficial aspects of telematics insurances to insurance companies.  
Karapiperis et al (2015) see the lack of transparency as a major problem in how the UBI-
products have been brought to the market in the US. This is a very important point for two 
reasons. Firstly, as we mentioned customers can change the way how they drive and thus 
become less risk-prone meaning less accidents and less costs for the insurance company. 
However, they are only able to change their behavior if they know how they are measured. 
According to Karapiperis et al. (2015) customers won’t change their driving behavior as 
much if they do not know all the factors that have an impact to the price. Secondly, privacy 
protection is one of the main concerns with the technology (as noted by Desyllas and Sako, 
2013 too), but it probably won’t convince the customers that the information collected of 
them would be treated with caution, if they do not even know what information is being 
collected. (Karapiperis et al. 2015) No doubt transparent measurements would also lower 
the barrier of entry for new UBI customers.  
Although both Karapiperis et. al and Desyllas and Sako (2015, 2013) saw privacy as one of 
the main concerns for the customers Dericx et al. (2015) found in their research that since 
the UBI-offering companies also offer price reductions, the customers won’t feel too 
negatively about their personal information (they value the price reduction more than the 
loss of privacy). However, Dericx et al (2015) point out as well, that the customers do feel 
very negatively towards giving away their information to third-parties, which is something 
that companies striving to create good UBI-offers ought to avoid. This conclusion is 
supported by Kehr et al. (2015), who found out in their research that consumers are not 
really too concerned over their privacy, when they are offered a product which gives them 
financially positive benefits given by a “reliable institution” such as an insurance company. 
However, they did find out as well, that the results varied based on the pre-assessed 
attitudes towards the product (Kehr et al. 2015) This could mean, that a segment of the 
customers (though possibly not a large one) is more “privacy-aware” then others, and has a 
more negative view on products that could endanger his/her privacy.  
Not just researchers, but companies too are naturally interested in analyzing and 
researching issues related to telematics insurances. Willis Towers & Watson studied the 
consumer perspective where there is a wide interest towards usage-based insurances. 
According to a study made by Willis Towers & Watson (2014), which had over 7500 
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respondents from the US and six European countries, 90% of the respondents were ready 
to try a UBI-based insurance if there was no risk of their premium rising. This resonates 
with the findings about first-mover advantage  and what Desyllas and Sako (2013) found 
out about Progressive insurance strategy, meaning that being fast and acquiring as many 
customers as possible from the beginning could seem like a good strategy. Most of the 
survey-participants were willing to change their driving-habits and willing to pay for 
additional services (Willis Towers Watson, 2014). Ptolemus consulting group (2013) 
confirm in their research, that the market in the US seems to be ready for the new products: 
they note, that Progressive as first-mover in the field has successfully educated the 
customers about the new technology. According to them the recession forces the 
consumers to find new ways to save money (like UBI-insurances) and finally they see that 
there is an “initial rush” now that the product is fairly new.  
Another consulting company PWC (2016) has in their study found out, that most of the 
insurance CEO’s they interviewed felt that improved data analytics and telematics 
technology are “likely to change the industry” over the next five years. However, most of 
them feel threatened by the new technology as well, since they do not know how the 
customer needs will change because of the technology. Over regulation is mostly seen as 
the biggest obstacle to growth (PWC, 2016). Karapiperis et al. (2015) mentioned that in the 
United States the (state) government many times supports and even subsidizes telematics-
based car insurances because of their possible positive impact on the society in general. 
Still, there might be problems with the technology concerning intellectual property or the 
ownership of information for example. 
Looking at these findings from the perspective of the theoretical framework insurance 
companies would not seem to have much sense in leaving themselves out of the telematics-
based car insurances. Although erosion did hit its new business model, for a while 
Progressive was able to enjoy a first-mover advantage, from telematics-based car 
insurances, proving that the incremental rates of innovation were high enough. Then again, 
as it would seem from the writings of Karapiperis et al. (2015) the latecomers did benefit 
as well, meaning there is a strong incentive for imitating too. It would seem, that insurance 
business is not affected by the theoretical framework created in this study; telematics 
provides a new way to escape the contested marketplace to better offer customer value. 
However, the articles we have discussed, are mainly from the US. Although the products 
and the basic-principles behind insurances are similar across the globe, the Finnish 
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regulatory environment has made the business models of Finnish companies different, 
leaving them to ponder the question presented in the theoretical framework, despite the 
fact, that they were not as relevant to the US insurance companies. There is no literature on 
the forces affecting the Finnish insurance companies, so seven interviews with Finnish 
insurance managers were conducted to find out what makes the Finnish insurance market 
different. Before taking a closer look on the results of those interviews we will discuss the 
methodology of this study and how those interviews were conducted.  
 
8. METHODOLOGY  
 
 
8.1 The Research Context  
 
The onto-epistemological starting point for this study is objective. It is both assumed that 
“the social world has existence independently of people and their actions and activities” 
and to “expect there to be a world that is external and theory-neutral”. (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008, p. 11-25). In other words; from a philosophical perspective, we do not 
see the world as something that can be changed just by the actors changing their views or 
understanding about it, but as something that exists independently of them.    
To understand the chosen methodology of this study, one has to first keep in mind its main 
research question “how slow-moving or traditional industries and companies react on 
disruptive technological advancements?” and its sub-questions a) How are the business 
models of regulatory bound companies constructed? b) How does the similarity of business 
models affect competition? And c) How do slow-moving or traditional companies react to 
the innovativeness of their competitors?  The theoretical framework made to help answer 
those questions was discussed and created earlier in this study. As we found out, there is 
much theory available on disruptive technologies, business model innovation, regulations 
relation to business models and on innovation and imitation. Studying those topics helped 
us to create context for the research question, and the sub-questions. Still, without 
conducting our own research, it is impossible to answer the sub-questions or the research 
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question confidently. This is why we now move on to discuss how the findings of this 
study were conducted and for what reasons. As the answer to the research question of this 
study is not possible to be a numerical one, qualitative research over quantitative, and more 
specifically a grounded theory approach research to be the most suited for this study. We 
will go more in to detail about these choices in this chapter.  
 8.2 A grounded theory  
 
To find the answer to the research question of this study we need to use the theoretical 
framework to create, together with the findings of the study, a new theory which explains 
this particular study and is also applicable to other similar contexts. To achieve this, 
grounded theory is needed, since it, as Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008, p. 158) put it “the 
grounded theory approach is developed for theorizing from the data through and with the 
help of a highly formalized and descriptive methodology”. As they later then continue 
“…theory development thus takes place in immediate ‘contact’ with the data: the closeness 
of the data is ever present in the grounded theory approach.” (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 
2008, p. 161) To create the explaining theory for this study, the context specific findings 
are very important. Another approach, less formalized and less in contact with the data 
would be good for a case study, where the researcher sees, if the theory fits the context or 
not, however, as we are now searching a new theory to explain the research question, no 
“stone should be left turn” and to this grounded theory is a well suited approach.  
What comes clear from all of this is, that the data-analysis is, where the uniqueness of 
grounded theory approach is most evident and that the analysis and interplay with it and 
the data collection is important in grounded theory. As Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008, p 
156) put it” …this new theory should consist of a set of plausible relationships proposed 
among concepts and sets of concepts is the outcome of the method's application. Therefore, 
it is possible to say that theory is an outcome of empirical analysis.” We will discuss the 
analysis and how it was done in this study more in detail later in this chapter.   
Although this study has some similarities to cases-study approach and to cross-case 
analysis, it is important to understand the difference between the selected grounded theory 
approach and the former approaches. As Yin puts it: “A case study is an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” 
(Yin, 2013 p.13) In this study however, there is no ready-made clear phenomenon which 
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could be directly “tried out” in the real life context of this study, but instead there is a 
larger theoretical context which to some extent is applicable to it but not completely, 
making grounded theory a better choice. 
 8.3 The samples  
 
Seven different managers from Finnish insurance companies are interviewed in this thesis. 
The main reason for the sample size comes from the core principles of grounded theory. 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967) a researcher should have as many samples as 
needed to have enough variety in the answers in order to have all the categories that will 
come out of the subject and to reach saturation. It should be noted here as well, that 
maximizing the samples or having as many as possible, can be very few depending of the 
study. In this case seven was enough to create saturation, and the number of respondents 
interviewed means, that this study covers basically all of the Finnish car insurance market 
making its results more valid. Seven is coincidentally also a sample size for qualitative 
analysis which is approved by several authors discussing qualitative methods (for example 
Eisenhardt 1989, Farqhuar 2012, Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008).  
There were three main criteria for the people to be interviewed: they needed to be familiar 
with insurance competition dynamics in Finland, they needed to be familiar with the 
strategy and business model of their own company and finally, they needed to know about 
the new telematics-based insurances. This criteria emphasizes the respondents’ knowledge 
of strategy over technology. This is so, because the research question of this thesis is about 
how a company makes strategic decisions over new innovation, not about the particular 
innovation itself. A person more familiar with the business side than the technological side 
is better to answer in a way that relates to the topic of this thesis. To make sure, that the 
respondents met with the criteria an HR manager was first contacted, with whom the topic 
of this thesis would be discussed and then a conclusion would be made on whom to contact 
for the actual interview.  
8.4 Collection methods 
  
Despite some more precise follow-up questions, the interviews were conducted mostly in a 
narrative form were the questions were open-ended and the respondents encouraged to tell 
with their own words how a situation is built or how they feel about an issue. This was 
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done to find out the true relation of the company and the industry towards the new 
innovation and the industry in general. Each manager needed, and was given a possibility 
to freely speak his/her mind over the issues. It needed to be found out if there were issues 
which would be hard to find out in the questions otherwise; with very strict questions and 
time limit this would not have been possible. All of the manager interviews were scheduled 
for an hour and lasted from 50 minutes to few minutes past an hour. All interviews except 
one were conducted face-to-face. The one that was not face-to-face was conducted via 
Skype.  In one case there were two respondents speaking for one company instead of one 
interviewee. These two respondents will still be discussed as one person later in this thesis 
to protect their anonymity and for reasons of clarity.  
Both in the managerial interviews and the client interviews Farqhuar’s (2012) advice was 
followed; firstly as an interviewer I tried my best to be discrete and respectful by stating 
that the interview can be stopped at any time, and reminded them that their anonymity in 
this research is guaranteed and noted that the interview is recorded, but that the recording 
is only used for this study. Farqhuar’s (2012) other advice is to “use language that is 
comprehensible and familiar to the informants”. In this case however, terminology was 
used fairly freely; if someone did not know what was meant with a term related to the 
industry that already tells something about the company and the respondent. Since 
Farqhuar’s (2012, p. 73) one main point is that the researches should “keep scrupulous 
records of who (including detail of position, how long they have worked for the company 
and how long they have been in that job), when, where, how long” all of that information 
was asked before the interview started. Also it was asked how long of an experience the 
interviewees have from insurance industry and whether they have worked in the same 
company for the whole time.   
The managers were given freedom to tell how they feel about different issues, although 
there were several individual questions/points an answer was needed to. This is why some 
of the questions were more open than other. There needed to be open questions in case 
something important would be missed – letting the interviewees talk freely reduced this 
risk. However, if the respondents were unable to address an important point that needed to 
be somehow commented, a more specific follow-up question would then be presented.  
The interview was categorized into three main topics. Firstly, what determines the Finnish 
insurance competition and how is the Finnish insurance business environment. Secondly, 
how should a business model of a Finnish insurance company be built. Thirdly, the 
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respondents’ were asked questions to determine their opinions and judgements on 
telematics based car insurances, and how they would change both the business models of 
the companies and the competition in the industry.   
After each interview, Farqhuar’s (2012) final advice was followed and an “aide-mémoire”, 
constructed, meaning instant analytical notes after and during the interview. The purpose 
of these notes was to gather possible “highlights” which occurred during or right after the 
interview and were helpful later determining categories in grounded theory coding.  
8.5 Comparative analysis: grounded theory and coding 
 
As there is no ready-made theory which would answer the research question or perfectly 
match the situation at hand, the results are analyzed and coded consistent with the 
grounded theory first introduced by Glaser and Strauss (1967). According to them, one can 
use qualitative data to form a new theory by creating categories out of the evidence and 
then comparing these to each other. In practice this was done by writing down all the 
interviews and then coding them with accurate codes, which could then be put into a 
category, which then ended up as groups in the findings of this study. What is important 
with grounded theory, is that no theoretical framework nor any hypothesis or presumptions 
affect the emergence of the categories. The authors ask the researcher “to be theoretically 
sensitive” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The data needs to be what leads the researcher to a 
certain category and then theory. The coding process itself was done with the help of 
Atlas.ti program. During coding four different categories and out of these categories one 
main-category of which the others were reliant on was defined as well.  
The analysis of this study already started at the end of the interviews with the “aide-
mémoire” written right after the interviews. Like Farqhuar (2012), Eriksson and 
Kovalainen (2008, p. 127) state too that “(researcher) starts the analysis of empirical data 
very early on in their research. Even if methods books (this one included) present data 
collection and data analysis as separate processes, in practice they are seldom so clearly 
separable from each other.” Also in grounded theory, it is important to remember, that the 
hypothesis only needs to be “suggested not proved”, while creating the different categories 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The aide-memoire and writing down / reading the interviews 
helped to grasp the emerging hypothesis and then create codes and categories.  
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Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) note that grounded theory has been criticized, because it is 
not widely applicable: to some studies it is not a proper fit, while for some it is. However, 
for this particular study grounded theory is suitable, because despite the fact that there is a 
fair amount of literature about issues that revolve around insurance companies and 
innovating overall, the true nature of the issue had to be solved from the interview results. 
As Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008, p. 156) state it themselves: “What is specific for the 
grounded theory approach in comparison with other qualitative methods and approaches is 
that the constant overlap and interplay between data collection and analysis phases is given 
specific procedural and rather formal form… Therefore, it is possible to say that theory is 
an outcome of empirical analysis.” There is no public peer reviewed studies on how the 
Finnish insurance market operates and how this affects innovations. Using telematics 
insurances, which are widely known but not in use in the Finnish insurance companies, a 
new theory can be formed based on literature synthesis and the interview results. To do 
this, grounded theory is needed. This notion can be backed up by what Grbich (2012, p. 
79) writes as well. According to her grounded theory is best suited to “specific 
environments” (which the Finnish insurance industry is) and when “there is little or no 
knowledge of the area”, “all related aspects of interaction in particular setting is to be 
observed” and “when there is a need for a new theoretical explanation to changes in the 
field based on empirical knowledge”. All of these requirements are fulfilled in this study. 
Though grounded theory is the base of the analysis in this study, advice from other 
qualitative sources has been used as well, whenever they have been applicable with 
grounded theory as it was explained by Glaser and Strauss (1967). This was done to get a 
big picture in what is important in qualitative analysis and what is not. 
The coding style for this research mostly correlates to what Eriksson and Kovalainen 
(2008) describe as “selective coding”. Some reflections have also been taken from 
Grbiches (2012) and Pulliam’s (2010) advice on how to conduct coding in qualitative 
research in general from the parts that these advice correlate with the restrictions of 
grounded theory. According to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) in selective coding the 
level of abstraction rises higher the further one goes to the analysis. Also, in this form of 
coding, as the codes are being put in to the categories, one of the categories (the “core 
category”) is selected to be the basis of the theory being formed.  In grounded 
theory/selective coding the difficulty is to create the different categories and to find the 
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hypothetical relationships. This is why Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) say that memos 
have an important meaning. Writing memos helps to conceptualize the emerging theory.  
Grbich (2012) advice to “read and re-read your database” was helpful too – after the 
information was gathered the information was read again as well. This way it was easier to 
start to make the memos and to conceptualize the categories. Phillips (2010, p. 169) too 
mentions that one should “re-observe and reread all the findings.” The purpose behind this 
is to find new insights by rethinking if there is something that was missed the previous 
times. (Phillips, 2010).  The point is nevertheless that one should read the interview data 
enough to “get the big picture”. The researcher should not instantly grab of something and 
follow that lead, but to make sure he or she understands what the theme of the dataset 
really is. As Phillips (2010, p. 169) puts it one should “keep a discovery mindset” and “be 
objective”.  
One aspect of grounded theory is, as we discussed, the fact that the whole research is 
reliant to the theory, which emerges from the data. Any theoretical framework would be 
built after this, since as Glaser and Strauss (1967) put it: “a pre-made theoretical 
framework will blind the researcher from the richness of the incoming data”. However 
because of time management reasons and for the purpose of master thesis seminar and the 
schedule of the thesis process, a theoretical framework was done before collecting the data. 
Nevertheless, any effect by this was minimized by following Grbich’s (2012, p. 61) rule to 
“recall ones research questions, theoretical framework, methodology and the literature” 
and to “decide what the most appropriate method for your data is”. This meant, that the 
focus was on the interviews and they were looked with “fresh eyes”, and only after 
understanding to which direction the theory is going the initial theoretical framework was 
modified.  
Another advice from Grbich (2012, p. 61) is to “underline/color key segments and/or write 
description comments alongside the comments where further insight is useful”. This and 
coding in general too was easiest to do with Atlas.ti software. The coding itself was done 
so, that as specific codes as possible were used, to get as many categories as possible as 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that the researcher should do. While coding an initial 
code from the interviews I would simultaneously write a memo which helped me to come 
up with the next code. These codes could then be arranged into families, which would then 
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be used as categories to help to formulate the final theory. This process has been depicted 
with the help of some examples in Figure 3.  
Authors writing about coding or qualitative research find categorization as an important 
part of the research: Grbich says to attach overarching labels and identify subgroupings 
(Grbich, 2013). Pulliam (2010) calls this “identifying key categories”. Stakes (1995) 
mentions conceptual categorization as an important part of thematic order too.  
Finally, after the categorization was done it was possible to renew the theoretical 
framework after which it was possible to “conceptualize these groupings and link with 
literature and theory” as suggested by Grbich (2013). This is where the results of analysis 
takes place. After all the ground work had been done it was possible to start to link the 
findings to the theory and literature. At this point, it was possible to see how the different 
groupings linked with some of the main concerns about the adaptation of telematics 
insurances found in the literature. Also the theoretical framework was used to highlight 
how the findings are supported by existing literature and on the other hand, what makes the 
theory of this thesis unique.  
The coding process of this thesis, with some examples from the findings has been depicted 
below in Figure 3. From the figure we can understand how the analysis was done: first the 
written down quotes were coded, then these codes where inserted into suitable categories, 
and from those categories the groups that are in the findings of this thesis have been 
constructed.  
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Figure 3: The coding process of this thesis 
 
8.6 Discussion of ethics in this study  
 
With interviews there are naturally always some ethical concerns. Most importantly, 
research-participant relations is an ethical topic which needs to be considered in this kind 
of research. Firstly, it was made sure, with each participant, that there was their consent to 
tape the interviews and it was told to them that they can ask the taping to be stopped 
whenever they wanted. Everyone was promised anonymity and so no real names of people 
or companies are used. Whenever real company names are used in thesis, it is because they 
have been mentioned as an example; any of those companies that have been mentioned did 
not necessarily participate in this thesis. The positions of the respondents were still vaguely 
mentioned, because it can make a difference who is being interviewed: it has meaning 
whether or not the answers come from a sales manager or from a CEO of a company. 
Confidentiality, consent and respect are all ethical issues in research which Kovalainen and 
Eriksson (2008) bring up as well.  Farquhar (2012) too lists confidentiality, integrity and 
transparency as key parts of research ethics. He also notes that the researcher should avoid 
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doing harm to any of the participants. These problems were tackled by a promise that this 
thesis will be sent to them when it would be done. It was also made sure, that all the 
participants have my contact information, so that they know who to contact in case 
questions emerge.  
9. FINDINGS  
 
9.1 The Regulatory Boundaries of the Finnish Insurance Market 
 
The regulatory boundaries of the Finnish insurance market is the first and the main 
category. What was found out, was that high regulations and especially the high coverage 
in traffic insurance make the Finnish business environment unique for insurance 
companies. The coverage is described even as the best in Europe or the whole world as In 
Finland traffic insurance is like a continuum to social security and made to protect third 
parties. This makes Finnish traffic insurance companies different than those US companies 
that were discussed in our literature overview of the insurance business. This also makes 
the Finnish insurance market more applicable with the theoretical framework created in 
this study, as the respondents see the regulations as a limiting factor in terms of new 
innovations.  
According to some of the respondents, the insurance is mandatory for all car owners in 
Finland, which has led to saturation in the market and to price competition. Still, none of 
the companies have yet to engage themselves in telematics based car insurances which 
could make it possible for them to escape the price competition and to offer new customer 
value, as depicted in the theoretical framework and what was done by Progressive as 
Desyllas and Sako (2013) noted. Instead, what would seem to hold true, is that the price 
competition is not severe enough to hit the profits of the companies, and that holding on to 
the profitable business model is a more secure option, than embracing new innovations.  
The regulations and the social aspect of the companies affect their brand too: no company 
is willing to risk their brand by testing the limits of the law. Even though insurance is a 
business of trust, if a company were to increase the level of justice with new innovation 
like telematics, it is better first to wait and see, that the legislation is surely ready for it. 
However, making changes to the law is not a fast not an easy task. For the lawmaker to 
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have an interest in changing the law, there must be a public debate about it. There can be 
constitutional issues, which makes changing the law more difficult and slower and some of 
the laws might come from EU regulations diminishing the local legislative power of the 
Finnish parliament. There is a change coming nevertheless: the renovation of the traffic 
insurance law by the beginning of 2017. This does not change the outlining principles of 
insurance business, but is to an extent more approving of telematics and vehicle 
automatization. At least when it comes to the renovation of the traffic insurance laws, it 
would seem that the companies have followed the advice of Paraskevopolou (2012) to 
actively informing the lawmakers.  
Though the environment is restrictive (or perceived as such) this was mostly seen as a 
positive aspect. For a long time this has prevented outsiders to join the Finnish market, 
protecting the companies not unlike those of the medical industry as depicted by Hwang & 
Christensen (2008), or Herzlinger et al. (2006), raising the questions of the literature 
framework from this research: why to invest in something that might harm the current 
profitable business model, as none of your competitors do not seem to act, and outsiders 
“cannot enter”. However, the respondents did note, that because of digitalization this can 
be changing, and other might in fact be able to enter the market. If these parties entering 
the market would do that with telematics, that would naturally raise questions of imitation 
as discussed in the theoretical framework.   
Innovating new product like telematics can bring even more legal confusion according to 
the respondents: information laws, laws and possibilities on transparency and privacy laws 
are all questions with no clear answer to. These were nevertheless depicted as great 
challenges to US companies as well by Desyllas and Sako (2013) and Karapiperis et al. 
(2015). Still, in the US telematics based car insurances are on sale in Finland they are not.  
The limits of the Finnish insurance market led to a state, where the competition happens in 
a narrow state. Risk management is the main component of competitive advantage for all 
the companies, as they all operate under the same main principle: many pay for the 
damages of the few. The industry also moves as one: if one of the larger companies is 
doing well, it usually means, that so are the others too. Car insurance is despite the 
saturation (or perhaps because of it) the main product of all the companies. Pricing, 
underwriting and investing processes all need to be efficient. Mimicking and copying other 
companies’ strategies is considered normal in the business. To gain customers, pricing is 
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considered to be the main component. These were all very traditional ways of competing 
for the companies, as was brought up by Bickley (1967) too and highlighted by the 
respondents. The regulatory environment seems to have created a similar way of looking 
the business models as was presented by Lucas & Goh (2009) on Kodak: even if there is a 
new revolutionizing technology that could address customer value in completely new 
ways, it might not be attractive to the companies as it might risk “how things have always 
been done.”  
  We can note, that issues like risk management, regulations and processes affect the whole 
industry so much that it creates actual and “safety” borders, inside of which the companies 
operate.  In this category we have studied how the borders in the theory created in this 
thesis have been formed. In the following categories we will go deeper, in how the 
companies operate inside these borders, and how they perceive the possibilities, given 
outside the borders. The way the businesses are constructed is so, that they are all in a 
narrow area inside the borders, and they consider the move to outside the borders as too 
risky. For these reasons this first category was selected to be the main category, as it 
defines the other categories in a sense that Glaser and Strauss (1967) meant. 
9.2 Respondents: the regulations and the Finnish car insurance market  
 
Starting from this part of the study we will go through what the respondents actually said, 
to back up the findings discussed. All the interviews were conducted in Finnish, so in 
many occasions a direct translation is not used. This is, because a direct translation would 
lose some or all of the original meaning of the respondent. From here on, whenever a direct 
translation as accurate as possible from the respondents is being used, that part has been 
marked in italics. The respondents will be called “A, B, C, D, E, F” and “G”, to protect 
their anonymity. 
This is the first, and the main category which was found in the coding: “the regulatory 
boundaries of the Finnish insurance market”. The name of this category means the 
regulations affecting the insurance business in Finland, what the companies think about the 
regulations and how they, according to the respondents, affects their competition 
dynamics. As was already argued, what becomes apparent in the answers is that this 
category is the biggest force explaining why the Finnish insurance market is slow to 
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change and fairly passive towards new innovations, especially when it comes to car 
insurances.  
One of the core issues in Finnish insurance business is the regulation around it. The 
industry is highly regulated and there are limitations on pricing and other factors but also 
forced coverage.  As respondent A put it: “the legal obligations force us to act in a certain 
way…especially when it comes to the obligatory traffic insurance”. The same manager saw 
that the most restricting part in the law, that it makes the Finnish traffic insurance “the 
widest and most comprehensive car insurance in Europe, as it has no limits on 
compensations and accidents can lead the insurance company to paying compensation up 
to 70 years”.  
B had similar thoughts and named the Finnish traffic insurance to be “the best in Europe”. 
He continued that the applicability of foreign business models to Finnish insurance market 
is therefore limited. It is difficult to say whether or not the Finnish regulation truly is the 
most comprehensive in Europe or the world – how to even measure such a thing? 
However, it is more important to note that the regulation is very comprehensive and that 
the managers can feel that it is even the most comprehensive legislation in which they and 
their company needs to operate.  
All the interviewees except one brought up the importance of the wide compensation of the 
traffic insurance as a limiting factor. Interviewee C pointed out, that the obligatory traffic 
insurance is in a way “a continuum to a person’s social security” and went on even further 
than others by calling the Finnish traffic insurance “the most comprehensive car insurance 
in the world”. He, continued that since the companies need to keep a buffer in case bigger 
accidents happen (since they cannot be predicted beforehand) there must be a certain price 
level on the insurances. There needs to be enough payments, so that a Finnish insurance 
company can hold the buffer and be profitable.  
The whole logic of a traffic insurance is different in Finland compared to other countries as 
we learn from interviewee C: in other countries people are insured, whereas in Finland the 
license plate is insured. The obligation of insuring according to interviewee C then again, 
ensures that many people have some kind of insurance and connections to insurance 
companies (possibility to sell more insurances to them). The traffic insurance in Finland is, 
according to D, “made to protect the third parties” in contrast to other countries where the 
target can be the insurance taker.  The biggest possibilities for growth for insurance 
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companies C sees however “in personal insurances, such as an accident cover or health 
insurances” instead of in car insurances. Since everybody who owns a car has to take an 
insurance, the saturation level is high.  
One aspect that derives from the fact, that the traffic insurance is so strongly regulated is, 
that the companies are not allowed to either over-price or down-price the insurances in the 
big picture, as stated by E. However, these principles are non-existent in voluntary 
insurances including voluntary car insurances. Traffic insurance can therefore be the 
product that draws the customer in but the better margin is drawn from the voluntary 
insurances. This can be applied vice versa as well: lowering the prices of the voluntary 
insurances helps to get the customers to pay the premium of the obligatory insurances. C 
nevertheless sees the issue differently: to him, “the only things that government regulates 
in pricing the insurances is that accidents need to have an effect to the payments and that 
the pricing factors need to have a connection to the risk”. Essentially both C and E are 
talking about the same thing, but where other sees risk factors in regulation as a limiting 
issue, the other does not. 
 F is clearer about this. To him, the conservativeness and especially the laws around it 
restrict the business, and according to him selling insurances is “a business of trust”. No 
insurance company is therefore willing to try the boundaries of the regulations because, 
they risk losing their reputation as a trustworthy company and losing their brand value. F 
sees, that, the new telematics-based insurances can increase the level of “justice” (which 
will from here on be a translation of the Finnish word “oikeudenmukaisuus” which could 
also translate to “righteousness” or “equity”)  among the customers both in insurance 
payments and compensations, but again, for this to be successful “the legislation needs to 
be updated” he states. What this means, is that according to F even if an insurance 
company can increase the level of justice with telematics, no action should still be taken 
towards the innovation before the legislation has been updated.  
The law which regulates the obligatory traffic insurance is due to change at the beginning 
of 2017. The interviewees are waiting for it to be somewhat more flexible, then the 
previous legislation, D for example stated that “the new law will be more applicable to new 
products such as telematics based car insurances.” According to E one should 
nevertheless not overemphasize what the new legislation will actually change: “the new 
legislation is supposed to bring more openness and competition, but it cannot change the 
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core principles. But it will give a possibility for better and more flexible models.” He notes 
that the need for the reform does not stem just from telematics industry but the coming of 
the autonomous vehicles too.  
The reform of the traffic insurance law has been an example on how slow and complicated 
the process of law reformation can be as stated by B: “I have carefully followed the 
reforming of the law and I think it well represents how of a slow and massive project it is 
to change established laws. There might even be constitutional problems ahead, so it is not 
easy.”  Some of the laws do not today even stem from Finland but “the EU-regulations 
have had an impact too” as pointed out by A. F continues, that if the benefits for the 
society are clear, then the legislation will be easier to modify, but this does require a public 
nation-wide political debate on what the society wants. All of these examples show, which 
large obstacles there can be in reforming the laws.  
It seems, that the technological progress is driving an inevitable change to the legislation. 
A supports this and claims that the current legislation is enduring a hard pressure because 
of the changes in the business environment and is “in need of the reformation anyway”. 
Then again, G notes, that the legislation has according to him, never stopped the industry 
from doing what they have wanted, and sees no problem that the legislation would pose for 
future endeavors.  However, he was also the only respondent who saw, that legislation has 
little to do with his job, and said that “I leave thinking of the law to others-I do not concern 
myself with legal issues, others can tell me whether or not something is doable or not from 
a legal perspective.” As G’s job-title and duties are more technical than those of others 
(who hold managerial positions), his comments about this do not necessarily represent how 
legislation truly affect strategic planning from the managerial perspective.  
This regulation is not necessarily seen just as an “obstacle to change” but can in fact have a 
positive tone as well. A sees, that because of the intensive regulation the Finnish insurance 
market “has been safe from outside (foreign) competitors.” The fear or the waiting of the 
foreign competitor seems to be a major issue for the companies.  However, he too sees that 
because of digitalization and the spread of the internet the obstacles for market entry have 
lowered significantly. This could mean, that “the outsiders” are already in better position to 
enter the Finnish market, and after reformation (lightening legislation) it will be even 
easier for them to enter.  
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Not just current regulations but future regulations are a concern to the companies as well. 
With telematics based insurances privacy laws seem to be a major source of uncertainty. 
What mostly concerned the interviewees, was that the regulations on personal privacy 
which seemed unclear to many of them. A saw “the usage of information, the control of 
information and how it can be surveyed” as problems which are still open and says they 
pose “a real challenge” for the insurance companies. One of the changes in the 
reformation of the traffic insurance law will be, that the different factors affecting the price 
are going to be “more transparent” according to A. Transparency, as we have discussed in 
the literature review, could prove a challenge to the insurance companies. According to F, 
the basic pricing factors should be given to the customers, at least in order to educate them 
if nothing else. 
For C the ownership of the information, which would be gathered with the telematics 
insurances, is clear: “the client owns the information” according to him. He says that this is 
based on European regulations. E sees too, that the ownership is in the hands of the 
customer, but the insurance company has the right to use that information.  
However, B sees privacy as a “major question legally” and something that definitely 
cannot be overlooked with the telematics based insurances. For B the ownership of the 
information belongs to the customer, but if the customer has agreed and committed to give 
out information to the insurance company then the information belongs to the company. 
According to D, this is just a matter of the agreement. F then again does not see the 
question of privacy merely as a question of agreement between the customer and the 
company, but also as a question on how far the company can go before some universal 
privacy laws, which cannot be overcome just with an agreement, are broken. He mentions 
that this has not been at least according to his knowledge, studied that much, and mentions 
the telematics based health insurances as an example.   
So the regulations are according to all the interviewees except one, fairly strict, and if not 
in theory, at least in practice, a limiting factor. This limitation leads to the fact that the 
strategies of the different companies are very similar. Their attitude towards privacy laws 
seems to be puzzled and distinctive of each other.   
G says, that the basic competition is about risk, and who is best at managing it. However 
he continues, that although it is at the core of the business, calculating risk has its limits. 
Companies cannot pay less and less payments forever, or they will end up with no one to 
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pay them back. That is because more compensations means more incoming payments as 
well. Also the combined ratio according to G goes in line with all the different companies: 
if one of the bigger companies is doing well, then so are the others too.  
For most of the companies car insurances bring in the biggest part of their revenue. For this 
reason, when it comes to the different insurance products the car insurances are “the 
flagship for all the different companies” according to G. This possibly leads the companies 
to be even more alert with changes in competition with car insurances then other products. 
E notes that “what unites the Finnish insurance companies is, that the car insurances make 
a large part of their revenue”. He sees, that in future there might be risks for the 
companies associated with declining revenue although the payment – compensation 
relation would become better. When cars become safer through telematics or 
automatization less accidents happen, which then leads to smaller premiums for the 
companies.  
According to C, the similarity of the offerings does not concern only the old products 
however, but new ones as well. If some company makes a new successful product, others 
will follow according to him, or at least try to match the same customer need. This would 
according to him be true with telematics insurances as well: there would be small or no 
first mover advantage as others could soon follow behind. Also the basic principle is the 
same for everyone according to him: “many pay the damages of a few”. In this sentence 
lies the logic of insurance business which was discussed in insurance literature review as 
well: to maximize the profits the insurance company should maximize the amount of “the 
many” who are paying and minimize “the damages of the few”. The most efficient way to 
do this is through risk selection.  
In an intense competition in a limited space, no “extra fat” can be carried around. E states 
this, by saying that “what is important for every insurance company is to keep the 
processes as efficient as possible”. Although there can be larger accidents which affect the 
combined ratio throughout the year and are impossible to predict beforehand, every 
company needs to focus on two main processes according to E: the other being risk 
management (how much risk is the company willing to tolerate) and the other is the 
efficiency of underwriting. If other or both of these are neglected the combined ratio won’t 
stay good forever according to him. He also sees there to be a tendency for Finnish 
insurance companies to copy the strategies of one another: if another Finnish company 
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makes a new innovation, it will soon be examined by the rest of the companies. This notion 
is shared by B, who thinks that “it is a normal form of competition.” F too sees this 
tendency, and reminds, that the copying is not limited to pricing or sales strategies but also 
concerns for example pricing strategies or the terms and conditions of the insurances. He 
sees, that especially in car insurances “the insurance companies move as one”. He notes, 
that with some larger issues like severe personal injuries, the industry as a whole does 
have, and needs to have, a single response to. F talks about efficiency as well and 
compares the processes to Toyota’s lean production (although highlighting the distinction 
between the industries): using analytics correctly is important. Available data needs to be 
used well both in pricing and marketing. He also mentions risk management, and online-
services.  
D sees that “the industry in Finland is saturated and that there are four different main 
processes which are important to all the companies.” Firstly, product development 
processes, secondly customer acquisition processes, thirdly insurance compensation 
processes and fourthly investing processes. He also reminds, that all information which can 
prevent accidents is important to insurance companies. All of this reminds of what others 
stated about efficiency. Everybody is competing in the same field with the same 
“weapons”.  
B too highlights the importance of fluency of the processes in the company. Both the 
insuring and compensating processes should be efficient according to him. He also reminds 
of branding by bringing up the importance of fairness in the business. For F the 
competition in insurance business is more of a price competition then competition of new 
products. To him the insurance companies in Finland are also mostly “traditional” and “act 
in a certain way”.  
As companies tend to follow the same path, the change seems to be incremental and slow. 
As mentioned earlier, A sees, that the regulations has been keeping Finnish insurance 
companies “safe from foreign competitors”, but because of the internet and digitalization 
this might be about to change. And at least if there are no companies operating yet there is 
“interest to do so” according to him.  
It seems, that it is not just that the insurance companies themselves who are deemed to 
move slow but to some extent the customers too. G notes, that the customers are fairly 
passive as well, and the renewal rates are low. For this reason all of the companies 
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generally strive for long-term relationships with the customers, as seems to be the case 
vice-versa as well, meaning that the customers wish to have long-term partnerships with 
the companies. He also reminds, the customers are fairly conservative too: the pricing for 
competition has been allowed only from the mid 90’s, which means, that the current state 
of competition is still young for both the companies and the customers.    
9.3 Similarities in business models and differentiation between the companies 
 
In the previous category we already noticed, how regulation directly affects the processes 
of the insurance companies. What was also stated by all the respondents was that the 
insurance companies strive for profitability in Finland. This means, that they do not 
underprice their insurances to get customers, which could be a possibility in insurance 
business, as the companies could patch the losses from low insurance premiums with 
investment profits. In Finland however, the companies are profitable not just because of 
the investments but because of the insurance premiums as well.  
To keep the company profitable in terms of insurances, risk management and risk scoring 
have an important role. Telematics based insurances could help with this according to all 
the respondents, but the new technology also brings up a dilemma: the insurance 
companies need a critical mass to sustain an insurance. However, if they get a critical mass 
they (normally) get more accidents too. However, if telematics based insurances lessen the 
amount of accidents, the premiums of the insurances will go down too. So the dilemma in 
this is, that accidents are very costly for the companies, but still, many accidents usually 
means many clients too and therefore more revenue. Although the size of the customer 
volume for new innovations no doubt is a serious question for the insurance companies in 
Finland, this still points to a situation of innovation and profitable business model as 
presented in the theoretical framework. Investing in telematics carries a risk of reducing 
the current profits.  
Still, if the technological change is inevitable, as was claimed by several of the 
respondents, one should try to take advantage of it. This then again leads to similar 
questions over imitation as illustrated in the theoretical framework: if this inevitable 
technological change will bring new threats such as outside competitors to the market, 
perhaps they should be prepared to imitate. Imitation then again, always needs some 
amount of innovation as stated by Pepall (1997) and Jenkins (2014). Being ready to 
counter these new entrants through this method, would surely require some changes in the 
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organizational culture, if the perspective currently is that “the current business model 
should not be jeopardized in any circumstances”.  
 Customers can be gained from other companies through extra offerings, price and 
customer experience. However, these extra offerings usually mean something extra in an 
insurance, for example a rental car service in case of an accident. These are easy to imitate 
and in reality all the insurance packages which are offered are very similar to each other. 
Telematics might help to move from current homogenous offers to heterogeneous offers, 
but only if the product is not imitable, in which case in principle heterogeneous service will 
become homogenous. Sales channels are a possibility to differentiate and an important part 
of the business model of every company. To gain efficiency, every possible part of the 
business should be automated. Some also claim, that big companies are built to address the 
big masses, while the smaller companies are for niche markets. The incremental rates of 
innovation are very small in these methods, and easily imitated by others.  
One aspect, which is very important as an important building bloc of the business model of 
an insurance company, and very much highlighted by the respondents are the sales 
channels. Most important ones of those for the insurance companies are the car 
dealerships, other physical locations, phone lines and the internet. Again, proving a very 
similar type of competition between the companies. True differentiation is very small and 
comes mostly from focusing on special separated segments. 
Innovations like telematics were seen as a way to differentiate against others, according to 
the interviews, but it seems, that the companies have been busier to develop them in the 
health insurance industry than with car insurances. When asked what the respondents 
deemed as interesting innovations in the Finnish insurance field in general, most of the 
answers were about health insurances. The field of health insurances was also said to be 
much less contested than that of the car insurances. Also, car insurances was said by some 
to be the biggest source of income for all the companies. This would be in line with the 
theoretical framework and especially with theories on business model innovation (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1999.  O’Connor & Rice, 2012 and others). Insurance companies in Finland 
have been unable to saturate the health insurance market: there is little risk, of “ruining” 
the profitable business model, but a possibility to gain a much larger market share, by 
using innovative methods to find or create customer value. Perhaps even test business 
models in that market as proposed by Chesborough and Rosenbloom (2002). Testing with 
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car insurances would be testing with the biggest revenue source of the companies, leading 
to a situation, where whole company will change meaning questions from the theoretical 
framework would be very relevant for evaluating that.  
Traditionally looking for clues from other countries has been difficult because a) of the 
unique Finnish business environment and b) because of transparency issues. Previously it 
has been hard to find out about foreign models even if one had wanted to. However, 
Canada is mentioned as a possible model at least when it comes to pricing the new 
insurance. The Finnish insurance companies should still look for signs in the foreign 
markets in what could help them to differentiate, since in larger countries, the markets are 
bigger, and it is easier to get a niche-product in the market and still get enough user to get a 
critical mass. Analyzing the foreign markets might help the companies to prepare for the 
future where, they might need to imitate a first-mover. Also, transparency and the internet 
work for foreign competitors too, and could enable an outsider competitor one day.  
9.4 Respondents: differentiation and business models  
 
What we have learned in this category is, that the companies do not really differentiate 
themselves at least when it comes to car insurances. This has led to what some call “fierce 
competition” in similar offerings. Despite the fierceness, most of the companies seem to 
benefit from the status quo. Now that we have discussed these issues, we can take a look 
on what the respondents said.   
A notes that every company, regardless of the industry, strives for profitable business and 
so this true for insurance companies as well. If insurance company wants to be profitable it 
needs to price according to the correct risk. It does not matter which insurance is in stake, 
but it has to be competitive from customers’ perspective and bring a good enough margin 
for the company. He continues though, that “at the current state of competition it can be 
hard to price the products exactly according to the risk, as the urge to attract new 
customers with higher discounts might arise and then years later the company needs to 
clean up the insurance base”.  
B sees, that “the competition is fierce, but that the business needs to be profitable, so the 
pricing cannot be too low”. There might be some un-profitable parts supported by other 
more profitable parts, but overall the business should be profitable she states. C supports 
the claim of the importance of risk in insurance business: “to maximize the profits an 
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insurance company must be efficient in risk management”.  G agrees with this statement as 
well, except for that he sees, that there is not a real pressure to keep prices down in Finland 
if one compares it to the UK for example. Still, G sees too, that competition in insurance 
industry is all about risk management: the company should simultaneously strive to 
maximize the incoming payments and to minimize the paid compensations. To achieve 
this, the company should excel in customer selection: the risky customers should either pay 
more for their insurances or choose another company. This is also the bottom line on what 
the business models of the companies are built on.  
The new telematics-based insurances might help according to C and B: the technology 
would help the insurance company to price the products more efficiently, giving the low-
risk customers low prices and driving the high- risk customers away with high prices. In 
other words: risk management would be more efficient. A sees that both with business-
clients and consumer-clients it would be easier for the insurance company to make the 
insurances profitable with the help of telematics. However, according to A, it is important 
to find the “smartness” in the system. The insurance company needs to be exact so that 
there won’t be problem in staying profitable with the insurances. The problem according to 
A with telematics based insurances is, that does the lowered revenue (as the prices are 
dropped) cover for all the compensations. So do the damages drop as the prices drop too? 
If not, how the lower prices will get covered? The basic questions of insurance industry 
will not disappear with telematics based insurances according to him: the risks must match 
the payments.  
G shares this concern. Although it is good in general that the company does not have to 
pay for compensations, it simultaneously means, that they will get less revenue too. This 
might mean less profit overall according to him. This demonstrates well how there are no 
short-cuts in risk-management in insurance business: maximizing paying customers’ 
means increased revenue, but also increased customer base means increase in 
compensation payments. If the large customer base was acquired with cheap insurances 
(remember, price is the main factor in acquiring new customers) will the premium cover 
the costs? On the other hand if the compensations are minimized how long can the 
company keep up a large premium? Maximizing paying customers and minimizing 
compensation seems to lead to efficient risk management.  
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C notes the importance of a sufficient customer mass with telematics (or any other 
insurance type) “there needs to be a critical mass of customers to cover the compensation 
expenses, but how many of the customers are ready to use the new insurance?” In some 
countries certain groups of people, like young drivers are forced to use telematics (enabling 
a critical mass) but this is not necessarily the case in Finland as we will discuss later. C 
later points out, that there is no point in going after the early adopters – the critical mass 
will not be acquired with them but with regular people, who are a much larger mass. B 
notes, that offering cost reductions only to some would not necessarily cut it: some 
customers would need to get a raise in their price too. This could possibly make getting a 
larger customer base more difficult. The question which rises from these points is: why 
would anyone voluntarily choose telematics if it would rise their payments? 
Also, even with telematics, risk scoring needs to be done beforehand as F states. An 
insurance company needs to know what high risk behavior is and what is not, new tools are 
perhaps needed to do that. The questions are to him: “what kind of driving brings more 
risk, but not more expensive risk?” and “what kind of driving brings more and more 
expensive risk?” D thinks too, that telematics will make the risk adjustment better, but that” 
the challenge is how to deal with the incoming information, and how to keep customers 
from changing company if they do get into an accident”. Clients already face higher 
payments after an accident and are eager to switch company. With telematics the risk for 
the insurance company seems to be, that this situation does not really change, but that they 
get to collect a smaller premium before the accident making it even more expensive.  
Nevertheless A sees, that although there are both threats and possibilities available with the 
new technology, “there is no possibility to look back or stick to the old ways”. Continuing, 
that if a company does so, it will disappear. E sees the possibility in telematics-based 
insurances to reduce serious accidents and to lower the amount of compensations paid out 
through educating the customers with the new system. Then again, a discount based model 
would reduce the revenue. The dilemma of “reduced accidents leads to reduced revenue” is 
not just a question of telematics based insurances, but as E notes, the autonomic cars are on 
their way, which will be a big question to insurance companies.  
Risk management and risk-adjustment are both really important for insurance companies, 
but so is customer acquisition. As A states, “everybody wants new customers, but so does 
everyone want to hold on to old customers as well, since it is much cheaper to hold on to 
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an old customer than to get a new one”. However, he also reminds, that “when we start to 
compete for the old customers with others the margin will get very small already.” This is, 
because as we have discussed, the easiest and most efficient way to “lure customers in” is 
with price.  
Another thing with customer acquisition pointed out by G is, that the number of insured 
objects (cars) will stay more or less the same, but that the company can try to offer new 
services for the customers, these services can mean for example new securities in voluntary 
(“kasko”) car insurances. G says that “a natural way to grow is to take customers from 
other companies”.  G continues that the key issues in customer acquisition are: 1)” to have 
something extra in comparison to competitors” 2) “have the right price” and 3) “good 
customer experience, especially with compensations”. Price refers to the risk management, 
good customer experience can be achieved with efficient insuring and compensation 
processes, but to offer something extra, is easier said than done. Later he does point out 
however, that with services / extra offerings in insurances, they can offer something extra 
for the customer. He mentions continuation security (rental car), insurance against elk 
accidents, and windshield cover as possible “extras” that the insurance company can give 
for the customer.  
The telematics-based insurances could offer solutions to “finding something extra”, as it 
could be something completely new, but also helping with price reduction and customer 
experience. F states risk-calculation and availability of data as the key factor in insurance 
business which are something telematics could be helpful in as well. Offering telematics 
would mean “a shift from homogeneous offers to heterogeneous offers” as C puts it. There 
would be more offers which could be presented to the customers.  However, as stated 
previously as well, C notes that telematics insurances won’t change the basic principles of 
insuring: “many pay for the damages of the few”.  
B sees, that the markets are not fulfilled in Finland in the sense, that there is room to 
develop the products all the time. This is especially true according to her with health 
insurances. B sees too the different services (parts of insurances) as a way to differentiate 
the company with car insurances. Others could offer a rental-car service in their car 
insurance for example. These seem nevertheless small differentiations, which can be easily 
copied by competitors if needed.  
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One important aspect in the business model of an insurance company, which was brought 
up by many of the interviewees, are the sales channels. A notes, that there are three 
different main channels: the phone channel, internet and still the physical sales locations 
(although he does question the future of this channel). The competitive advantage then 
depends how a company decides to focus on these different channels and what are the 
costs of keeping one up. For A the sales channels are seen as “the most important resource 
in competing against others”. This is very logical: since the products are essentially the 
same, and price is highly competitive, to reach the customers better than the competitors 
can prove very advantageous.   
C agrees and adds, that channels affect the buying behavior of the customers, for example 
it is typical, that a customer can change his/her insurance company when purchasing a car 
from a dealership if getting a good offer. C shares with A the view that the company 
strategy is partly reflected on which sales channel to invest in. E takes this further by 
stating that their choice of keeping physical locations is a competitive advantage for them, 
and sees sales channels as “a critical factor” for any insurance company nowadays. He 
sees too, that UBI-based products will have an impact on sales channels, especially the 
traditional ones. D notes, that “organizing sales channels to sell telematics based 
insurances is going to be a challenge”.  Where E emphasizes the importance of traditional 
sales channels, F then again notes that digital sales channels and services are the core of 
their services. It would seem therefore, that sales channels act as a way of differentiation as 
well.  
As the tight regulations and traditional conservative atmosphere of the industry molds the 
companies to resemble one another, so do their product resemble each other as well. A 
sees, that “the product portfolios of each company have been organized in a very similar 
fashion”, the differences are in price and some possible additional service offerings which 
are connected to the insurance. As C noted with possible first-mover advantage with 
telematics, the offerings are homogenous and supposedly, they will eventually get 
homogenous again, after the first product has been launched. E brings up, that it is not just 
the product itself that the customers seem to be similar in each company, but they have 
certain expectations on how the processes will go further in the company, meaning 
insuring and compensation processes. In other words, they expect certain processes to be 
and act in a certain way in every company. According to B, the new telematics based 
products “won’t change the setup of the competition, but offer new basis on creating 
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offerings.” As F tells, especially the car insurance offering are very standardized, as each 
company has a similar bonus system and the “track record” used to count the bonuses is 
transferable between companies. He sees too, when it comes to UBI-insurances, that the 
new products would compete with the older ones, possibly displacing the older offering, or 
in practice becoming so similar to the old one, that it would be hard to tell apart. So even if 
telematics based insurances are objectively something completely new in the Finnish 
markets, the question remains whether or not it will be different enough to give some 
company a competitive advantage which would not be possible or hard to imitate.  
Efficiency is one of the core issues in every part of insurance company’s business model. 
A notes, that “the automatization rates must be high – the less people there are putting a 
new insurance to be in place, the better”. From customers perspective paperless service is 
part of this efficiency. Also the compensation processes should be automatized as much as 
possible. To both of these processes, the insuring process and the compensation process, 
digitalization offers tremendous new possibilities according to A. B says automatization is 
“the most important part in making processes efficient”. Not everything is possible to 
automatize, but all the basic things, she adds. Naturally automatization also makes it 
possible for the company to make savings in employee costs in terms of number of 
employees and time spent in compensation processes for example.  
G highlights the importance of compensation processes. Everything needs to go 
“smoothly” and efficiently. To achieve this, the insurance company should simplify the 
terms and conditions as much as possible according to him. The processes should be 
dynamic and “all the loose parts” should be cut off. Efficiency in risk calculation is also 
very important according to G.   
D agrees on this and says that efficiency is everything in the business. He brings up two 
different aspects: firstly the expenses need to be minimized and secondly the terms need to 
be as simple as possible. The simpler the terms the faster the compensation the happier the 
customer.  
One aspect of the stagnation of the competition is, that the competition is concentrated 
around big three companies, at least according to G. E notes this as well, and sees, that the 
“big three” have similar ways to compete, and then the smaller companies try to compete 
with niche-offerings. B sees, that “it is a shame if the competition revolves only around a 
few big players” – he sees that it is good for the whole industry if there is a proper 
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competition. However, he reminds, that the small companies are able to efficiently 
compete and not just follow the larger ones. Though they say this, it is still difficult to see, 
that the larger companies’ offers would differ that much from the smaller companies. They 
just have more resources to invest in sales channels and to better calculate risk. As G puts 
it “a larger company might have synergy-benefits from all the different locations. There 
are also more resources in a larger company to select the right customers by offering them 
the right prices. A larger company, especially if a part of a conglomerate, can also offer 
cheaper prices.” He adds still that “some of the larger companies are closest to the 
hypothetical state where the payments would match the risk perfectly.” 
A sees, that Finnish insurance companies do not have a tendency to copy one another’s 
strategies, which can be seen from the fact, that companies have different attitudes on sales 
channels – some companies have many physical locations while at least one is completely 
online-based. However, as we noted in the previous category, sales channel options are 
nevertheless same for all: phone, the internet and physical locations. Differentiation then 
rises from how the companies decide to weigh these options.  
G notes, that “one way to differentiate is to add up services”. So the amount of insured 
objects (cars) won’t go up too much, but the insurance products can be differentiated with 
added services. The products cannot be completely similar than those of the competitors 
but that there needs to be something extra.  As we discussed earlier, these probably are 
something which are easily imitated by the competitors.  
Innovations can be a way to differentiate of course. According to G the most space for 
movement is in other areas then car insurances however. He mentions OP-omasairaala (a 
hospital-chain completely owned by the OP Pohjola insurance company) as a new 
innovative way of doing insurance business. This clearly is innovative and something that 
is hard to imitate, because it requires significant investments, but again, it mostly has to do 
with personal health insurances and health insurances and less with car insurances. Of 
course, in case of traffic accidents where the insurance company is liable to compensate, 
they can try to direct the patients to their hospital, where they can overlook the efficiency 
of the doctors and the treatments to save costs, but mostly this shows how the companies 
strive for the uncontested market of health insurances in comparison to the saturated car 
insurance market.  
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C states diversity of sales channels, and a wide array of products as their competitive 
advantage against others. From processes, he mentions the compensation process – that 
95% of the compensation applications are accepted. The fastness of the compensation 
process and the coverage of the insurances are both important competitive advantages 
according to him. As a new innovative way to compete he notes the OP-syke health 
bracelet by OP Pohjola which measures how you live affecting the price of your life 
insurances. Once again, bringing up the possibilities of the health insurance market.  
B sees, that a smaller company must profile itself somewhat differently in order to survive 
against the larger competitors. She sees that this could mean offering personalized services 
also for those customers who are not ready to move completely to the digital-era. However, 
she does note too, that today every insurance company does need an online presence as 
well. According to her, “there is also readiness to try on new innovations for example 
telematics based car insurances in small companies as well”.  What can be taken from 
these statements, is that large companies can strive for the economies of scale, 
concentrating on efficient risk management whereas smaller companies, can strive for 
niche-segments, like customers who need more personalized service. Is telematics for the 
masses or for niche-segments, like the tech savvy youth, depends on how the product is 
designed.  
One way for the companies compete against one another and differentiate is to focus on 
certain segments. For example A says that the company focus could be on entrepreneurs 
which can have a positive impact on the company brand as well in personal insurances, and 
not just in company-insurances. For D one of these “special segments” could be people 
who are not digi-native or trade unions to name a couple examples.  
F sees that small companies need be somewhat more innovative than the big ones. He 
mentions too that “although the smaller companies have less money to use in product 
development they are more agile, and it is easier for them to bring a product to markets”. 
For their company, the online presence (sales channel, customer service) is their biggest 
competitive advantage however. He mentions POP-insurance company new kilometer-
based pricing factor as a new innovation in insurance field. He sees the telematics based 
insurances as a new possible way to gather more information of the customers, which can 
then be used as a competitive advantage. For a smaller more agile company he sees the 
technological advancements as competitive advantage, since with them comes new 
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opportunities. As a new innovative way of doing business he mentions an anonymous 
health insurance company which always pays the amount of the diagnosis, not minding if 
the customer has any other insurances. From his answers, we can note that even though 
smaller companies are describes as “more agile” or that they should “innovate more”, the 
main competitive advantage are sales channels and customer service, which are basic 
building blocks of the business model of any company as we have discussed. The 
kilometer-based pricing factor is something new, but it is also very easily adaptable by 
others. Here again, possibilities in the health insurance market are brought up.  
D sees both online presence and targeted customer groups as competitive advantages. He 
also sees, that it is easier for a smaller company “to give face to the company” and to 
“serve the customer how he wants to be served”.  He sees, that this can improve customer 
retention rates too. According to D to some extent there is copying from other competitors 
when it comes to strategy. He mentions OP hospital and Lähitapiola health bracelet as new 
innovative solutions. Again, niche-markets for smaller companies are recommended, and 
possibilities in health-insurance brought up.  
To understand the limitations of the Finnish insurance companies it is good to look abroad 
– to see which possibilities are limited and what makes the Finnish market unique. 
Although one could argue that the Finnish companies are very similar now, A thinks the 
field is much more diverse now than what it was five years ago. He also wonders what will 
happen if a foreign/out-of-insurance player would enter the field. He notes, that “the 
competition is not merely between different insurance providers but between all service 
providers.” When it comes to taking ideas from foreign companies A reminds, that some 
years ago the transparency was weaker, so even if one had wanted to learn from foreign 
companies it was harder. Now, thanks to digitalization and the internet, the processes are 
more open according to him: not necessarily all core activities, but the basic logic behind 
the business. A finds it very possible that a foreign non-insurance company can enter the 
field and that every company should be prepared for that. He does not see, that “keeping 
300 physical locations around Finland would be in accordance with the future” implying 
to the change brought by digitalization.  
G sees, that the pressure to change the traditional business models will come from outside 
and most possibly in the sense, that the way people use cars and the vehicles themselves 
will change. What he hints here, is not just telematics based insurances, but automatic 
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vehicles, shared cars and other changes in the industry which are probable to happen in the 
future.  
What C noted earlier is important here as well – the regulations in Finland are very 
different in comparison with many other countries. Whereas in other countries a person is 
insured, in Finland is the register plate. When someone (whoever) drives, the third parties 
are always protected. The coverage of the Finnish traffic insurance therefore limits the 
applicability of other countries’ insurance business models to Finland.  C sees too, that 
with telematics based insurances for example, the Finnish customers have not yet 
developed a need for it. He says that “Finnish drivers have much smaller tolerance for risk 
than their foreign counterparts, they are willing to take only the smallest amount of self-
risk whereas foreign drivers are ready to take the higher self-risk.” The foreign drivers 
therefore believe, that they have the capability to affect the risk and the amount of 
accidents they get into. He also sees, that the national business environment has an effect 
on the adaptation of telematics: in Italy the technology is in wide use, but there, according 
to C, “up to 60% of accidents might be framed”. He continues: “in Britain, the payments 
for young drivers have used to be very high, so they offer telematics to them, but after the 
young drivers have proven that they are not among the highest risk group, they give up 
telematics and switch to regular insurances”. So even if the technology is in wider use in 
other countries, the Finnish business environment is regarded as an obstacle.  
Despite the challenges in the Finnish business environment, C still sees a possible model in 
Canada, where the customer needs to know what the maximum price for the insurance can 
be. He thinks in Finland this could be done as well, which means, that the customers could 
then be offered either a) so that the beginning price would be higher than a normal car 
insurance would, and then the customer could gradually lower the price or b) there is a 
certain level of risk that the customer must achieve, or he/she loses the right to use 
telematics-based insuring and is switched to regular insurance.  
E points out as well, that we are living exiting times, and it is very possible that in the 
coming years some foreign or outside the business operators might come to the Finnish 
markets. E sees, that although the regulations and business environments differ from 
country to country, it is still useful to look across different countries; “the sheer volume of 
insurable objects in countries like Germany, France and Italy is so much bigger that 
product development is in another level in those countries as well.”  It is a good reminder, 
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that the market size of Finland is much smaller than for example in those countries or the 
US or UK too. A niche in Finland cannot necessarily provide the critical mass needed, but 
in a larger market, the situation might be very different.  
B says that they only look to abroad in a broad sense. They have their own business model 
which is not necessarily compatible to anywhere else. F then again actively tries to look for 
foreign models or ideas which could be replicated in Finland. He does note, however that 
the regulations on traffic insurances are a limiting factor. He sees the regulating as a good 
thing overall, representing the nature of a constitutional state (“oikeusvaltio” in Finnish). 
He does see, that “the regulations on insurances concerning people are much tighter than 
those that have to do with property”. Which is interesting when one remembers, that health 
insurances have seen many more innovations than car insurances in Finland, despite the 
fact that they have much to do with people than property. 
Some other differences in Finland according to D is the “length” of the insurances. In 
Finland the insurances never end, unless one of the participants (the company or the 
customer) ends the contract. In other countries then again the contracts can only be made 
for a limited amount of time. Also, in Finland the insurance companies are responsible for 
the sales of the insurances and the role of brokers is small in comparison with the UK for 
example, as D brings up.  
Because the differences are so small between the companies, the competition gets narrower 
and can seem tough from some perspectives. A states that the competition is tough and it is 
getting even tougher. He says “the companies are competing fiercely for the consumer 
clients.” This situation has not been around for the last 10 years, but he sees that in the last 
5 years the competition has “exploded”.  C too sees that the competition is “getting 
tougher” and notes that with car insurances there is saturation. Perhaps people take more 
comprehensive insurances but overall there is saturation.  
 Respondent E sees that the competition has gone “tougher” during his career in insurance 
field. Especially the bigger companies tend to compete harsh against each other and then 
the smaller counter with niche-type solutions. The competition is mostly based on price. 
“In some voluntarily insurances there might be pressure to lower prices” he adds later.  
D sees, that from salesman perspective the competition is always tough, but that in wider 
picture the Finnish market is still fairly calm. There are no foreign or outside operators yet, 
and there is still “unconquered” market overall.  
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9.5 The customer behavior of an insurance customer  
 
In this category we learnt, that since customer retention is very important for the insurance 
companies in Finland. However, the companies do not get many chances to affect the 
customer satisfaction. The two main occasions for this are, when the customer buys the 
insurances and when an accident happens. The companies can prepare for the accidents 
beforehand: simple terms and conditions make the compensation process more efficient 
and make the decision more understandable for the customer. Additional services like car 
rental service might come as a surprise for the customer when the accident happens, which 
may lead to a positive experience. If the insurance is adaptable to the needs of each 
individual the customer will get a feeling that his/hers needs are met, again resulting in 
positive experience. Nevertheless, since customers do not really think their insurances that 
often, because rarely they have anything to do with them, price is their main concern. 
Another aspect which affects their way of thinking is that when it comes to insurances one 
of the main factors in their behavior are easiness and laziness. These hold true especially in 
the coming telematics insurances: the customers might not want to change their driving 
behavior to get a lower premium if they can just change the company and keep driving like 
they always have. Also, any installation or use of the telematics equipment might be too 
much for them. This is why the telematics devices should be unnoticeable and as easy-to-
use as possible. All these concerns increase the ambiguity linked to telematics insurances 
by the companies, surely decreasing their level of confidence in the new technology and 
the changes it would require in their business models. As was stated by Von den Eichen et 
al. (2015) confidence is a mandatory requirement for successful business model 
innovation.  
The Finnish customers also care much more about insuring their property than themselves, 
which can be seen from insuring statistics. Justice is one of the core values for them, and as 
insurance industry is a “business of trust” it is important from the companies’ side to 
appear as a side that upholds the bargain no matter what. For some customers privacy is a 
major concern, which could be a difficulty with telematics. Price is still the main factor for 
them however, so possibly most customers would still value price over privacy. As 
explained earlier, telematics could provide a solution for the low prices the customers want 
in their insurances.  
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The main thing to understand with customer behavior in this study is, that although it is 
brought up many times by the respondents, and eventually it has meaning on the success or 
failure of a possible telematics-based product, it does not explain why the innovation has 
not been embraced yet in Finland. The comments on privacy issues and the customers’ 
willingness to easiness with their insurances tells mostly about the ambiguity linked to the 
possible telematics-based product. Despite all this ambiguity, price came up in all the 
interviews as the main component of customer value, and it is also one of the main benefits 
of using telematics based insurances for the customers. In the US, where price was the 
main value as well, similar types of ambiguity on customer behavior has been successfully 
dealt with. Another thing is, that with business model innovation, at least according to 
Sarasvathy and Dew (2005), O’Connor and Rice (2012) and Chesborough (2010) customer 
value is mostly created, not found in business model innovation, meaning that the decision 
to launch the product or not should not be made solely on the current customer 
ambiguities. Then again, with telematics, the price is a clear component that could be 
better addressed with the new technology, and other value from the technology could be 
created after the product is launched in form of new services (as Desyllas & Sako, 2013 
noted). Still, the ambiguity of the customer reaction is not helping if a company is not 
confident enought to strive for innovations in the first place.  
9.6 Respondents on customer behavior  
 
Customer retention is important part of the insurance business. According to A customer 
retention might be more easily achievable, if you focus on their specific segment: for 
example entrepreneurs might appreciate an entrepreneur focused company. A reminds us 
as well, that to change your insurance company in Finland is extremely easy and it is easy 
for customers to follow the lowest price. This naturally, poses a great challenge for all the 
companies in the field and makes the competition more price-sensitive.  
Despite the chance to change their company quickly, G sees, that customers nevertheless 
are not too eager to change their company, and want to focus on long-term relation with 
the company, just as the company want with the customer. However, G continues, that it is 
important to show for the customer in a compensation situation, that they will get their 
money not to feed the “an insurance company never refunds anything – attitude”. It seems, 
that insurance companies have two important times, when they can influence the customer 
satisfaction: when the customer buys the insurance and when an accident happens. G sees, 
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that additional services might help to improve the customer experience. For example, when 
a customer’s car breaks down and he gets a rental car to use instead, he might actually be 
surprised how fluently everything went. The customers do not really think about their 
insurances that much, so when something actually happens, everything can go better than 
expected leaving them a feeling of relief and happiness according to G.  
C conversely sees, that the retention rates have been lowering when compared to the past, 
and that because of this, offers with low rates and loss leaders are more common today. C 
does not incline that telematics based products would help with customer retention, since if 
the big masses start using the product, they will have several options (from many firms) to 
choose from. This is about what we discussed earlier as well: even if the offer is in nature 
heterogeneous, there is risk for it to become homogenous again if everybody offers a 
purely individualized product for the customer.  
C sees, that there are two main elements in customer satisfaction: first one being the 
feeling that the customer got himself covered (the insurance coverage is wide enough / 
enough offerings), and the second one is the smoothness of the compensation process after 
something happens. C reminds, that insurance business is a business of trust, where the 
selling company is only selling a piece of paper and must therefore hold to its promise. E 
sees then again, that “”safety” and “the continuity of normal life” are the most important 
aspects for customer satisfaction. And for some customer he thinks that simply the will to 
protect their property brings them satisfaction.  
F sees, that affecting the customer satisfaction side is difficult, since the customer emotions 
towards an insurance company only come about when an accident happens; and then if the 
company does not compensate, the customer might see the insurance company as a “large 
and greedy company sitting in top of a pile of money”. This relates to what we discussed 
about making the terms and conditions as simple as possible; it does not just shorten the 
time to make compensation decision, but it also makes it more understandable for the 
customer why a certain decision was made.  
Finnish consumers seem to be mostly interested about price when it comes to insurances. E 
sees, that “the competition in insurance field has been tightening in the recent years and 
this can be seen especially in price competition.” He says that mostly the competing is 
about price. To G the price sensitivity of the customers is seen especially in the obligatory 
traffic insurance. Since the insurance is so regulated, the company does not really have any 
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other ways to compete with it than price.  C also states, that “the customers are good in 
knowing how much they should pay for an insurance. “ Whereas some years ago it was 
difficult to compare the prices, today it can be done online fairly easy and fast. Price might 
be the most luring aspect of the new UBI insurances as well according to B. Possibly even 
outweighing the concerns of privacy. According to F car insurance sales is all about price, 
and if one wants to participate in it, one needs to be competitive with price.  He notes that 
the Finnish bonus system makes it very easy to compare prices among different companies 
and that the consumers are very price aware. Being the most affordable company in some 
categories can pay off according to him. F sees price reductions as one of the most 
important parts of UBI-insurances as well.  
D notes, that the company does not necessarily have to be the cheapest but not the most 
expensive either. One car model can be expensive for others and affordable to some. Price 
will be an important driver for consumers to take UBI according to him, and to be able to 
sell the product the price needs to be competitive. B sees price as such an important aspect 
that customers would change their driving behavior if they would get lower payments. For 
F this is not as clear of an issue, but still he thinks it is possible, although he does believe 
that some people will never change their behavior.  
The price of the insurances, the reputation and the overall brand image of the insurance 
company are surely all factors, which affect whether or not the consumers will buy an 
insurance. But when it comes to telematics, the easiness to install the measuring device is 
an important factor too. According to A, “it is a big issue for a customer if he or she must 
install the device themselves”. A believes it should be someone else who does that, but 
believes simultaneously that mobile devices such as smartphones will be the future in this, 
since they require no installation from anyone. It is hard to really affect the relationship 
that people have with insurance companies, which leaves price as the most important 
component in choosing an insurance company / insurance coverage. According to A this 
will be the case with telematics based insurances too.  
“When taking a new product like UBI to use the insurance company needs to take into 
consideration the old insurances” D reminds. The company cannot just cancel all the old 
insurances or force them to use UBI. The “bad drivers” are one question too: who will 
insure them if they are deemed uninsurable with the new UBI insurances? G talks about 
this as well and wonders how the customers will accept the new pricing policies. Is the 
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only way to get the bad drivers to take the new insurances if they (telematics) are enforced 
as default-option? There are many question, to which answers are hard to find before the 
product has been launched.  
Price is the biggest issue in any insurance for the customers, but with telematics the 
measuring device itself might cause problems. It is not just the installation that should be 
easy according to G, but the device should be small and mostly undetectable by the 
customer to a level, that it does not disturb him or her in any way. And on the counter side: 
“the customer should not be able to affect the way the machine operates” he says. B sees 
too, that if the activation of the device means any extra effort for the customer, it will get 
more difficult to get him use it. To get the great masses, the easiness and effortlessness of 
the technology are the most important aspects according to C. E sees that any black box 
device solution is too complicated for the customer and sees an application or a plug’n play 
type of solution more feasible. “Everything depends on the reward that the customer gets” 
he ends.  
D notes, that in the next generation cars, the telematics devices are built-in, but that in 
Finland the average age of a car is so old, that there will be much to do in Finland if the all 
the cars were to be equipped with the devices or to be replaced with next generation cars. 
He also adds later that UBI might just take over the current bonus-system, which already to 
some extent punishes some and rewards others.  
As G mentions, another problem is that customers know how they drive. Therefore they 
know whether or not they should give out their driving information to an insurance 
company or not. This point relates to the question: “why would the bad driver choose 
telematics if given a choice?”  
C shares this view. He sees, that for other people the benefit is clear, for example those 
who do not drive much, but then again the negative effects are also clear to those who do 
drive much. According to him, research tells, that the way or style of driving, does not 
usually have an effect in general on accidents except for some small more extreme 
segments like young BMW-drivers. Therefore the biggest indicator of risk, according to 
him, would be how much one drives since it is clear that for one who drives 300 days a 
year it is more probable to get into an accident than to someone who drives 100 days a 
year. However, it is hard to say whether or not people would lessen their driving even if 
they would get price reduction in their insurance. He does not see either that those who do 
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drive worse than the population in general would change their behavior since “the biggest 
driver behind consumer activities is laziness – it just easier for them not to change their 
driving habits and get a regular insurance.”  According to C the new UBI products would 
have a different target segment than the old insurances too, which raises the question, 
whether or not it can reach a critical mass of customers to be viable offering.  
E thinks there is a market for telematics based insurances but that the customers most 
probably know if it will benefit them or not beforehand as well. B comments on the 
dilemma too: “why would anyone who has a possibility to both, traditional and UBI-
insurance take UBI, if the UBI would increase his insurance prices? “As D notes, the 
problem with the new insurances are the “bad drivers” and how to insure them. 
One possibility with UBI is to offer extra services with it that would not be possible 
otherwise. These could be according to A advices on route selection, or just giving the 
information to transporting (cargo or people) companies so they can better teach/advice 
their employees to drive. Not just for companies’ though, G sees, that transparency and 
privacy concerns could be smaller if the information would be given to all the customers 
for driving consulting. Then they would not see that they are being spied on.  
B sees driving tips especially helpful when directed at young people. She also sees a 
possibility of an “emergency call system” meaning that the system would call for help 
(112) automatically if the car would get into an accident.  
One very typical aspect for Finnish customers which came across the interviews, was, that 
Finns are more eager to insure their property than themselves. A notes that this is very 
traditional way of insuring in Finland and remembers that currently only 40% of Finns 
have a life insurance. Simultaneously 60% of that company’s revenue is from property and 
40% just from car insurances according to him.  
One important aspect that came along in insuring is how justice as a value affects the 
business. A sees, that UBI would offer a more just system for the customer – you would 
only pay for the risk you cause, whereas now the system is more standardized, meaning 
you may have to pay for risk you have not done yourself. B agrees with this.  
C sees justice as a main value of UBI too. As he mentions, something can be derived from 
the car the person drives but it is not a direct indicator of risk. With telematics this could be 
found out, and the price set would be more just. But he does note, that the justice aspect 
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only occurs if the person is able to alter his/her behavior. In some cases the customer might 
live in a risky area (Helsinki) and just has to drive much without possibility to minimize 
driving. Also the technology might be a limiting factor to justice according to him. That is, 
because to get the risk calculated correctly, every driving situation should be taken into 
account. However, even if the person does drive an accident without the telematics device 
on, the insurance still has to cover because of the tight regulations in Finland. So the 
challenge is, how to make sure that the device is kept on and onboard whenever driven.  
F sees UBI as a question of justice too. He looks at it (with his own words) “from perhaps 
an ideological standpoint”. He sees that someone who drives wisely and not that much 
should pay less than someone who drives with high risk and much. He sees too, that with 
the information gathered from UBi-insurances, the traditional insurance prices could be 
modified as more just as well. Perhaps justice is a way to convey other aspects than price 
about the telematics for the customers.  
Some of the interviewees noted how their old insurances too are “tailored” for the needs of 
the customers. A says, that with the obligatory traffic insurance there is not much to do (as 
of course with the price) but with the additional kasko insurance there is much that can be 
done. How old you are, how much you drive, do you want your windshield covered, do 
you use parking garages… All of the risks associated with these factors can be met in the 
offerings of the additional insurances according to A.  
One of the biggest aspect that concern customers about telematics is their privacy. Because 
of that the companies are worried both the reactions of the legal authorities and those of the 
customers. A sees that some customers still have the “big brother watches” mentality. As 
we discussed earlier, privacy is an obstacle from legal perspective too. According to A the 
authorities are not sure where the limits go on privacy ownership and usage either. He ends 
that in the future automatic vehicles can prove to be an extra challenge to the legislation 
too.  
G mentions the “big brother” type of thinking as an obstacle to privacy too. He sees 
however, that if the government starts issuing road tariffs and so starts to observe car 
movements the transition can be smoother than expected, and thus the insurance company 
would not even have to install any machinery to the cars. He thinks that because of NSA 
and Facebook privacy scandals, which have had significant media coverage, the privacy 
issues have been on consumers’ minds. However, he thinks that it could be possible for 
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any insurance company to portray as a more reliable information holder than some other 
private companies.   
E states, that there is much fear around the debate on privacy. He sees, that an insurance 
company could tackle this by being honest and transparent about where the information is 
used and what is really gathered. B sees that privacy will “most definitely” be one of the 
biggest challenges with UBI-insurances. Still, she believes that price will be more 
important for the customers than privacy in the end. However, “some people might be 
ready to pay more for ‘a private insurance’”. She ends.  
F thinks that “some customers would not give up their privacy no matter the cost.” He also 
thinks that there is a possibility of a security breach so their fears are not completely 
without meaning. He notes, that overall insurance industry is very conservative and legally 
restricted and no company wants to test the limits of the law, or even go near the limits.  
D sees, that the question of privacy is somewhat irrelevant, since driving is not really that 
private at the moment. When you drive, you drive in public so it is not really that secret. 
He also points out that one can check from Trafi the driven kilometers and other 
information of any car. So if the consumers do not really have that much privacy now, how 
to convey it to them that they are not really losing anything by adopting telematics?  
9.7 How the business might change   
 
What was mentioned briefly in the last part of this chapter was the emergence of automatic 
vehicles and other changes to driving as a concept. In this part we will take a closer look 
on how the respondents see the future of insurances and driving, and what role do 
telematics based insurances hold in that.    
What came across in the interviews, was that driving as an activity might be changing. Not 
just telematics based insurances which encourage less driving, but other concepts like app-
based carpools and completely autonomous robot cars. Thanks to these and the emerging 
environmentalism, a car is not necessarily “the thing to have” for many young people of 
today. Young people of today are, of course, the middle-aged of tomorrow and represent 
the future of consumption. They do not care as much of the insurance brand as their 
parents did either and are therefore less brand loyal, meaning a price is even bigger of a 
factor for them than it was for their parents. Therefore on one hand the young are excellent 
target for telematics as they have to pay more than older drivers and they care more about 
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the price as well, but on the other hand, they might not necessarily drive at all anymore. 
With telematics-based insurances guidance could also be given for the customers and this 
too would naturally benefit the young more, as they have less driving experience than the 
older drivers. The installation and use should however, be as easy as possible. The 
respondents seemed to favor more plug’n play-type of system or smartphone based system 
over a blackbox-based system, because they are much easier to use and install than the 
latter. In next generation cars however, the telematics devices will be built-in meaning no 
effort for the customer and easiness to gather data. A partnership with a larger car 
manufacturer could prove beneficial for an insurance company making imitation more 
difficult to others as suggested by Teece (2010), but this kind of deal can be out of reach 
for the smaller companies. Also, there is no guarantee that the car companies would strike 
a deal with anyone. Lastly, cars in Finland are on average very old compared to the rest of 
Europe. Old cars are not as much insured as the consumers might have less incentives to 
insure them.  
What these points tell, is about the fact that the disruption might come from outside. If a 
company decides not to engage in innovation, but its competition does, as depicted in the 
theoretical framework of this study, this competition might not necessarily be one that it is 
used to. As next generation cars will have in-built telematics systems, the car providers can 
have much power over who gets to use the information they gather. Perhaps some 
manufacturers could even sell their insurances themselves. At that point the lower 
insurance margins have come to stay and the insurance companies might not be able to 
hold to their current profitable business models. So the question here is not just about 
whether one of the current competitors engages in the new technology, but whether the 
business environment changes so much, that the competition will come “unexpectedly” 
from outside.   
9.8 Respondents on the changing business environment 
 
B mentions carpooling and “other new possibilities” for transportation as new inventions 
causing pressure to modernize car insurances. He thinks also, that if the companies can 
acquire the critical mass (enough volume) the telematics based products will eventually 
supersede the traditional insurances.  
The future of insurance customers naturally lies in the younger generations, which came up 
in most of the interviews. B states that “since the young are statistically the most risk-
   
85 
 
prone group they would have the most to benefit from UBI-insurances and from possible 
additional “driving instructions”. She sees too, that the tech savviness of the youth makes 
them more ready to try new technology, like telematics. As we discussed earlier, in Britain 
the youth are already the main target of the telematics market.  
Despite of this A is skeptical whether or not even telematics will lure the young to drive a 
car in the future. “Not necessarily” he thinks. According to him, overall in the Nordic 
countries there have been dramatic drops in getting a driver’s license when people turn 18 
“it is not the thing anymore” he says. Green values encourage people to drop driving for 
mass transportation. Then there are carpools or shared cars. He does not think that 
telematics would be a sufficient encouragement to get a car for the youth. “In Finland the 
willingness to get a driver’s license is lowest for the young people in Southern Finland, 
and as the biggest movement of people is to the south from other parts of the country, this 
attitude will spread to more and more people” he ends. Car is itself an expensive thing to 
buy, and so is the license. And not just Helsinki, but 3-4 different city centers are growing 
in Finland, which means, that public transportation will be more efficient all over the 
country in the future. Uber, and similar services seem to catch on too, even lowering the 
need for a car.  
G sees, that “the younger customers are also less brand loyal then their elders.” Meaning 
price is even more important of a factor for them than for older generations. Nevertheless, 
Finland is still “in a calmer state than other Nordic countries for example”, according to 
him. What he means by this, is that the retention rates are still higher in Finland than in 
other Nordic countries.  
E then again sees, that the youth might possess the best possibility for a PAYD insurance. 
He sees that a British-model where the youth do not have any other option besides 
telematics might prove to be the best choice. There are many unsolved question related to 
the telematics technology itself too. One thing which came up in some of the interviews 
was transparency of the measurements in telematics. G sees the mathematical formulas 
they use to count risk as their “bread recipe” or “a drug formula”, which they can’t give 
up to someone just like that. However, he sees that giving information about the pricing on 
general level is a good idea. C goes even further by saying that “in a long term, pricing is 
the only thing with which the companies compete against one another”. It cannot therefore 
be opened completely but to some extent (broader) yes.  
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E sees, that for guidance reasons, the pricing factors should be opened for the telematics 
customers. However, again not too specifically but to an extent, as to not give away any 
company secrets. B would go further and says that “all the available information should be 
given for the customers, so that they could change their driving behavior”. Also guidance 
should be provided according to her.  
F sees, that insurance companies give out only the information which they are obliged to 
give. However, he notes that even currently the insurance companies give out many tips for 
the customers – how to keep your boat / home / summer house safe. Up to a point the 
companies should also rely that the customer knows what is dangerous and what is not, he 
says.  
D sees that there is nothing that stops them from sharing the information, but that it is not 
really a secret either what causes accidents and what does not. This is why he says, that he 
is somewhat cynical about the customers changing their driving behavior, even if given the 
information. “Also the usage of the information is a challenge once the company has it”. 
He states. It is true, that big amounts of information can be gathered, but what information 
is really relevant to the risk? Perhaps only the place and the amount driven are critical 
factors as discussed earlier.  
So there are some issues with transparency and with the information gathered, but how to 
organize the information gather itself? A sees that previously a black box has been the 
solution, but now there are more alternatives. Cloud based services are providing many 
new possibilities.  
G says that they have more experiences with Plug-in type of solutions. The most important 
things should be, whether the device is removable or not, that the customer won’t be 
nervous about the technology or feel distracted. Also the customer should not be able to 
change how the machine operates. These remarks relate to what we discussed about the 
customer preference on “not having to do anything”  
As C stated, even if the telematics machine is taken off, or no information would be 
collected, the insurance would still compensate an accident because of the strict insurance 
law. Also, the quality of the data is important according to him, besides that everything 
should go smoothly from the customers’ perspective.  
   
87 
 
E notes, that there are many different solutions to organizing the data collection, but the 
robustness of these solutions is important. The measuring needs to be reliable or the 
customers will not trust the system either. Black box seems too complicated to him from 
the customers’ perspective, and so he would favor plug’n play or an app-type solution. He 
sees car manufacturers as one possible partner for the insurance companies in information 
collection. A notes that “the geographical differences need to be taken into account.” 
Someone driving in Lappland is driving with completely different risks than someone 
driving in Helsinki even if the person from Lappland drives far more. Technical wise A 
sees smartphones as the future. He sees that transparency too would be easiest to conduct if 
all the information would be directly in the smartphone. With a box this would be harder to 
do.  
B sees that at the moment the information which can be gathered with outside machinery is 
too unreliable. She sees though, that the technology develops all the time and that new cars 
will have these measurements as default option. Getting partners will still be a challenge 
for insurance companies according to her. Surely, larger companies are in a better position 
to negotiate deals with the larger car manufacturers than the small companies. Also, who 
says that the larger car companies would strike a deal with a Finnish company or any 
insurance company for that matter? Perhaps if the risk levels drop low enough they can 
organize the insuring themselves.  
F sees that it should be decided beforehand how to deal with the customers. He believes, 
that a separately installed device is the most probable option together with a smartphone. 
He also reminds of the issues with the privacy laws: “no-one wants to take any risks with it 
or even go near the border zones.” Also the devices are not that complicated anymore he 
adds. He thinks that a partnership for installation could be arranged, but to get car 
manufacturers open the data they gather to insurance companies is another thing.   
So in future cars information gather will be automated. But how about now? A notes that 
the average age of a Finnish car is 13 years and that after the car gets more than 6 years old 
people do not tend to insure their cars any more than necessary. “That is a problem for 
insurance companies but so is for the government too” he says and believes that the 
government has some plans to change the situation as well. However, in the near future 
things might be very different he believes. Already some larger trucks have devices which 
take information from the truck that drives in front of them he ends.  
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As we found out in this chapter, there are legal, and “voluntary” barriers, which keep the 
Finnish insurance companies from innovating radically, keeping their innovation in very 
incremental and cautious levels. They do try to differentiate themselves, but only in the 
narrow space which they all operate. This operation in narrow space, is not harmful but 
benefits most of the participants, making embracing innovation a more radical choice. The 
case of telematics based car insurances has been used in this study to point out how the 
companies look innovation from a strategic point of view. Based on these findings and the 
theoretical framework constructed in the previous chapter, a theory has been created and 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  
10. DISCUSSION  
 
 
10.1 A standard business model and the competitive situation of the Finnish 
insurance market  
 
What we found out in the theoretical framework was, that companies rise and fall through 
creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1950). This destruction can then be reinforced by 
disruptive technologies, such as those based on digitalization or big data management. 
Betting on disruptive technologies is not that simple of a choice as we found out: to fully 
take advantage of disruptive technologies a company must embrace business model 
innovation. This can also mean, that the company destroys its current profitable market, 
leaving a company with a choice to make: to innovate or to imitate? The company must 
choose whether to actively pursuit innovation or to be prepared to imitate a successful 
innovation made by their competition. What we also found out, was that regulation plays 
an important part in all of this: tight regulations mean that companies are unable or 
unwilling to innovate, because either the regulation makes it too difficult, or the regulation 
protects their current profitable business model.  
Before the interviews with the insurance managers we took a look on how these issues are 
dealt with in literature about the insurance industry and the telematics based insurances. It 
seemed from that perspective, that insurance companies are as ready for innovation as any 
other company. Traditionally the industry has been about price and risk management. For 
Ferguson (2003) insurance business “is not viable” meaning that, there is generally a 
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pressure to keep the prices down, both from the market and the regulator. Telematics 
seems to be a solution to excel in this task, at least according to what Desyllas and Sako 
(2003) found out about Progressive and what Karapiperis et al. (2015) wrote about 
telematics in the US. This despite the fact, that Karapiperis et al. (2015) found many issues 
with privacy concerns and transparency. However, they too saw the technology itself and 
the business model innovation coming with it as a good solution for insurance companies’ 
future. The problem was just that the companies in the US had not launched the products 
based on the technology properly according to them. Also, from the private studies we 
looked, insurance managers around the globe seemed to be ready for the technology. 
Looking at all this information, the original motivation for this study remains; if according 
to general and more specific literature telematics-based insurances could disrupt the market 
and benefit the first-mover why is the technology not yet in Finland?  
 
 
 
Figure 4:The standard business model of a Finnish insurance company (business model canvas blocs from Osterwalder 
and Pigneur (2010)) 
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What is visualized in Figure 4 above is a standard business model for a Finnish insurance 
company. The business models are “standardized” because the Finnish business 
environment for the car insurances differs mostly in regulation compared to that of most of 
the other countries. The extensive regulation, was also stated by most of the respondents as 
a reason why the technology is yet to come in Finland. What we also found out, was that 
the differences in regulation mainly comes across in compensations; the Finnish traffic 
insurance is very comprehensive, and according to laws which define it (to an extent in a 
similar way as Paraskevopoulou (2012) proposes to health industry), Finnish insurance 
companies must pay in many occasions when their foreign counterparts do not have to. It 
seems however, that the argument of the comprehensiveness as an obstacle is to some 
extent incorrect. The comprehensiveness of the regulation means, that the traditional ways 
of competing in risk management and pricing is even more important to Finnish companies 
to other, and as we have discussed, telematics seems to be a great way to deal with that 
traditional problem as it provides accurate information for risk calculations. What is argued 
in this thesis instead, is that the extensive regulations have molded the business models of 
the Finnish companies very alike, which then has resulted in similar ways of competing, 
which also is more or less profitable to all the participants.  
The components for the business model (key processes, key resources, profit formula and 
customer value proposition) are used by many authors, for example Osterwalder and 
Pigneur (2010). What is illustrated in Figure 4 is that originally the regulation has forced 
the business model to a certain shape, which then forces a certain type of competition to 
happen between the companies in the field. The immobility and lack of disruptive 
innovations in insurance industry in Finland is not so much about the regulation itself but 
about the business models which favor a similar type of competition. 
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Figure 5: The competitive environment of a Finnish insurance company 
 
To better elaborate and visualize the place of telematics insurances in all of this another 
model was drawn and presented in Figure 5 above. The outer border of the model 
represents the legal barrier generated by the Finnish laws and regulations of the European 
Union. Positioning one’s company outside that barrier would be outright illegal. The inner 
barrier represents the “voluntary barrier” inside which all the Finnish insurance companies 
position themselves. Inside this barrier are the insurance companies represented as black 
dots. The larger dots in the middle represent the largest companies whereas the smaller 
ones represent the smaller companies. What can be noticed is that the larger companies are 
closer to each other and closer to the center of the region whereas, the smaller companies 
“test more limits” but still stay inside the inner barriers. The larger dotted circle represents 
the approximate area, where a Finnish insurance company should position itself in order to 
embrace the telematics insurances; closer to the edges of the legal barriers but still in the 
clearly legal sphere but also clearly outside the “comfort zone” of the companies. This is 
not just about comfortability, but the companies risk destroying the common benefits the 
companies enjoy inside the inner barriers if they try to test their limits.   
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10.2 Mechanism from the models and the theoretical framework   
 
Both of these models, together with the theoretical framework, show how companies with 
these regulatory borders react to new innovations. What is different between the models 
and the theoretical framework, however, is that whereas the cases looked at in the 
theoretical framework (health industry), were about a very strict regulation that directly 
forbids many kinds of innovation, with the Finnish insurance companies the regulation 
does not directly forbid the new innovations but it has affected the way the companies’ 
business models were constructed. This way the regulation does indirectly affect the level 
of innovation, but makes the situation somewhat different. The Finnish insurance 
companies cannot rely as strongly on a presumption that no outside company would come 
and disrupt the market with the new invention. This makes questions of imitation and 
innovation more relevant in this case. Cases like the Finnish insurance market, where the 
strict regulation has had a great role in defining the business models, could seem very 
similar to the health industry in the way that Hwang & Christensen (2008) presented, but 
actually have a lot more to do with the case of unregulated businesses and innovation 
presented by Lucas & Goh (2009). The different to the latter comes from the fact that 
although the regulation is not as strict as with health industry it still does prevent outsiders 
to an extent. At the end of this chapter we will discuss other fields, where the model of this 
thesis is applicable  
 As was discussed in the interviews, the Finnish insurance laws tend to be more extensive 
than its foreign counterparts. The Finnish laws on traffic insurance were even described as 
“the best in Europe” or even the whole world. This is also an important part of what makes 
the distinction between the inner and the outer borders in our model Figure 3). Whereas the 
outer borders are the true barriers set by the law, the fact that these laws are the most 
comprehensive laws forces the inner borders further away. Over regulation was said to be 
one of the biggest obstacles to growth according to the PWC (2015) respondents as well 
and Ferguson et al. (2003) saw that the fear of government interference drives the 
insurance companies to keep their prices not viable. Nevertheless, these two examples 
were from the United States, which is a country where telematics based insurances already 
exist. It is therefore possible that the Finnish notion, that the regulations are stricter than 
anywhere else, creates a cautiousness towards innovation. A Finnish company could look 
to the US (or to any other country for that matter), to see new innovation but then disregard 
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them as incompatible with the Finnish legislation even if this would not be the case. What 
this means therefore is that although the outer lines are indisputable as they are made by 
the regulator, the inner line has been born, not through unanimous group decision, but from 
individual decisions to position one’s company to a safe distant from the borders made by 
the regulation.  
Ambiguity plays a role here too. In some issues, such as privacy, it was not clear to the 
interviewees where the limits of those laws go. As pointed out by the respondents 
“insurance is a business of trust”. Another reason for the companies to position themselves 
in the middle. The closer the company is to the borders, the bigger is the chance they have 
to face the ambiguity and in a worst case scenario risk their reputation and brand, 
damaging their business. A mistake like this could then show others where these 
ambiguous borders actually go, in a similar way as in the rivalry-based imitation by 
Lieberman and Asaba (2006). Innovating with large steps could prove to be too radical, 
destabilizing the profitable structure the companies have created for each other and put the 
company in risk in terms of legal issues and brand value. Not to mention lost investment 
costs if the innovation does not succeed. According to the interviews, “the industry moves 
as one in Finland”, and so as one of them is doing good, then other are probably as well. 
This means, that as long as everyone stays inside the inner borders, the good or the bad 
circumstances will help and hurt the companies more or less equally. If the company 
would change its position through innovation, this could unbalance the current (profitable) 
state and lead to smaller profits. Many of the participants inclined, that the combined ratio 
of all the companies has been steadily growing in the recent years strengthening the notion 
that the companies do not necessarily want to shake up the current state of things. Car 
insurances are the “flagship” product for the companies as well, which means that 
innovating with them might be especially destructive. It would not be about testing radical 
innovation for a small fraction of the business like a medical company testing a cure for a 
rare disease, but in fact about changing the whole business. Competing in the smaller and 
narrower space inside the inner borders means that the insurance companies compete with 
the same products in the same ways: risk management and effective processes are the core 
for all the companies. These are the traditional ways of competing for insurance companies 
as was mentioned by Bickley (1967) for example.   
Understanding the difference between the immovable and self-set barriers (outer vs. inner 
barriers) is important, but it is also important to understand how the business models’ of 
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the companies have been built (Figure 5). One thing the interviews revealed was, that all 
the Finnish firms strive for profitability with their insurance margins. Though Ferguson et 
al. (2003) meant when writing that “insurances cannot be viable”, that the price cannot be 
fixed and same for all, forcing the insurance companies to excel in pricing and risk scoring, 
they still incline, that it is “natural” for insurance companies to sell the insurances in non-
profitable prices than profitable. The companies can always invest the revenue they get 
from the insurances (an integral part of insurance business, as brought up by Desyllas and 
Sako (2003), so non-profitable insurances can lead to profitable businesses anyway. 
However, in this case what was meant was, that in Finland the companies strive for 
profitability even if taking only insurance revenue into consideration, despite “the 
competition being intense” (is it?). As mentioned, risk management and risk scoring are 
nevertheless very important to maximize the said profits by minimizing compensation 
payments. The companies could use telematics to do these tasks more efficiently, as 
presented by Karapiperis et al. (2015) and Desyllas and Sako (2003). They could also 
increase customer value in terms of price (the most important factor for them) and in terms 
of justice. However, with the profit fomula of Figure 4 an important dilemma of telematics 
based insurances comes across: the companies want to maximize their revenue and 
simultaneously minimize the compensations paid. However, large revenue usually means 
large compensations and small revenue equals small compensations. If the company could 
cut the amount of customers who get into serious accidents with the help of telematics, 
they would not justify larger payments anymore either: although there would be less 
money going out of the company there would be less money coming in as well. Then 
again, in Finland individual accidents can cost significant sums of money for the company: 
one accident paralyzing several young-people can mean compensation payments lasting for 
decades for the company and eventually reaching millions in total compensation sum. This 
demonstrates how the regulations are connected to the business model and therefore to the 
competition practices of the companies.  
A couple interesting notions, which came across in the interviews, were the “inevitable 
coming of the technological change” and the advice that “one should not stay motionless”. 
This should be considered from the perspective of rivalry-based imitation by Liebermann 
and Asaba (2006).  As we discussed the companies have created themselves this “safe 
haven” for competition, where they all move together: for better or for worse (and usually 
for better). However, what slows down the innovations with rivalry-based imitation, is that 
   
95 
 
the companies do not want to take chances on either a) using resources on “wrong” type of 
innovation or b) “ruining” the current profitable status quo in the competition, but if there 
truly is inevitable technological change coming, it will shake up the status quo anyway. 
This implies that if this notion is shared among the companies widely (as it seems to be) 
they are cautious about option a) as well as option b): using their resources to the wrong 
type of innovation. Simultaneously the companies are therefore very keen on the current 
system, but seem to be sure that there can be an outside force that could tear it down.  
If the companies are truly waiting for a technological change to come, it might explain as 
well, why they are not too eager to innovate: as Pepall (1997) stated, if the innovator and 
imitator are close to each other, imitating is easier, at least if there are no patent protection 
or co-operative alliance on which the innovator can rely to. Also what Aghion et al. (2001) 
wrote about incremental rates of innovation relates to this: if the incremental rate of 
innovation is small, it is easier for imitators to follow. So from these points comes the 
following situation: there are a group of companies operating with similar tactics in a same 
business environment. If one company decides to differentiate itself using innovation, it 
needs to make sure, that the incremental rate of the innovation is high enough so that 
others cannot quickly imitate. However, if it does this, it might use its resources poorly 
(chances to which are higher the higher the rate of innovation because of rising levels of 
ambiguity), of which the others could learn from.  
If a major technological change might be happening it could be the best to wait and 
monitor what others are doing until the situation is clearer or until someone else innovates 
and fails or succeeds. From this perspective it makes sense why the companies are located 
in the middle and fairly close to each other in the business environment depicted in Figure 
5, even if they anticipate some sort of eventual technological change. This might not 
necessarily still be the best tactics, as we keep in mind the follower’s dilemma presented 
by Semadeni and Anderson (2010): imitation is not always successful. One cannot simply 
assume that, if another company succeeds in innovation his company will do the same by 
imitating the first mover. Also as Jenkins (2014) proposed, imitation is many times 
considered to be “the easier choice” but that is not necessarily the case, and imitating will 
too require some innovation in form of new performance features. Although it is logical 
how the companies are positioned in relation to teach other in the Finnish insurance 
market, it is not necessarily seen as the best choice (at least forever) for individual 
companies in this study.  
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So ways for these companies to differentiate themselves against one another (presented in 
Figure 4) are mostly the same: different focus to sales channels, different focus groups, 
additional services and innovations. Sales channels focus means, whether or not the 
company focuses on physical locations, phone lines or online services. Different focus 
groups can mean for example an “entrepreneurial focus” or “trade union” focus to name 
some examples. Additional services mean mostly extra securities which other companies’ 
insurances lack. An example of this could be a rental-car service in case of a car-
breakdown which is offered by some, but not all companies. Innovations then again were 
hardly seen as a way to differentiate or to compete against others. Those innovative 
measures which have been taken into use and mentioned by the interviewees were mostly 
from the health insurance sector. These included an insurance company owned hospital, 
usage based-health bracelet and a small new insurance company which pays customers a 
fixed amount of compensations, no matter if there are other insurances or conditions. As 
discussed earlier, health insurances are a far less contested market than car insurances.  
There are two important aspects to be understood from these differentiation methods. 
Firstly, the companies differentiate themselves almost exactly in the same measures and in 
ways which are not very radical and easily imitated by others, for example by widening (or 
narrowing) sales channels, improving customer service or improving efficiency. This 
shows, how the companies are competing in a narrow space as we discussed earlier and 
what is depicted in the models depicting the competition (Figure 4 and 5). Because the 
health sector is less contested and there is much room to operate for all the companies, it is 
easy to see, why they are ready to try more innovative solutions in that field. Then again, 
these innovative solutions in the health insurance field are not disruptive as innovations 
regarding car insurances would be as we discussed earlier.  
Big data and information technology are emerging in ways which might transform the way 
we do business decisions as McAfee et al. (2012) describe. Porter (1985) noted, that 
technology can be used as a competitive advantage if it has a significant role in 
“determining cost, position or differentiation”. All of these would seem to hold true with 
telematics. However, in addition to the fact that car insurances is a bigger and therefore 
riskier part to “shake the business”, Padgett and Mulvey (2007) note that in terms of ROIC 
adopting new technology does not automatically mean success. They did find however, 
that adopting new technology did have an effect to customer value and firm positioning. 
This leaves an insurance company decision maker to a tough situation: to embrace new 
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technology might be embracing a long-term success, which would not be realized in the 
next few years. That would be a difficult decision to make for any CEO, but especially for 
a publically traded insurance company CEO. How to explain to shareholders an 
investment, which might not realize in the next few years and would threaten the current 
business model, meaning a threat to the investors’ dividends and / or share value of their 
stock? This notion too might explain why the companies move fairly slowly despite the 
“inevitable technological change” they see to come.  
What we learnt about the insurance customers, is that they are very price sensitive and that 
it is difficult for the insurance company to affect their perception of the company since 
they are usually only in contact with the company when they buy an insurance or when an 
accident happens. The companies strive for long-term partnerships and so do many of the 
customers too. Also, what is most important about the brand of the company is to 
understand that “insurance business is a business of trust”. According to Teece (2010) any 
new service or product innovation requires business model innovation, and the new 
business model should then again be built around the customer needs. From telematics 
perspective the issue would seem to be clear: customers want lower prices, and additional 
offerings can please them when something happens. Telematics can offer these both, so 
offering a UBI-based product would seem like a great solution.  
There is another side to this however: laziness is a driving factor for at least some of the 
insurance consumers as we learnt. Why to offer them a product which might increase their 
trouble and interaction with the insurance company, when they seem to want a long-lasting 
“quiet” and cheap partnership with the companies. This is an important question to answer 
when making a decision concerning the technology. As O’Connor and Rice (2012) and 
Chesbrough (2010) put it, designing a business model is at least equal (or more important 
if asked from Chesbrough) in importance with developing the technology. Just looking at 
the properties of telematics based insurances for example, and making a decision based on 
those is not enough. All aspects of business model and especially the customer value 
should be considered and evaluated in order to decide how to proceed. As Chesborough 
and Rosenbloom (2002) remind though, customer value can be difficult to estimate 
beforehand and no business model should be carved in stone but should adjust as time goes 
on and the market develops. So if the insurance companies are uncertain on whether or not 
the new telematics-based business model will work or not, they should keep in mind, that 
for better or worse it should still be adjustable. The situation here reminds of the Hwang 
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and Christensen (2008) and Herzlinger  (2006) example of the health care industry. It is 
clear for the customer value that they want more efficient and more accessible health care 
services, but for companies to change their system better to add up with this need, can be 
very difficult, or something they do not want to do, because it would interfere with their 
current business model. The customers then again, do not have a choice until a new player 
comes to field or forces one of the older players to change the competition. In insurance 
industry too, the customers want a just and cheap system (possibly provided by telematics) 
but the insurance companies do not necessarily want to or can give it to them. This leaves 
the customers to the background, and the change will most probably come from outside in 
a way or another.  
In the right upper corner of Figure 5 is a dotted circle. It represents the move the insurance 
companies business model face if moving to telematics: a legal venture, but still closer to 
the legislative borders and much further from the current position of the companies. This 
raises a question: if telematics-based car insurances could be legal, and have been an 
example of successful business model innovation for Progressive (Desyllas & Sako, 2013) 
and a huge possibility for the whole American insurance sector and consumers 
(Karapiperis, 2015) why is the innovation outside of the companies’ comfort zone? Well, 
firstly whereas Desyllas and Sako (2013) saw that the underlining principle of insurance 
business is shifting from “taking advantage of economies of scale” in to rewarding the 
good customers, the interviewees of this research then again, saw that telematics makes 
little or no change to the underlying principle “many pay for the damages of the few”.  
Another thing is, that both Desyllas and Sako (2013) and Karapiperis et al. (2015) studied 
the US market, whereas the respondents of this study felt negative towards, taking advices 
from abroad. Even European countries where telematics is in wider use, such as Italy and 
the UK, despite being geographically closer and EU-member states, were considered as ill-
fit examples for Finnish insurance companies. Mostly this was because of the Finnish law 
which is considered most extensive, than the legislation of those countries, but also the size 
of the market. In countries like Italy or the UK not to mention the US, the population is 
much larger than in Finland. If the perspective towards new insurance products is, that one 
needs a critical mass to keep it up, then the innovation should be for the crowds and not 
just a niche-product or the invest will go to waste. This logic seemed to leave the 
respondents with a thought that the change would not come to Finland unexpectedly. This 
is very logical if we remember what Von den Eichen et al. (2015) brought up; to be 
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successful one needs to be prepared to change the whole culture of the company and to be 
successful one must be confident. This is hard to achieve on new ventures if one is already 
operating a profitable business.  
Another issue that the companies consider is, that who would use the product and benefit 
from it the most. The obvious answer would be the youth, since they are the most price-
sensitive, the group that has to pay the most at the moment and are also the most tech-
savvy. According to one of the respondents the youth are also the main and only target of 
telematics in the UK and according to Karapiperis (2015) the biggest benefiter group in the 
US as well. However, the respondents see, that the Finnish youth does not necessarily want 
to have the trouble of getting a driver’s license, not to mention buying a car. 
Environmentalism, urbanism and technology all affect this: driving is not necessarily 
perceived as something “one needs to do”. As the population in Finland concentrates to 
larger cities, mass-transportation becomes cheaper and better, reducing the need for a self-
owned car. Also the new technology and solutions for diving like Uber and other 
carpooling systems, even self-driving cars, which are not in wide use by any standards, but 
have already hit the road, all accelerate this change. It would seem possible, that even if the 
competition dynamics in the Finnish car insurance does not change, the disruptive change 
could come from a completely different industry; if cars or transportation as a whole 
changes rapidly, that would at the latest force the companies to change their business 
models.  Nevertheless, customer behavior does not seem to be the most important issue in 
driving towards telematics or away from it. Still, if a telematics product is launched, it will 
be important to analyze to get the most out of the product.  
This far in this chapter we have discussed about the models constructed on the basis of the 
literature synthesis and the findings of this research. We have also discussed the reason 
why the car insurance market in Finland is constructed like it is, and what forces affect it. 
In the next part of this chapter we will discuss suggestions for the insurance companies 
based on these findings.  
10.3 Suggested way to proceed for a Finnish insurance company  
 
The current strategy of the companies “staying put” and waiting is not necessarily the 
worst strategy, as long as they are also prepared for the upcoming technological changes. 
The current form of competition depicted in Figures 4 and 5 resemble the starting point for 
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rivalry-based imitation as Lieberman and Asaba (2006) depicted it. It is true, that there is 
much ambiguity and concern over the telematics-based industry, even if it is completely 
legal, and there is basically no incentives for the companies to “stir up” the current 
competition: they are all doing well, and for all of them car insurances are an integral part 
of their overall structure. However, many of the respondents did not see the situation as 
depicted in this thesis. They saw that the companies are “very different” to each other or 
“compete with different strategies”. What is argued in this thesis is that they are in fact not, 
and that to be able to plan for long-term success this should be understood. The situation 
resembles a form of game-theory, where to not act (invest to telematics) leads to definitive 
short-term profit, whereas acting can lead to several other options including smaller, larger 
or equal profit with little or no amount of information on the probability of those 
possibilities. However, there is a chance nevertheless, that an outsider will be the first 
mover in this field. A party which does not benefit from the current status quo. This could 
be for example a foreign insurance company, already equipped with the right partnerships 
and experience from larger markets, where the technology is already in wider use. Or, this 
could happen through a party with no previous affiliations with insurance market (such as a 
car manufacturer). Also other disruptive innovations on cars might change the competition 
before telematics has been applied. To help consider these challenges we will discuss three 
concrete points to take into consideration for any Finnish insurance company, illustrated 
below. 
 
Table 4: Recommendations for Finnish insurance companies 
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A) An Insurance company should be prepared by making tests on telematics-based 
insurances. As we have discussed on the findings of this thesis and about the literature over 
business model innovation, it is very hard or near impossible to tell beforehand how the 
consumers’ will feel towards the product, or how much trouble are they willing to do to 
reduce their payments. Also, as proposed by the findings it is not impossible that an 
outsider would enter the Finnish market with telematics based insurance products. As 
stated in the theoretical framework, question about imitation will become very current for 
the companies after one of their competitors or an outsider embraces the innovation. Also, 
as written by Chesborough and Rosenbloom (2002) for example, flexibility and continuous 
analysis is important after the initial launch. Surely, doing initial tests can help to 
understand how far the customers are willing to go themselves to reduce their payments; 
whether the driving behavior truly changes and how much trouble they are willing to go 
themselves, helping to conduct the ongoing analysis after a decision to imitate would be 
done. Also the tests would tell more on how to plan risk scoring: according to some of the 
interviewees, the amount of driving and the place where the driver drives are the only 
factors that truly matter.  
Perhaps, if that holds true, a simple plug-in device or an app, could measure enough 
information instead of a heavy and complicated black-box. These and other technical 
questions can only be found out only by doing tests. In a nutshell: one of the insurance 
companies can decide only from their own part whether or not to sell telematics-based 
insurances. As long as the market moves as one and is beneficial for the participants they 
can be fairly sure, but not completely sure, that their direct competitors will not engage in 
it either. Outside the industry or foreign competitors then again, do not benefit from the 
current situation, and for them taking some market share with the new products or 
disturbing the current profitable state of competition would be a possibility and not a threat 
to their current profits. None of the companies can therefore completely “lay back” but 
they should be prepared to imitate if their competitors decide to take the technology in use. 
As Jenkins (2014) proposed imitation requires some form of innovation as well to be 
successful. To know what innovative features are needed, the company is surely better off 
after conducting some tests.  
B) An insurance company should make deals and form connections with future 
stakeholders in the field of telematics. Insurance companies are experts in risk 
management, risk scoring, efficient underwriting and investing as efficient partnerships 
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could secure that the innovation would be harder to imitate as suggested by Teece (2010), 
Jenkins (2014) and others. Securing right partnerships would also benefit the company if 
they were the first to innovate, maximizing the possible first-mover advantage. The 
insurance companies are not experts in technical issues of telematics. The important 
stakeholders in this case would be at least the manufacturers of the telematics devices 
(plug-in/app/black box) and car manufacturers of next generation vehicles with in-built 
telematics. Both of these groups should be contacted. Especially with car manufacturers a 
secured partnership would also reduce the risk that they would become a new competitor 
meaning a reduced risk of outside competition in the field of insurances. .  
C) An insurance company should diversify away from car insurances. This 
recommendation rises from the finding that currently the car insurances are the most 
profitable products for the companies and looking for new value in that field could harm 
the profitable business model as discussed. In other, less contested fields, finding or 
creating new customer value in the way as discussed in the literature synthesis of this 
thesis (for example by Kim & Mauborgne, 1999 and Chesborough, 2010), would not harm 
the whole business model of the company, but give possibilities to rise their market share. 
As we have discussed, the role of the car is uncertain in the coming decades. In short-term, 
car insurances will surely stay as the main source of revenue when compared to other 
insurances, but in the long-term it is impossible to know what is going to happen. As 
explained by the interviewees, the youth already has a different attitude towards cars than 
the previous generations and automated cars are not a fantasy but a reality, as the partly 
automated Tesla’s have hit the roads. So there is a possibility that the older generation does 
not want to switch normal insurance to telematics and the younger generation does not get 
a car as probably, and finally an automated car will enter the market with such low risks, 
that the manufacturer can carry the risk themselves or the premium for the companies will 
get very low. Although it is hard to state the probability for this event, it is clear that 
although car insurances were important to companies already back in John S. Bickley’s 
writing of “an overview of the insurance market” in 1967, it will probably have a very 
different role for them in the coming decades. Health insurances for example are still much 
less uncontested than car insurances in Finland and as many of the companies have already 
done, they can try to use innovative measures to conquer more ground in that field..   
These points naturally have their limitations. For example negotiations and partnership 
deals with foreign companies might be easier to do for larger companies than smaller ones. 
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However, the points underline the overall situation and the most important point in this 
thesis for insurance companies in Finland: that they are, despite being more isolated than 
some other businesses, not immune to megatrends such as digitalization and globalization. 
New applications of technology can change the competition from the within but also bring 
new contesters to the race. As we have discussed in this this thesis, the business models of 
the companies have been molded the way they are by regulation and then these models 
have molded the competition the way it is today. For a company that benefits from the 
current system (basically all of them) to invest in disruptive technology poses a risk. 
However, not to be prepared to an outside change, either in a form of a new competitor, 
another company changing their business model, or disruptive transportation technology, is 
an even greater risk. The theory created in this thesis in not just applicable to this narrow 
field but can help to understand other similar situations, which we will have a closer look 
on in the next part of this chapter.  
10.4 Applicability of the mechanism to other fields  
 
Naturally one field where the theory made in this thesis could be suitable is the health 
industry which was already discussed earlier in this thesis. What is different about health 
industry is, that the regulations are possibly even more binding then with insurances. What 
was argued in this thesis was not that the regulations would be so tough that it would give 
no possibilities for a diverse range of business models but it encourages a certain type of 
business model which then creates certain kind of competition. With medical practices and 
especially with medicine the restrictions can be even greater. Still, as with insurance 
business, two questions remain for the healthcare industry; to what extent does the 
regulation really define the business models, and to what extent do the managers of the 
company want to keep up the current profitable status quo? To study this, the models 
founded in this study would surely prove to be helpful.  
Another example could be the Finnish taxi industry. Regulation forces the drivers and the 
taxi entrepreneurs to get permits and licenses to operate. The purpose of this is to limit the 
operators so that they can be observed and the customers guaranteed a good service.  
Simultaneously this does raise the prices as well, making the business more profitable for 
the taxi entrepreneurs. For many years the system did work to an extent; hailing an illegal 
cab was maybe cheaper, but there was no guarantee of quality. That person could be just 
anyone, whereas a legal taxi is more or less authorized. However, as disruptive 
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technologies like Uber have arrived, the situation has reversed from customers’ 
perspective; the “illegal taxis” are no more just random people from the streets, but the 
customer can actually see whether other people have validated the driver or not using the 
Uber’s 5-star rating system. The consumer can then accept or decline the Uber based on its 
rating. Normal taxi lacks this system making Uber better not just in terms of price but in 
customer value as well. This puts the Finnish taxi-companies in a difficult spot; should 
they try to lobby as hard as they can to keep the old profitable system, which then again 
could be crumbling away anyway (if Uber in Helsinki is a sign) or should they embrace the 
disruptive technologies and stop lobbying for the restrictive regulations? Again, in 
comparison with the situation observed in this study, the restrictions are stricter with the 
taxi-industry than with insurances. With insurances the companies just decide not to 
engage in anything too drastic or to shake up the profitable competition dynamics as we 
have observed, but with taxis to work without a taxi permit is outright illegal (Kammonen, 
2016) and to get a permit might prove difficult as well. Still, the underlying principles are 
the same in both cases; to be prepared, to actively change or to stick in the past are all 
possibilities, and to evaluate the possible consequences the companies operating in these 
fields need to understand the regulatory forces affecting their business models and 
competitive measures.  
Finally, an example could be the banking services of consumer clients. The regulation here 
is less clear to grasp than in the previous examples, but sure it can be agreed that there are 
barriers of entry to create a consumer bank. Not just in terms of regulation, but in terms of 
volume like with insurances; an insurance company needs the many paying customers to 
pay the damages of the few. A bank needs many deposits to loan money to them and others 
(in basic principle). However, now as companies like Facebook are entering peer-to-peer 
payments (Economist, 2015), and bitcoin and crowdfunding services are becoming 
popular, the consumer banks too must look themselves too the lenses of this regulation-
business model–competition cycle that has been studied and presented in this thesis. To 
simply keep up from the old business model without understanding the reasons for its 
restriction and the possibilities of its future could prove to be a great mistake.   
This study was conducted because from a research motivation stemmed a research question 
that needed to be answered. The question would have been impossible to answer without a 
new mechanism which was created in this thesis. This mechanism is not, however, just a 
mechanism to solve the particular question on the Finnish insurance market, but is in fact a 
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multi-purpose tool that can be used in other environments as well as demonstrated in this 
part of the study. In the next chapter we will conclude the thesis.  
11. CONCLUSION  
 
 
11.1 Research summary  
 
The main goal of this research was to find out answer to the research question “how slow-
moving or traditional industries and companies react on disruptive technological 
advancements?” through the lenses of telematics car insurances and the Finnish insurance 
market. What was found out was, that the slow-moving or traditional companies can feel 
distrust towards possibilities offered by new technologies, as they do not want to risk their 
current profitable business models. This feeling is emphasized if the companies feel 
protected because of barriers of entry from regulation.  
To help the reader to understand what questions the solving process of the main research-
question holds three sub questions were created as well. These are a) how are the business 
models of regulatory bound companies constructed? b) How does the similarity of business 
models affect competition? And c) How do slow-moving or traditional companies react to 
the innovativeness of their competitors? We know now, through the literature review and 
the findings of this study, that regulation can affect the business models of the companies 
to be alike. This alikeness of the business models leads to similar types of competition, 
which then means that when it comes to innovation, imitation might be the main objective 
for these companies. From those answers to the sub-questions the answer to the main 
research question is possible to be answered.  
By studying literature on new technology as a competitive advantage, business model 
innovation, regulation as an obstacle to business model innovation, and literature on the 
relationship between imitation and innovation, it was possible to generate a theoretical 
framework depicted in the Figure 2. Through this synthesis, we could understand the 
questions companies face when encountering new disruptive technologies. It could be 
noted, that companies with profitable business model, and especially with regulatory 
protection have very little incentives to engage in new innovations or business model 
innovation. If the regulation does not rule innovations out entirely, this leads to a situation 
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where the company needs to focus on questions related on imitation, in case its competitors 
or an outsider will enter the market with the new technology.  
We then compared the theoretical framework to literature about the insurance business and 
the telematics based insurance for two reasons: firstly, to understand some universal 
principles on insurance business and secondly, to understand what makes the Finnish 
insurance market unique. What was noticed, was that according to the literature telematics-
based insurances would be a suitable way for insurance companies to find or create value 
for customers, and that the companies would not face the setting proposed in the 
theoretical framework. After going through the findings, it was discovered, that the Finnish 
insurance companies share many similarities with the cases explained in the insurance 
literature: price and risk management are main issues for all and the management and the 
customers shared similar ambiguities over the new technology. What made the Finnish 
insurance companies different, and what made all the difference in this study, was, that the 
Finnish regulation is tighter than in other countries, and most importantly, very much 
perceived as such. Another main difference was, that the Finnish companies are profiting 
from the current state of things, meaning there is less incentives to escape or change the 
current competitive situation and more incentives to conserve it as long as possible.  
The research in this thesis was done with seven interviews with insurance managers from 
different insurance companies in Finland representing almost all of the Finnish car 
insurance market. The data-analysis of those interviews was done through the principles of 
grounded theory. The main categories that rose from the interviews were the regulatory 
boundaries of the Finnish insurance market, similarities in the companies’ business models 
and differentiation, customer behavior and the changing business. Based on these findings 
two models were constructed, illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5. The purpose of the 
Figure 4 is to illustrate the similarity in the business models: the main blocs for all 
companies were their sales channels, the efficiency in same processes and the price of their 
products. Figure 5 then again illustrates the competition dynamics of the companies: all the 
companies are apart from each other but still inside a relatively small area. To engage in 
telematics would mean breaking the current beneficial dynamics between the companies.  
Although the answer to the research question was found out with the help of the context of 
the Finnish insurance market and telematics insurances, the goal was not to answer just 
why telematics-based insurances have not yet arrived in Finland, but to also bring up a 
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mechanism that could be applicable to other similar situations in other fields of business. 
The findings of this study together with the theoretical framework enabled us to widen the 
mechanism found to other fields, where regulation is a strong force affecting the creation 
of the business models too. The examples named were the health care industry, Finnish 
taxi-industry and consumer banking.  
11.2 Limitations of this study  
 
This study answers well how slow-moving or traditional companies see themselves in 
relation to disruptive technologies, and the mechanism that is formed with the findings 
from the Finnish insurance market helps to understand and explain other situations where 
regulation or other external force plays a role in business model and competition definer. 
Still it should be noted that there might be issues about the Finnish insurance business that 
limits the scope of this study. One aspect could be that the respondents did not want to 
share everything with this study, such as information about tests on telematics or about 
future product launches. It was also agreed with all the interviewees that on basis of 
anonymity and competitive advantages, anything about secret project developments or 
tests would not be asked, nor were the respondents expected to tell anything about them. 
Also in this study, the role of managerial decisions is emphasized over customer behavior. 
All the evidence that has been gathered here does support this choice as it is known most 
issues with customer behavior are unknown until the product is actually launched (for 
example Chesborough, 2010). Some other researches could however look this study more 
from a marketing than a strategic decision-making standpoint.  
11.3 Possibilities for future research 
 
One aspect, which was out of the scope of this study, but would surely be interesting to 
look closer, is the relation of the HR-policies and strategies of Finnish insurance 
companies. The questions for the respondents were designed in this study so, that it would 
be possible to find out as much as possible about their business models and the business 
environment of the Finnish insurance market. One issue, which was realized later, was that 
albeit the interest of this thesis was about the competitive advantages the companies had in 
comparison to each other, and what they considered to be the important resources in 
creating this advantage, none of the interviewees mentioned their personnel. Customer 
service did came up, but not as in “our customer service representatives are great” but as in 
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that the service itself is great – implying the importance of processes and policies over 
people. Some also brought up the “simplicity” and “traditionalistic characters” of the 
business. As said, it is impossible to say anything about this based on the evidence that was 
gathered for this study, but it would seem like many of the companies see that “the 
business makes itself, as it always has” and not the people. If this holds true, it might also 
have an effect on the way the companies view innovations and the renewal of the business. 
An insurance company does not own oil-fields like an energy company or airplanes like an 
airline nor any other very expensive fixed assets, so one would expect the employees to be 
the most important resource for them, and their HR-policy to be one of the competitive 
advantages. If it were that this is not the case, this would surely give an important and 
intriguing topic for a research.  
Another possible research could be some other conservative sector of business which does 
not necessarily embrace change (for example one of the industries were the scope of the 
theory of this study reaches). For example, a similar study than this could be made about 
the Finnish consumer banks to see how they are prepared for the future trends like cashless 
environment, paying through social media services, bitcoin payments, crowdfunding or the 
possible declining trust for hedge funds by the millennials. Banking and insurances share 
similarities in that both industries are very old in their basic nature, but that the business 
environment around them is changing fast.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Appendix 1: Interview outline  
 
Haastattelu nauhoitetaan muistiinpanotarkoituksessa. Sekä vastaajille, että näiden 
yrityksille taataan anonymiteetti tutkimuksessa.  
 
1) Kerro itsestäsi, kuka olet ja mitä teet?  
 
2) Miten kuvailisit vakuutusalan kilpailua Suomessa yleisesti tällä hetkellä?  
 
3) Pitävätkö seuraavat väitteet mielestäsi paikkaansa (Kilpailusta Suomessa)?  
 
a. Onko vakuutusyhtiöillä painetta pitää hintoja ”liian alhaalla?” 
b. Onko vakuutusala Suomessa saturoitunut (matured)?  
 
4) Mikä luo teille eniten kilpailuetua suhteessa kilpailijoihinne (resurssit)?  
 
5) Mitkä ovat mielestäsi suomalaisen vakuutusyhtiön tärkeimmät prosessit 
(toimintamalli)?  
 
6) Miten yhtiönne tekee tulosta?  
 
a. Yhtiönne yhdistetty kulusuhde oli viime vuonna x. Mitkä toimenpiteet ovat 
mielestäsi tärkeimpiä tämän parantamiseksi? 
b. Onko yhdistetty kulusuhde ylipäätään hyvä mittari vakuutusyhtiön 
suorituskyvystä?  
 
7) Mikä on sinun mielestäsi asiakkaan saama hyöty hänen ostaessaan teiltä 
autovakuutuksen?  
a. Mitä emotionaalisia ja funktionaalisia elementtejä liittyy autovakuutuksen 
hankintaan?  
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8) Onko suomalaisilla vakuutusyhtiöillä tendenssiä kopioida strategiat suhteessa 
toisiinsa (markkinoiden saturointi)?  
 
a. Pyrittekö  katsomaan omaa liiketoimintamallianne ”ulkopuolelta”?  
b. Katsotaanko mallia ulkomaisista vakuutusyhtiöistä?  
 
9) Mitä ajattelet: ovatko suomalaiset vakuutusyhtiöt valmiita kokeilemaan täysin uutta 
liiketoimintamallia, joko muuttamalla vanhaa tai testaamalla sitä vanhan rinnalla? 
Onko sinulla antaa esimerkkejä?  
 
10) Kuinka tuttuja sinulle ovat telematiikkaan perustuvat vakuutukset PAYD, UBI 
yms?  
 
11) Mitä hyötyjä näet asiakkaan kannalta PAYD-vakuutuksissa?  
 
a. Entä vakuutusyhtiön?  
12) Mitä muutoksia nykyiseen liiketoimintamalliin koet tulevan?  
 
13) Mitkä koet suurimpina haasteina telematiikkaan pohjautuvien autovakuutusten 
käyttöönotossa?  
 
a. (Teknologian järjestäminen)?  
b. (Kilpailisiko uusi tuote liian vahvasti vanhan kanssa?)  
14) Miten suomalaisen vakuutusyhtiön sinusta tulisi tuoda tällainen tuote markkinoille?  
a. Nopeus (first-mover advantage)  
b. Markkinointi 
c. Tuote: suomalainen vai ulkomaalainen palikka  
15) Omasta mielestäsi, kuinka valmiita suomalaiset kuluttajat olisivat tälläiselle 
tuotteelle?  
a. Yksityisyydensuoja  
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b. Maksaminen – pelkkä alennus vai alennuksen tai noston riski?  
 
16) Jotkut tutkijat ovat syyttäneet Yhdysvaltalaisia vakuutusyhtiöitä siitä, etteivät ne 
ole julkaisseet UBI-tuotteitaan tarpeeksi läpinäkyvinä: miten kuluttajat voivat 
muuttaa ajokäyttäytymistään jos eivät tiedä mitä heistä mitataan? Koetko, että 
Suomessa tällainen tuote olisi mahdollista julkaista läpinäkyvänä?  
a. Mitä tietoa voidaan antaa asiakkaalle? 
b. Kuka omistaa tiedon viime kädessä?  
c. Luuletko, että lainsääädäntö on Suomessa valmis tähän (uuteen 
teknologiaan)?  
 
17) Lopulta: Koetko teknologisen muutoksen uhkana vai mahdollisuutena?  
 
